QUEENSLAND LAW REFORM COMMISSION

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ACTIONS AGAINST THE CROWN

REPORT NO. 24

17 April 1978

A Report of the Queensland Law Reform Commission

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QUEENSLAND

A REPORT OF THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION

ON THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIONS AGAINST THE CROWN
AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST
GOVERNMENT ACT 1866

Q.L.R.C. 24
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The Honourable W.D. Lickiss, M.L.A.,
Minister for Justice and Attorney-General,
BRISBANE.

The former Minister for Justice
and Attorney-General has requested the Law Reform Commission
to examine the procedure for appointing a Nominal Defendant
in actions against the Crown and to replace the Claims
Against Government Act of 1866 with a more modern Statute.
It was also his suggestion that the replacement Statute
provide for actions by the Crown and to deal with such
matters as cost in Crown proceedings, recovery of
estreated recognizances, as well as any other changes
which the passing of years had rendered necessary or
desirable.

The Commission forwards herewith
its report comprising a draft bill and commentary which set
out its recommendations in this regard.

A working paper was previously
circulated to persons and bodies known to be interested in
the subject and some comments and suggestions were
received.

Consideration has been given to
suggestions in a letter dated 13th October, 1977 from the
Solicitor General. The insertion of clause 2(4) and clause
6(3) results from this letter for reasons given in the
commentary. The letter has also dealt with the decision of
the High Court in Grant v. Downs (1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 198 and
asks that provision be made in the Bill to restore the
Crown and Crown Corporations to the position they enjoyed
as regards legal professional privilege prior to this
decision. However as is explained in the commentary to
clause 7, the Commission recommends that the proposed
legislation should be enacted without the inclusion of any
special exemption in favour of the Crown or other Corporations
in the matter of discovery so that the existing principles
which have prevailed since 1866 will continue to apply.

Signed : The Hon. Mr. Justice D.G. Andrews  
          (Chairman)

Signed : Mr. B.H. McPherson, Q.C.  
          (Member)

Signed : Dr. J.M. Morris  
          (Member)

Signed : Mr. G.N. Williams  
          (Member)

Signed : Mr. J.J. Rowell  
          (Member)

Signed : Mr. J.R. Nosworthy  
          (Member)

Dated at BRISBANE  17th April, 1978
CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT

Commentary on Draft Bill

INTRODUCTION

In the constitutional context of the Australia States, the expression "the Crown" is used as a synonym for "the Government" (cf. Hogg: Liability of the Crown, pp. 9-10; Ryder v. Foley (1906) 4 C.L.R. 422). Although the Crown is regarded as a corporation: see Re Mason [1928] 1 Ch.385, 398, at common law there were several obstacles to proceedings by a citizen in order to obtain legal redress against the Crown. One was the rule that the King could not be impleaded in his own courts. This difficulty was to some extent overcome by the procedure by way of petition of right, which, however, was not available where the wrong complained of was the commission of a tort. In the field of tortious liability, the maxim applied was the "the King can do no wrong", in consequence of which it was held that the Crown could neither commit nor authorise the commission of a tort. A further possible obstacle to redress was the decision in Sloman v. Government of New Zealand (1875) 1 C.P.D. 563, to the effect that a colonial government was not a corporation and could not effectively be served with process. The decision in Sloman's case, although criticized by Professor F.W. Hailman, never seems to have been overruled, although in Australia it has probably been displaced by the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution, which clearly enough conceive of the States as entities capable of suing and of being sued: see particularly s.75(iv) of the Constitution; and cf. Commonwealth v. Rhind (1966) 119 C.L.R. 584.

Had the foregoing state of affairs prevailed it would have been intolerable in a society in which, in and after the nineteenth century, the government has become increasingly involved in trading and in a host of other activities which bring it into frequent contact with individual citizens to whom a wrong may be done. Fortunately, at an early date each of the then colonies of Australia and New Zealand enacted legislation enabling claims to be made and enforced at law and in equity against the "Government" of the colony, or, in other words, the Crown. This legislation provided for a petition to the Governor praying for the appointment of a nominal defendant, against whom proceedings may be brought and providing for satisfaction of judgments out of Government moneys. The effect has been to overcome or, perhaps more accurately, to circumvent both the rule that the King could not be impleaded in his own courts and the rule that a colonial government was not an entity capable of being sued. Any remaining difficulty arising from the common law immunity of the Crown in respect of tortious wrongs disappeared when in Farnell v. Bowman (1887) 12 App.Cas.643 the Privy Council held that the colonial legislation rendered the Government of a colony liable to be sued in an action of tort.

In Queensland the legislation enabling claims to be instituted and enforced against the Crown is the Claims against Government Act of 1866 (29 Vic. No.23). Section 2 of the Act provides for a petition by any person "having or deeming himself to have any just claim or demand against the Government" praying for the appointment of a nominal defendant. The same section provides for appointment of a nominal defendant by notification in the Government Gazette. Although the word used in s.2 is "may" and so appears to import a discretion, the proviso to the section automatically makes the Treasurer the nominal defendant if no such
notification is made by the Governor within one month after presentation of the petition.

In practice the procedure provided by the Act of 1866 has operated satisfactorily, but it is subject to a few defects. One is the process of petition, appointment of a nominal defendant, and gazetted appears to be a quite unnecessary, wasteful and expensive step. Another is that the appointed nominal defendant may die before determination of the action, in which event a further appointment becomes necessary. Another disadvantage is that, particularly in cases where urgent relief such as an injunction is sought, it is not practicable or possible to follow the statutory procedure for appointing a nominal defendant because of the delay involved. In such cases, it has been held proper for the proceedings to be brought against the Attorney-General as representing the State: see Australian Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Queensland [1916] St.R.Qd.135, but, if this so, then there seems to be little compelling need for retaining the present system of appointment of nominal defendants for the purpose of proceedings against the Crown.

The Bar Association of Queensland has recommended in a memorandum dated 9th June, 1976 that the Act of 1866 be repealed and new legislation enacted providing for proceedings against the Crown to be brought against it under the name of the State of Queensland, without the necessity for appointment of a nominal defendant. This recommendation has been considered and is concurred in by the Solicitor General, who has approved a memorandum dated 7th June, 1976 prepared on this subject by one of his legal officers Mr. K.M. O'Shea. The former Minister for Justice and Attorney-General (Hon. W.E. Knox) has in his memorandum dated 23rd July, 1976 also approved the proposal for abolition of the procedure of appointment of a nominal defendant, and its replacement by a procedure for bringing actions simply against the State of Queensland, together with the repeal of the Act of 1866 and the substitution of a statute in more modern form.

In addition to the proposal for modernising the procedure for suing the Crown, the foregoing memorandum also recommends the enactment of new legislation simplifying the procedure for enforcement of claims by the Crown and the recovery of moneys in the form of forfeited recognizances, etc., due to the Crown. The existing procedure is hedged about by many archaisms which were only partly eliminated by the early New South Wales enactment entitled the Costs in Crown Suits Act 1856 (20 Vic. No.3) and The Crown Remedies Act, 1874 - 1976 (38 Vic. No. 13). Part III of the Bill, which has been drawn to a considerable extent upon the provisions of Part I of the Victorian Crown Proceedings Act 1958 (No. 6237), is designed to improve the present state of Queensland law in this regard.
PART I - PRELIMINARY

Short title and commencement

1. The existing Act of 1866 is entitled "Claims against Government Act". Because the proposed new Act will be concerned with suits by as well as against the Crown, the old title is inappropriate. We consider that the title "Crown Proceedings Act" is preferable. It is the title used in the comparable legislation of Victoria, Western Australia and the United Kingdom.

2. Division of Act.

3. Repeals and Savings. The three existing statutes - Claims against Government Act, 1866, Crown Remedies Act - 1974 - 1976, and the Costs in Crown Suits Act, 1856, will be repealed, or, in the case of the latter (New South Wales) statute, will cease to apply.

The effect of Clauses 3(3) and 3(4) will be to apply the provisions of the new Act to proceedings instituted after the new Act commences, irrespective of when the cause of action arose, but the Act of 1866 will continue to apply to actions in respect of which notification of appointment of a nominal defendant has been gazetted prior to the commencement of the new Act.

In a letter dated 13th October, 1977, the Solicitor General, in commenting on the Commission's Working Paper, drew attention to s.4(2) of the Subcontractors Charges Act 1974 - 1976 added by way of amendment in 1976 (Act no. 38, s.4). Section 4(2) is as follows:-

"(2) Notwithstanding The Claims Against Government Act, a proceeding under this Act against the Crown may be brought against the Permanent Head of the Department concerned in the name of the office he occupies as such Permanent Head.

Where it is proposed to institute a proceeding under this Act against a Permanent Head, he shall for the purposes of that proceeding be deemed to be the nominal defendant duly appointed under The Claims Against Government Act and the provisions of that Act shall apply in respect of that proceeding."

This represents a further, and different, procedure for prosecuting claims against the Crown in the specific instance of proceedings under the Act in question. We consider it most undesirable that such special procedures should be retained when the object of the legislation proposed in the Bill is to simplify actions against the Crown by removing the defects mentioned earlier in this Report. Accordingly, we consider that s.4(2) of the Subcontractors Charges Act should be repealed, with the consequence that claimants against the Crown under that Act will make such claims against the "State of Queensland" and serve them in the manner provided in cl.6(2).

The provisions of subclause 4 of clause 3 are intended to cater for proceedings already commenced.

4. Application. The effect of the decision of the Full Court in Sundell v. Queensland Housing Commission (No.5) [1955] St.R.Qd. 162, and of the High Court in Commonwealth v. Rhind (1956) 119 C.L.R. 584, appears to be that a corporation which represents the Crown enjoys all the privileges and immunities of the Crown: see the
discussion of this point in this Commentary under "any proceedings" in relation to cl.7 of the Bill. The Act of 1866 did not apply to proceedings against Crown corporations (which were probably comparatively rare phenomena in 1866). Hence, it seems clear enough to follow that, in litigation by or against a Crown corporation which is invested with the privileges of the Crown, that corporation would be entitled to the very privileges, from discovery, etc., which it is a principal object of the 1866 Act to remove in any other proceedings against the Crown. The point appears never to have arisen directly in any reported case although the two decisions mentioned plainly imply the foregoing conclusion.

It is quite anomalous that a Crown corporation should enjoy a privilege which is now by statute denied to the Crown itself. Hence cl.4(2) is intended to ensure that the procedural provisions of cl.7, 8 and 9 of the Bill will apply to Crown corporations and so place them on the same footing as the Crown and all other litigants.

5. Interpretation. This comprises definitions including a definition of the term "Crown corporation."

**PART II - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BY AND AGAINST THE CROWN**

6. Proceedings by and against the Crown. The proposed clauses 6 and 7 follow in substance the wording of s.5 of the Act of 1866. The following differences should however be observed:

"Subject to the provisions of any other Act". These words have been introduced to preserve cases in which by some specific statutory provision a peculiar form of procedure is prescribed (e.g. appeals against an assessment of stamp duty, which are provided for in s.24 of the Stamp Act 1894 - 1976). They will also serve to ensure that claims against statutory corporations which represent the Crown and are able to sue and be sued are brought by or against the statutory corporation in its own name and not by or against the Crown as such.

In his letter dated 13th October, 1977 in which he comments on the Commission's Working Paper and draft Bill, the Solicitor General doubts whether the use of the foregoing introductory words in cl.5(1) is sufficient to achieve the second of the above purposes. He draws attention to s.23(3) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958 (Victoria) and, by implication, suggests that it may be preferable to adopt a similar form of provision.

Upon reflection, we consider that the Solicitor General is justified in his doubts as to the efficacy of the introductory words of cl.6(1) of the draft Bill to achieve the object of ensuring that actions by and against statutory corporations representative of the Crown continue to be brought by and against those corporations and not against the Crown as such or the State of Queensland. However, we respectfully doubt the wisdom of adopting s.23(3) of the Victorian statute. The provision in question is part of a section (which for convenience is set out in full as an appendix to this Report) which may have been intended amongst other matters to resolve the doubts arising from the decision in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. R. [1921] 3K.B.500 as to the liability of the Crown in respect of what are described
as "non-commercial" contracts. The present status of that decision as an authority in law is not entirely clear, and the conflicting considerations in favour of and against its adoption are discussed at length by Hogg: Liability of the Crown, at pp. 129 - 140. Section 23 of the Victorian Act has given rise to some difficulties of interpretation mentioned by Hogg at pp. 142 - 143 of his treatise, and (as mentioned hereafter) the legislation adopts a somewhat different starting point from that taken in the draft Bill and derived from the existing Claims against Government Act 1866. For reasons explained in paragraph 7, we prefer to retain the general form of s.5 of the existing Act, rather than to adopt this aspect of the scheme of the Victorian legislation including s.23.

The problem referred to by the Solicitor General does, however, remain. We suggest that it is possible to resolve it by adding to cl.6 of the Bill a further sub-cl. (3) reading as follows:

"(3) Nothing in this section applies to any claim or proceeding by or against a Crown corporation, constituted by or pursuant to any Act which provides that such corporation may sue or be sued by the name of that corporation."

By way of explanation, it should be observed that cl.6 of the draft Bill is concerned with the means by which claims may be made and enforced by proceedings, and with the means by which process originating such proceedings may be served. If, by virtue of cl.6(3), such means are not available in the case of a Crown corporation, otherwise able to sue and be sued, it seems to us that it will be impossible to sue the Crown in the name of "State of Queensland" in respect of the acts or omissions of such a corporation. This means that all such proceedings will have to be brought against (or by) the relevant corporation in its corporate name, as is contemplated by the particular statute pursuant to which it is incorporated.

"Proceedings" in both cl. 6 and 7 is confined to proceedings of a civil nature.

"Crown". The word "Crown" is used throughout the Act in place of the word "Government" which appeared in the 1866 Act. There are two reasons for this. One is that the word "Government" is, as we have seen, synonymous with "Crown" so far as the Government of Queensland (and other Australian States) is concerned, and was no doubt used in the Act of 1866 only because it was then thought somewhat impudent for a colony of Her Majesty to permit actions against the Crown eo nomine. Such a consideration no longer has the same force in the latter part of the twentieth century and in the prevailing constitutional context.

The second reason is that the Bill proposes the repeal of The Crown Remedies Act 1874 - 1976, and The Costs in Crown Suits Act of 1856, which in substance placed the Crown as plaintiff in the same position as a private citizen for purposes of all litigation. Of these statutes (which will be replaced by the provisions of the proposed new Act) the former requires proceedings to be brought in the name of "The Queen" (s.17), whilst the latter refers to "the Crown". It is preferable that the Crown be uniformly so described throughout the legislation irrespective of whether it is suing as plaintiff or defendant.

The modern legislation of Victoria, Western Australia and New Zealand also uses the term "Crown" in place of "Government".
"by the Crown". Clause 6 will permit of proceedings by the Crown under the name "State of Queensland". Such proceedings are at present possible under the Crown Remedies Act, which however provides in s.5 that debts due to the Crown may be recovered by proceedings commenced by writ of capias and respondendum (ca.re.) issued out of the Supreme Court. This writ, as Mr. O'Shea points out in the memorandum already referred to, is archaic and has as one of its undesirable features the possible arrest of the debtor, a course which is otherwise very seldom possible in purely civil proceedings. The Crown Remedies Act was amended in 1930 by the insertion of s.2A to permit an action to be brought by the Crown in the Magistrates Court in the ordinary way, and there is a similar provision in s.70 of the District Courts Act. The reform proposed by s.8 will produce uniformity of proceedings by the Crown in the Supreme Court and in the other two courts. In view of the provisions of cl.7 and of decisions such as that in Commonwealth v. Anderson (1961) 105 C.L.R.303, we see no need to retain special provisions, such as that in s.13 of the Crown Remedies Act, expressly enabling the Crown to bring proceedings for recovery of land by ordinary action rather than by writ of intrusion or by information.

It should be noted that the provisions of s.5 of the Act of 1866 have in the Bill been separated into two provisions (cll. 3 and 4) for reasons which appear below.

7. Procedure. Section 5 of the Act of 1866 provides that a petitioner may sue a nominal defendant "at law or in equity in any competent court" and that "the proceedings and rights of parties therein shall as nearly as possible be the same and judgment and costs shall follow on either side as in an ordinary case between subject and subject at law or in equity." The reference to "law or equity" appears in the section only for the sake of completeness, and has been held not to exclude actions in Admiralty: South Coast Road Metal Quarries v. Whitfield (1914) 14 S.R. (N.S.W.) 300. With the passing of the Judicature Act of 1876, it has become redundant and the reference thereto has consequently been omitted from cl.7. Section 5 of the 1866 Act (or its equivalent elsewhere) has been held to place the Crown on a footing of substantial equality with the subject in matters of procedure in litigation, e.g. as to discovery: Janieson v. Downie [1923] A.C.691; interrogatories: Fisher v. Tully (1873) 3 Q.S.C.R. 194 (the headnote to the report of this case may be rather too widely expressed); and costs: see Affleck v. The King (1906) 3 C.L.R.608, 630-631.

As regards discovery, the recent decision of the High Court in Grant v. Downs (1976) 61 A.L.J.R. 198 has prompted the Solicitor General in his letter to advance two reasons for proposing that the Crown (and any Crown corporation) be placed by legislation in a position differing from other civil litigants. He argues, first, that the Crown, and in particular Crown instrumentalities, such as the Commissioner for Railways, follows a practice of requiring routine reports from employees with respect to all accidents which occur. The purpose of these reports is partly for use in possible future litigation in respect of the accident, and partly for other reasons, such as departmental inquiries and charges, and in order to comply with statutory obligations. If, as the majority of the High Court in Grant v. Downs appear to suggest, such reports must be discovered unless the sole purpose of their creation is their use in future litigation, then (the Solicitor General submits) the obligation to discover is "unfair" to the Crown.

We understand the suggestion of unfairness to arise from the existence of the practice of making routine reports, which, it is said, is "not always the case in private enterprise". As to this,
we accept that there are probably many enterprises (most of them small) which do not maintain a system of routine reports in the case of accidents. On the other hand there are, to knowledge of members of the Commission, many public companies and other enterprises, as well as local authorities such as the City Council, which are not State-owned, which do maintain such a system, and which operate on a scale and in circumstances as vast and as varied as those affecting the Commissioner for Railways. It would be quite wrong to suggest that such companies, authorities and enterprises should be entitled to claim privilege from discovery in proceedings against them by individual citizens or other bodies; and for the same reason, it is, in our view, quite wrong to suggest that the Crown should be placed in position of special privilege simply because its Departments and instrumentalities, like other bodies, make a practice of requiring routine reports from employees in cases of accident, etc. Nothing in Grant v. Downs, or in the proposed legislation, affects, limits or impinges upon the recognized right of the Crown to claim privilege in respect of documents privileged from discovery in the public interest, e.g. police reports: Hogan v. Dorries [1976] Qd.R.314. This was recognized in Grant v. Downs itself: see (1977) 51 A.L.J.R.198, at p.205.

It should be appreciated that the proposed legislation the subject of the draft Bill and commentary in no respect extends the liability of the Crown to make discovery. Any supposed extension which has occurred follows from the decision in Grant v. Downs, which was concerned with the general law of discovery in its application to all corporations, whether or not the same are not private, statutory or Crown corporations. And, of course, the decision in Grant v. Downs will continue to apply whether or not the proposed legislation is passed.

The Solicitor-General does, however, suggest that the proposed legislation will in effect extend the scope of the discovery which is to be made by the Crown. He makes this suggestion because the proposed legislation will permit of actions against the "State of Queensland" in place of the nominal defendant appointed under the existing Act of 1866. The Solicitor General's memorandum proceeds:

"The question also arises - what are the documents within the possession or power of the "State of Queensland" in an action? The Crown may have to have a general search of all its departmental files on which there might possibly be "tucked away" some memorandum or other document on the matter or is the Crown to be in the same position to that of some large corporation which is sued? If one takes the position as it presently exists, then surely a Nominal Defendant, say the Director-General of Education, who is sued for an injury sustained by a child at school would not have to go perhaps through the records of the Department of Children's Services, the Works Department or any other Department which, depending upon the type of factual situation involved, might have a file which just could have something in it which could strengthen the Plaintiff's case.

It may be, of course, that the files of a Department coming within the ministerial responsibility of some other Minister would not be readily made available to the particular Nominal Defendant, so that it could be argued such files were not in his possession or power."
With respect, there can be no doubt the substitution of the State of Queensland for a nominal defendant in suits against the Crown will have no such effect as is suggested. Although the nominal defendant appointed in practice is almost invariably a head or other permanent officer of a Government department, he in no sense represents that department. What he represents is "the Government" against which the claim or demand is made: see s.2 of the Act of 1866; that is to say he is "a nominal defendant representing the Crown before the Court": see Jameson v. Downie [1923] A.C.691, at p.694, per Lord Buckmaster on behalf of the Privy Council. It follows that as the representative of the Crown or Government, the nominal defendant is bound to make discovery of all documents in the possession or power of the Crown or Government, and not merely those held in the Department to which he is attached. If the position were otherwise, the Crown could always avoid its obligation to discover by appointing a nominal defendant employed in a department quite dissociated from the events the subject of the litigation; or by transferring the nominal defendant to another such department after litigation had commenced.

In view of foregoing, and with great respect to the comments of the Solicitor General, it is our firm recommendation that the proposed legislation should be enacted without the inclusion of any special exemption in favour of the Crown or other corporations in the matter of discovery. In other words, that the existing principles, which have prevailed in this context in Queensland since 1866 and which will be preserved by the proposed legislation should continue to apply.

The Victorian Crown Proceedings Act in ss.22 and 23 uses a slightly different formula for expressing the principle that proceedings by and against the Crown should be regulated by the procedure governing suits between subject and subject. In so far as this concerns the court in which proceedings are to be commenced, we have adopted the Victorian provision in cl. 7(a), but otherwise we prefer to retain in cl. 7(b) the general form of the original s.5 of the 1866 Act, the meaning of which has been well settled by judicial decisions over the period of a century or more since it was passed. The following observations may, however, be made on cl.7:--

"court". The word court is defined in cl.5 so as to include "tribunal" and so cover proceedings not in a court strictly so called, e.g. arbitration proceedings.

"any proceedings". Difficulties sometimes arise from the express provisions of statutes establishing and incorporating particular bodies for specific Governmental purposes. For example, s.9(2) of the State Housing Act, 1945 - 1974 declares the State Housing Commission to represent the Crown and to be a corporation capable of suing and being sued; but in s.9(4) provides that it shall have all the privileges of the Crown. In Sundell v. Queensland Housing Commission (No.5) [1955] St.R.Qd.162, the Full Court held that the Commission enjoyed as one of these privileges the immunity of the Crown from seizure of its property in execution. Taken to its logical conclusion this means that the Crown's privilege from making discovery or paying costs is also available to such a corporation, and such a conclusion is consistent with the approach adopted by Barwick C.J. in Commonwealth v. Rhind (1966) 119 C.L.R.584, 600, in the case of a Commonwealth Crown corporation. As mentioned earlier, what is anomalous about this state of affairs is that the Crown as such does not enjoy such immunity in proceedings under the Act of 1866, but proceedings against a statutory corporation are not brought against the Crown under that Act, but against the corporation established by the relevant Act which constitutes it. Even if the decision in Sundell's case cannot be taken to re-invest the Crown with all
the foregoing privileges, it is obviously desirable to place the matter beyond doubt, particularly because there are so many Crown corporations which by statute are given the same form of privilege, e.g. the Commissioner for Railways: see Railways Act 1914 - 1972 s.8(1). It is for this reason that we have thought it necessary in effect to subdivide s.5 of the Act of 1866 into separate clauses 6 and 7, introducing the latter with the words "In any proceedings by or against the Crown ....", and in cl.4(2) to express the sections as applying notwithstanding the provisions of any other Act. Otherwise the provisions of cl.7 would apply only to proceedings against the Crown under the proposed legislation and not to proceedings against a special statutory corporation which under the statute incorporating it is declared to represent the Crown and enjoy its privileges.

"rights of appeal". Section 25 of the Victorian Crown Proceedings Act specifically places rights of appeal on the same footing as other rights of parties in Crown proceedings. We consider this a useful addition and have consequently included in cl.7(b) an express reference to "rights of appeal", "appeal" being itself defined in cl.5 of the Bill.

8. Nature of relief. Clause 8 follows in substance the existing provisions of s.7 of the 1866 Act. There was at one time a doubt whether an injunction might be granted against the Crown, but this doubt must, as regards Queensland, be regarded as having been set at rest by the decision of the Full Court in Australian Alliance Co. Ltd. v. A.G. (Qld.) [1916] St.R.Qd.135. Out of abundance of caution cl.8 expressly refers to relief by injunction, and we have, for completeness, included a reference to declarations, a form of relief which was not available in 1866.

9. Satisfaction of judgments. There are some differences in the provisions of various jurisdictions as to the mode of satisfying judgment against the Crown. As far as the Commission is aware, no such difficulty has hitherto been encountered under the existing provisions of s.8 of the Act of 1866, and cl.9 of the Bill simply repeats those provisions in modern form.

PART III - RECOVERY BY THE CROWN OF OTHER DEBTS

10. Fines to be recoverable by judgment. Section 3 of The Crown Remedies Act is concerned with recovery by the Crown of fines imposed "otherwise than by judgment or conviction of the court". Instances of fines imposed otherwise than by judgment or conviction must needs be rare and the form which appears in the Schedule to the Act suggests only one case, viz. that of a fine for contempt committed in the face of the court. Evidently such fines are, apart from express statutory provision, not recoverable by judgment.

Clause 10 of the Bill repeats the verbiage of the existing s.3 without substantial alteration.

11. Debts due by recognizance to be recovered by judgment. A recognizance is a bond by which the obligor acknowledges his indebtedness to the Crown and which is subject to a condition of defeasance rendering it void only in event of fulfilment of a specified condition or conditions. The common form of recognizance is the bail bond under which an accused binds himself, with or without sureties, to appear for trial. In the
event of non-appearance or other non-fulfilment of the condition of the recognizance, the recognizance is estreated, i.e., the amount of the recognizance is forfeited, and the goods and chattels of a surety may be distrained and sold to satisfy the amount of the recognizance. Section 4 of the Crown Remedies Act provides for a final judgment in a prescribed form to be signed in the Supreme Court for the amount of such recognizance, and declares that no appeal shall be from such judgment.

Clause 11 of the Bill maintains the foregoing procedure but, also confers a power to order imprisonment of the principal in the event that the amount of the recognizance is not paid. To this extent the clause resembles s.5 of the Victorian Crown Proceedings Act.

12. Relief against forfeiture of recognizance. Section 5 of the Crown Remedies Act authorises the court to order satisfaction to be entered upon a judgment for the amount of the estreated recognizance. However, it is established by authority that there is no discretion in the court to refuse the Crown's application to have the recognizance estreated: see R. v. Ralston [1952] Q.W.N. 48, (where Mack J. indicated that he would have exercised the discretion favourably if he had possessed a discretion in that behalf); and also that s.5 confers on the court no general jurisdiction to order that the judgment be regarded as satisfied or discharged simply because the judgment debtor (whether principal or surety) is unable to pay the amount of the judgment: ex parte Muir [1932] V.L.R. 182.

Cases like R. v. Ralston show the law to be too rigid.
Clause 12 of the Bill, which is modelled on s.5(3) of the Victorian enactment, is designed to confer on the court a discretion to vary or rescind the order forfeiting the recognizance where it is shown to be unjust "in all the circumstances of the case". Clause 12(1) requires the relevant application to be made within 28 days after the forfeiture order first comes to the notice of the principal or surety, and it is for this reason that cl.11(4) postpones the issue of a warrant for recovery of moneys due until 28 days from the date of the order.

13. Forms of warrant. Clause 13 prescribes the form of warrant for use where imprisonment has been ordered under clause 11(1).

14. Application to prior forfeiture. In accordance with s.5(6) of the Victorian Act, cl.14 extends the foregoing provisions to the case of a recognizance forfeited before the commencement of the new Act.

15. Execution of warrant.


17. Duty on receipt of payment. The foregoing provisions, which are derived from subsection 10 to 12 of s.5 of the Victorian Crown Proceedings Act, are self-explanatory.
An Act to simplify proceedings by and against the Crown and
to consolidate and amend the laws relating to such proceedings.

PART I - PRELIMINARY

1. Short title and commencement. (1) This Act may be

(2) This Act shall come into operation on the first day of
1977.

2. Division of Act. This Act is divided into Parts as
follows: --

PART I - PRELIMINARY (ss. 1 - 5)
PART II - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BY AND AGAINST THE CROWN
(ss. 6 - 9)
PART III - RECOVERY BY THE CROWN OF OTHER DEBTS
(ss. 10 - 18)
FIRST SCHEDULE - ACTS REPEALED
SECOND SCHEDULE - FORMS

3. Repeals and savings. (1) The Act specified in Part 1 of
the First Schedule shall cease to apply in the State.

(2) The Acts specified in Part 2 of the First Schedule are to
the extent indicated in that Part repealed.

(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act, this Act applies
to all proceedings whether commenced before or after the
commencement of this Act and in respect of any claim made or
based upon a cause of action arising whether before or after the
commencement of this Act.

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
subsection, where at or before the commencement of this Act :-

(a) notification has appeared in the Government
Gazette of the appointment of a nominal
defendant pursuant to the provisions of the
Claims against Government Act of 1866, all
proceedings consequent upon such notification
may be commenced, continued and enforced as
if this Act had not been passed;

(b) proceedings have, in accordance with subsection
(2) of subsection 4 of the Subcontractors
Charges Act 1974 - 1976, been instituted against
a Permanent Head of Department, such proceedings
may be continued and enforced as if this Act had
not been passed.

4. Application. (1) This Act binds the Crown.

(2) For the purposes of this section and sections 7, 8 and
9 of this Act the term "Crown" shall include any Crown Corporation.

(3) Save as provided in section 6, the provisions of this Act
shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any
Act or enactment or any rule of law, practice or procedure.
5. **Interpretation.** In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -

"appeal" includes appeal, rehearing and review;

"court" includes tribunal;

"Crown" means Crown in right of the State of Queensland;

"Crown corporation" means any body corporate constituted by or pursuant to any Act and representing the Crown or entitled to any of the privileges of the Crown;

"judgment" includes decree, order and award;

"proceedings" means action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature.

**PART II - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BY AND AGAINST THE CROWN**

6. **Proceedings by and against the Crown.** [cf. Vic. No.6232, s.22(1)] (1) Subject to the provisions of any other Act, any claim by or against the Crown may be made and enforced by proceedings by or against the Crown under the title of the "State of Queensland".

(2) In and for the purpose of any such proceedings against the Crown, and writ of summons, plaint, complaint, originating proceeding, process or other document may be served upon the Crown by service thereof upon the Crown Solicitor or person authorised to accept service on his behalf.

(3) Nothing in this section applies to any claim or proceeding by or against a Crown Corporation, constituted by or pursuant to any Act which provides that such Corporation may sue or be sued by the name of that Corporation.

7. **Procedure.** [cf. Vic. No.6323, s.22; Qld. 29 Vic. No.23, s.5] Any proceedings by or against the Crown -

(a) shall be commenced in the court which would have jurisdiction if the proceedings were between subject and subject;

(b) shall be commenced in the same manner, and the proceedings and the rights (including rights of appeal) of the parties therein shall as nearly as possible be the same and judgment and costs shall follow on either side as in ordinary proceedings between subject and subject in such court.

8. **Nature of relief.** [cf. Qld. 29 Vic. No.23, s.7]. In any proceedings by or against the Crown, all necessary judgments may be given, and, according to the nature of the case, shall include every species of relief, whether by way of specific performance, injunction, declaration, restitution of rights or chattels, recovery or delivery of land or chattels, or payments of money or damages, or otherwise.

9. **Satisfaction of judgment.** [cf. Qld. 29 Vic. No.23, s.8] (1) Any judgment decree, order or award for or of any money, damages or costs in proceedings against the Crown shall be
satisfied by the Treasurer by payment out of any moneys —

(a) in his hands for the time being legally applicable thereto; or

(b) which may be voted by Parliament for that purpose.

(2) In the event of any such payment not being duly made by the Treasurer execution may be had and the same may be levied by distress and sale upon any property vested in Her Majesty in right of the State of Queensland other than —

(a) all property used, held occupied or enjoyed or intended so to be by the Governor for the time being;

(b) the Parliamentary buildings at Brisbane, and all property, therein or appertaining thereto or used or occupied therewith for the purposes of Parliament or of the Legislature;

(c) the Supreme Court and other court houses and offices pertaining thereto; and

(d) all prisons within the meaning of the Prisons Act 1958 - 1974, and all property therein or appertaining thereto or used or occupied therewith.

PART III — RECOVERY BY THE CROWN OF OTHER DEBTS

10. Fines to be recoverable by judgment. [cf. Qld. 38 Vic. No.13, s.3; Vict. No.6232, s.4.]. (1) When any fine is imposed on any person otherwise than by a judgment or conviction of some court, a Judge or Magistrate of the court by which or by whom such fine is imposed if the same is not immediately paid shall by writing under his hand in Form 1 of the Second Schedule to this Act or to the like effect certify —

(a) the fact that such fine has been so imposed;

(b) the name and place of residence or business of the person on whom such fine has been so imposed; and

(c) the cause and amount of such fine —

and shall deliver or send such writing to the Attorney-General.

(2) Upon receipt of the writing referred to in subsection (1), the Attorney-General shall cause a final judgment to be entered in a court of competent jurisdiction for the amount of such fine and the costs of entering judgment.

(3) Every such judgment may be in Form 2 of the Second Schedule to this Act or to like effect.

(4) No appeal shall lie or be available in respect of a judgment under this section.

11. Debts due by recognizance to be recovered by judgment. [cf. Qld. 38 Vic. No. 13, s.4; Vict. No.6232, s.5.]. (1) Where a
court is satisfied that a person has failed to observe a condition of a recognizance to Her Majesty the court shall declare the recognizance to be forfeited and shall order that the amount of the recognizance be paid to the registrar of the court or the clerk of the Magistrates Court (as the case requires), forthwith or within such time as the court allows and may further order that in default of payment of that amount in accordance with the order -

(a) in the case of the principal he be imprisoned for the term (not exceeding two years) fixed by the order; and

(b) in the case of a surety that the amount be recoverable by execution against the goods and chattels of the surety.

(2) Every order under subsection (1) shall be in writing in the form or to the effect of Form 3 in the Second Schedule, shall be signed by the Judge or Magistrate presiding, and shall be delivered to the registrar or clerk (as the case requires).

(3) Where a court makes an order under sub-section (1) in the absence of a principal the registrar or clerk (as the case requires) shall send by post addressed to the principal and to each of the sureties (if any) at the respective addresses shown in the recognizance a notice in writing in the form or to the effect of Form 4 in the Second Schedule signed by the registrar or clerk setting forth -

(a) particulars of the order made against the principal and each of the sureties (if any); and

(b) a statement that a warrant of commitment or a warrant of execution (as the case requires) will issue after the expiration of twenty-eight days or such extra time as the Court may have allowed under subsection (1) unless -

(i) the amount due under the order is paid;

(ii) an order is made for the payment of the amount by instalments; or

(iii) application is made under section 12 for the rescission or variation of the order.

(4) Where a court makes an order under subsection (1) of this section 11 in the absence of a principal no warrant shall issue under the order until after the expiration of twenty-eight days from the day the order is made or such extra time as the court may have allowed under the said subsection (1).

12. Relief against forfeiture of recognizance. [cf. Vic. No. 6232, s.5 (3)]. (1) Where a recognizance has been forfeited under subsection (1) of section 11 any principal or surety may at any time within twenty-eight days or such extra time as the court may have allowed under subsection (1) of section 11 after the making of the order or, if the order was made in the absence of the principal or surety, within twenty-eight days after the order first comes to his notice apply -

(i) in the case of an order made by the Supreme Court or the District Court - to a Judge of the Court making the order; or

(ii) in the case of an order made by a Magistrates Court - to a Stipendiary Magistrate -
to vary or rescind the order on the ground that it would be unjust to require him to pay the amount of the recognizance having regard to all the circumstances of the case; and the judge or magistrate may vary or rescind the order and cancel any warrant issued in the case under the provisions of this Part before the warrant so issued is executed.

(2) Every application under subsection (1) shall be in writing in the prescribed form signed by the person making the application, shall set forth the grounds of the application, and shall be lodged with the registrar or clerk of the court concerned (as the case requires).

(3) Not less than 28 days before the hearing of an application under this section the applicant shall serve or cause to be served personally or by post on the complainant or, in the case of an indictment, the Crown Solicitor, a true copy of the application lodged with the registrar or clerk of the court concerned. Provided that with the consent of the parties the application may be heard at a time earlier than twenty-eight days after such service.

(4) At any time after the lodging of an application under subsection (1) the applicant may apply ex parte to a Judge or Stipendiary Magistrate (as the case requires) for a stay of proceedings in the matter, and upon any such application the judge or magistrate may direct the return of any warrant unexecuted or may stay the issue or execution of any such warrant pending the determination of an application under subsection (1).

(5) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing forms for the purposes of this section.

13. Forms of warrant. [cf. Vic. No.6232, s.5(4)] (1) Every warrant for the committal of a principal to prison pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1) of section 11 shall be in or to the effect of the form set forth in Form 5 in the Second Schedule.

(2) Every warrant of execution against the goods and chattels of a surety to a forfeited recognizance shall be in or to the effect of the form set forth in Form 6 in the second schedule.

14. Application to prior forfeiture. [cf. Vic. No.6232, s.5(6)] (1) Where at any time within a period of twelve months prior to the commencement of this Act a recognizance was forfeited by any court or judge or magistrate or justices and the amount of the recognizance, or any part thereof, is due and unpaid at the said commencement the following provisions shall, subject to sub-section (2), apply:-

(a) In the case of a principal - the principal shall be liable, in default of payment of the amount due and payable at the same commencement, to be imprisoned for one day in respect of every $2 of the amount of the forfeited recognizance then remaining unpaid but not in any case exceeding two years; and

(b) In the case of a surety - that the amount of the recognizance due and payable by him at the said commencement shall be recoverable by execution against the goods and chattels of the surety.

(2) Where it appears to the registrar of the court, or a clerk of the Magistrates Court (as the case requires), that a person has made default in the payment of moneys due and payable under a
recognizance forfeited before the said commencement the registrar or clerk shall serve or cause to be served on the person a notice in writing in the form or to the effect of Form 7 in the Second Schedule to the effect that if the amount of the recognizance is not paid within twenty-eight days after the issue of the notice a warrant will be issued for the committal of such person to prison or for execution against the goods and chattels of such person (as the case requires) in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1).

(3) The provisions of section 12 shall extend and apply with respect to moneys due under a recognizance forfeited before the commencement of this Act in all respects as if the provisions of section 14 were incorporated in an order made by the court by which the recognizance was forfeited on the day on which the notice in writing under subsection (2) is issued.

(4) A notice referred to in subsection (2) may be served personally or by post.

(5) If after the expiration of twenty-eight days after the issue of a notice referred to in subsection (2) any moneys due under the recognizance remain unpaid the registrar or clerk (as the case requires) shall issue a warrant under his hand for the committal of such person to prison or for execution against the goods and chattels of such person (as the case requires) in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section.

15. Execution of warrant. [cf. Vic. No.6232 s.5(10)]. Any member of the police force to whom a warrant under this Part is directed shall execute the warrant according to its tenor unless the amount of money specified in the warrant be sooner paid and the keeper of the prison shall receive into his custody any person referred in a warrant of commitment and safely keep him for the term or period on the warrant named unless the said amount be sooner paid or unless he is otherwise removed or discharged from custody by due course of law.

16. Application of Justices Acts. [cf. Vic. No. 6232, s.5 (11)]. The provisions of the Justices Act 1886 - 1976 with respect to warrants and to the payment or part payment of moneys shall, so far as those provisions are applicable and with such modifications as are necessary, extend and apply with respect to the recovery of moneys payable under forfeited recognizances and in particular with the following modifications, namely :-

(a) Any reference in those provisions to a warrant shall be read and construed as if it were a reference to a warrant issued for the purposes of this section;

(b) Any reference in those provisions to a fine or penalty or other sum adjudged to be paid under a conviction or order of a Magistrates Court or a justice or justices shall be read and construed as if it were a reference to an order made for the recovery of the moneys payable under a forfeited recognizance;

(c) Any reference in those provisions to a Magistrates Court or justice shall be read and construed as if it were a reference to the court Judge or Magistrate making an order forfeiting a recognizance; and
(d) Any reference in those provisions to a clerk of the Magistrates Court or clerk of petty sessions shall be read and construed as if it included a reference to the registrar of the Court.

17. **Duty on receipt of payment.** [cf. Vic. No.6232, s.5(12)]. The keeper of a prison shall on receiving payment of moneys payable under a forfeited recognizance forthwith pay the amount received to the registrar or clerk who issued the warrant (as the case requires).
# FIRST SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Act</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Extent of Repeal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Vic. No. 3</td>
<td>The Costs in Crown Suits Act of 1856</td>
<td>PART I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Vic. No. 23</td>
<td>The Claims against Government Act [of 1866]</td>
<td>PART II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 37 of 1974</td>
<td>Subcontractors' Charges Act 1974 - 1976</td>
<td>Section 4 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECOND SCHEDULE

Form 1

This is to certify to the Attorney-General that at the this day held at the several persons whose names and places of abode or business are specified in the schedule below were fined the several sums set opposite to their respective names in the said schedule and the cause of such fines is duly and truly set forth in the same schedule.

The Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proper Full Name</th>
<th>Place of Abode or Business</th>
<th>Cause of Fine</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Behaving and conducting himself in a disorderly manner in court.</td>
<td>$ 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$ 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given under my hand this day of 19 .

Judge.
FORM 2

Queensland

(to wit)

The Attorney-General for the State of Queensland having informed the Court that at the Magistrates Court of Queensland held at on the day of 19 before J.G.F. Esquire Stipendiary Magistrate a fine of dollars was imposed and inflicted upon A.B. for that the said A.B. [behaved and conducted himself in a disorderly manner in the said court or as the case may be] as appears from the certificate of the said J.G.F. Esquire filed herein.

It is this day adjudged that the State of Queensland do recover against the said A.B. the said sum of and also the sum of for costs making a total of $
ORDER FORFEITING A RECOGNIZANCE

In the

Court

IN THE MATTER of a Recognizance to Her Majesty wherein -

A.B. is Principal

and

C.D. is Surety

WHEREAS on the day of 19 in the Court at

in the State of Queensland

A.B. of in the said State as Principal

and C.D. of in the said State as Surety

severally acknowledged themselves to owe to Her Majesty the amount of $ conditioned (for the appearance of A.B. in the said court on the day of 19):

AND WHEREAS the said A.B. has failed in the condition of the recognizance:

NOW THEREFORE this court hereby declares the said recognizance to be forfeited and orders as follows :-

(i) that A.B. do pay the amount of $ to the Registrar [Clerk of the Magistrates Court] at within days after the date of this order and that in default of payment of the amount within that time that the defendant be imprisoned for the term of ;

(ii) that C.D. do pay the amount of $ to the Registrar [Clerk of the Magistrates Court] at within days after the date of this order and that in default of payment of the amount within that time that the amount be recoverable by execution against the goods and chattels of the Surety.

DATED at this day of 19

Judge of the Supreme Court.
Judge of the District Court.
Stipendiary Magistrate.
FORM 4

s.11(3)

NOTICE OF FORFEITURE OF RECOGNIZANCE

In the Court
In the matter of a Recognizance to Her Majesty wherein -
A.B. is Principal
and
C.D. is Surety

On the day of 19
the Court at in the State of Queensland having been satisfied that the said A.B.
has failed to observe a condition of the Recognizance, the
said Court declared the recognizance to be forfeited and
ordered as follows:

TAKE NOTICE that a warrant of commitment for your imprisonment
(or a warrant of execution as the case requires) will issue
after the expiration of twenty-eight days unless

(i) the amount due under the order is paid;
(ii) an order is made for the payment of the amount by instalments; or
(iii) application is made under section 12 for the rescission or variation of the order.

DATED at this day of 19

Registrar of the Supreme/District Court.
Clerk of the Magistrates Court.

* as the Court has ordered
** or such other time as the Court has allowed
WARRANT OF COMMITMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF MONEYS DUE
UNDER A FORFEITED RECOGNIZANCE

In the Court.

IN THE MATTER of a Recognizance to Her Majesty wherein -

A.B. is Principal
C.D. is Surety

and to all other members of the Police Force
in the State of Queensland and to the keeper of the prison at
in the said State or any other prison which
is more accessible or more convenient.

The said A.B. having entered as principal into a recognizance
to Her Majesty in the sum of $ with surety in the sum
of $ conditioned for the appearance of the said A.B. at
the Court on the day of 19; the said A.B. having failed to observe
the condition of the recognizance and the Court
having declared the recognizance to be forfeited and ordered A.B.
as principal (and C.D. as surety) to pay the sum of $ due and
payable under the recognizance and the said (A.B.) not having paid
the sum as ordered:

These are to command you the member of the Police Force
executing this warrant to take the said (A.B.) unless the said sum
of $ is sooner paid to you the said member of the Police Force and
(him) (her) safely convey to the prison at aforesaid
or any other gaol which is more accessible or more convenient and
there deliver (him) (her) to the said keeper with this warrant.

And I do command you the said keeper to receive the said (A.B.)
into your custody in such prison there to imprison (him)(her) for
the period of $ is sooner paid to you the said keeper and for so doing
this shall be your sufficient warrant.

DATED at this day of 19.

Registrar of the Supreme/District Court.
Clerk of the Magistrates Court.
FORM 6

WARRANT OF EXECUTION FOR MONEYS DUE UNDER A
FORFEITED RECOGNIZANCE

In the Court.

IN THE MATTER of a Recognizance to Her Majesty wherein -
A.B. is Principal
and
C.D. is Surety.

To the principal police officer at in the State of Queensland and to all other police officers in the said State.

The said A.B. having entered as principal into a recognition to Her Majesty in the sum of $ with surety in the sum of $ conditioned for the appearance of the said A.B. at the Court at on the day of 19 : the said A.B. having failed to observe the condition of the recognizance and the Court at having declared the recognizance to be forfeited and ordered C.D. as surety to pay the sum of $ and it was thereby ordered that if the said sum of $ were not paid on or before the day of 19 , then next, the same should be levied by execution against the goods and chattels of the said C.D. And whereas the said C.D. has not paid the said sum of $ (or any part thereof) : These are therefore to command you, in Her Majesty's name, forthwith to take the goods and chattels of the said C.D., and if within the space of days after taking them the said sum of $ together with the reasonable charges of taking and keeping the said goods and chattels are not paid, that then you sell the said goods and chattels and pay the money arising from such sale to Registrar of the Court at Clerk of the Court in the said State and if no goods and chattels can be found then that you certify the same to me.

Given under my hand at in the said State,

this day of 19.

Registrar of the Supreme/District Court.

Clerk of the Magistrates Court.
NOTICE REQUIRING PAYMENT OF MONEY

In the Court.

IN THE MATTER of a Recognizance to Her Majesty wherein -
A.B. is Principal
and
C.D. is Surety
WHEREAS on the day of 19
the Court at in the State of Queensland, declared the above recognizance to be forfeited, the
amount of the Recognizance namely $ and surety of $
are due and payable.

TAKE NOTICE that unless the sum of $ owing by you as principal
is paid within twenty-eight days from the date hereof a warrant will
be issued for your committal to prison where you will be
imprisoned for one day in respect of each $2.00 of the amount of
the forfeited recognizance remaining unpaid but not exceeding a
period of two years.

OR

TAKE NOTICE that unless the sum of $ owing by you as surety
is paid within twenty-eight days from the date hereof a warrant will
be issued to take your goods and chattels and to sell them unless
the said sum of $ together with the reasonable charges of
taking and keeping the said goods and chattels are sooner paid.

DATED at this day of 19

Registrar of the Supreme/District Court.

Clerk of the Magistrates Court.
23. (1) Subject to this Part -

(a) the Crown shall be liable in respect of any contract made on its behalf in the same manner as a subject is liable in respect of his contracts; and

(b) the Crown shall be liable for the torts of any servant or agent of the Crown or independent contractor employed by the Crown as nearly as possible in the same manner as a subject is liable for the torts of his servant or agent or of an independent contractor employed by him.

(2) No proceeding shall lie against the Crown under this Part in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibility of a judicial nature invested in him.

(3) No proceeding shall lie against the Crown under this Part -

(a) in respect of any contract made by or on behalf of any public statutory corporation; or

(b) in respect of any tort of any such corporation or of any of its servants or agents or of any independent contractor employed by it -

and nothing in this Part shall affect any provision in any Act by which any liability of any such corporation or of any of its members officers or servants in respect of any matter is specifically limited or conditioned, but no such corporation shall on the ground that it is the Crown or the servant or agent of the Crown be exempt from any liability to which it would otherwise be subject.