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THE ROLE OF JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRAILS

Working Paper 28

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THE ROLE OF JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
PREFACE

The Law Reform Commission has been functioning since the 1st March, 1969 and is constituted by the Law Reform Commission Act 1968-1984.

MEMBERS:-

The Honourable Mr Justice B.J. McPherson, Chairman

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The office of the Commission is at the Central Courts Building, 179 North Quay, Brisbane.

The third programme of the Law Reform Commission of Queensland as approved by the Governor in Council in September, 1983 has as its first item the matter of a review of the role of juries in criminal trials.

As part of this process of revision, a working paper has been prepared which contains a commentary and certain recommendations for amending legislation.

The working paper is being circulated to persons and bodies known to be interested in this subject, from whom comment and criticism are invited. It is circulated on a confidential basis and recipients are reminded that any recommendations for the reform of the law must have the approval of the Governor in Council before being laid before Parliament. No inferences should be drawn as to any Government Policy.

It is requested that any observations you may desire to make be forwarded to the Secretary, Law Reform Commission, P.O. Box 312, North Quay, Queensland, 4000 so as to be received no later than 1st April, 1985.

The Hon. Mr. Justice B.H. McPherson,
Chairman.

Brisbane,
SUMMARY

At the time when the Commission was given the reference to review the role of juries the utility of juries in criminal trials was under a considerable degree of public scrutiny in Queensland. This resulted from the discharge of a jury without verdict in what became known as the Russell Island case. In that case eight people were charged with conspiracy to defraud the public in respect of a number of dealings in land on Russell Island. After a hearing lasting just over nineteen (19) months the jury had retired for thirteen (13) days when a juror was found to be medically unfit to continue in the deliberations. In the circumstances, upon the application of all defence counsel, but against the opposition of the Crown, the jury were discharged without returning a verdict.

Whilst that case was in many ways both unique, and highly publicized, it served to focus the spotlight on a number of areas of concern to those connected with the administration of the criminal law relative to the effectiveness of the criminal jury system. The public reaction even went so far as to question the value of the criminal jury at all, at least in certain areas of criminal trials.

Most of the areas of concern referred to have been the subject of discussions, writings and research by practising lawyers, academics and various Law Reform bodies over many years. The range of publications devoted to these subjects is extensive covering the whole spectrum from complete books to short articles and commentaries. In our own researches we have endeavoured to absorb at least a representative sample of this literature in addition to relying on our own experiences on the Bench and at the Bar. We have also sought and obtained comments and information, particularly of a statistical nature, from the Law Reform Commissions in Australia, State and Territory authorities and others in an endeavour to establish a picture of the workings of the jury in Australia, isolate its problem areas and propose some reforms.
In making any suggestions for reform in such a sensitive area as criminal juries one has to particularly bear in mind the practicalities of the situation. The final aim is to have ones recommendations incorporated into legislation. To achieve that end one has to negotiate the real hurdles of professional and political approval, both of which are understandably conservative.

Bearing that in mind we have made recommendation for reform which we believe are realistic and effective, reforms which will eliminate the most glaring deficiencies in criminal practice and procedure but at the same time are modest enough to secure acceptance. They do not go as far as we should, perhaps, have liked, but we are dealing in practicalities and not ideal solutions.

The following is a summary of the substance of the more important matters dealt with in the paper, including proposals for reform.

After a brief introduction the paper looks at the historical evolution of the criminal jury. One of the purposes of that exercise is to set the scene for proposed reforms. Such a review indicates that the jury, historically, has been far from a static organism. Change and adaptation have been common in its history so that, in present times, where change is seen to be warranted there should be no hesitation in bringing it about.

Given that historical background we perceived that the problems affecting criminal juries could be conveniently grouped under three headings:-

1. Those related to the constitution of the jury itself (lack of representativeness, lack of familiarity with proceedings) and the procedures governing the operation of the jury (challenge procedures, majority verdicts, pre-trial procedures etc.).
2. Those arising from committal proceedings in their present form.

3. Those resulting from the very nature of the jury and its approach to its task (possible inability to understand complex cases, "equitable" view of the law resulting in high proportions of acquittals, disagreements, etc.).

Having established the problems, as we see them, we then looked at the legislation governing juries in Australian jurisdiction in some detail. In the course of doing so we considered that, in Queensland, in general machinery terms, the legislation was satisfactory but that in one respect it needed considerable modification. This was the matter of exemption from jury service. We are of the opinion that the present position in Queensland should be drastically modified. In essence we recommend that the present system whereby the Electoral Officer or the Sheriff automatically delete from the roll the names of persons in categories exempted in the Act be abolished. We also recommend that the present list of exemptions be dispensed with. In place of that system we suggest one whereby when the prospective juror receives a notice from the Sheriff it will specify the persons who may be ineligible to serve or exempt from serving. The recipient will have to notify the Sheriff of his ineligibility, or claim exemption, as the case may be. In the latter case, if he fails to do so, he will have to serve, subject to the discretion of the trial judge. The criteria for exemption are basically those suggested by the Canadian Law Reform Commission. They are in general terms. They cover the position of serious hardship or loss to the juror, or those immediately relying on him, or his employer; or where serving as a juror would be contrary to the public interest.
Committal proceedings are next dealt with as it is considered they have an important bearing on the efficiency of the criminal trial procedure as a whole. After examining the present system in detail, and although we found that the system operating in Queensland was relatively effective we categorized the most serious defects as follows:-

(1) The unnecessary delay occasioned between charge and trial by interposing committal proceedings. These result in injustice to both the community and the accused.

(2) The considerably added expense of conducting both a committal proceeding and a trial in each instance.

(3) The inconvenience, expense and, sometimes, trauma occasioned in witnesses by being forced to attend court twice; and be subjected to examination and cross-examination twice.

(4) The fact that despite these considerations the vast majority of committals are largely a formality anyway, only a very small percentage of defendants ever being discharged at that hearing.

(5) The delay occasioned to magistrates in disposing of their summary cases, civil and criminal, by the necessity to conduct committals, often of a lengthy nature.

To meet these defects we suggested, in the Queensland situation the following reforms:-

1. A right to be given to the accused person to waive the committal proceeding if he so desires.

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2. Provision should be made for the accused person to plead guilty at any stage of the proceedings rather than, for the first time, at the end of the informant's case, as the law is at present.

3. Written statements should be admissible by consent whether or not the accused person is represented by counsel or solicitor.

4. A technical amendment should be made to section 110A(5)B of the Justices Act 1886-1982 by inserting at the beginning of that paragraph the words "A reasonable time before the hearing..."

5. There should be special provisions for the reception of statements by minors and illiterate persons. Such legislation already exists in the New South Wales, Victorian and English Acts.

6. By consent parties may dispense with the statutory conditions precedent to the admission of written statements.

7. Provision should be made to accept as proven fact the stated age of a deponent in his declaration.

We then moved to consider the subjects pre-trial pleading and procedure and summary trial. In this regard we gave earnest considerations, firstly, and as a separate subject, to the trial of complex commercial crimes and conspiracies relating to them. We decided to adopt, with some important modifications, the system of summary trial in the higher courts for these offences introduced in New South Wales. Basically we would invest the Supreme Court and the District Court (in New South Wales the Supreme Court only) with summary jurisdiction to certain specified offences. These offences would be set out in a separate section of The Criminal Code and would comprise those of a commercial nature arising under the Code together with
specified offences under Companies Acts and Code and the Securites Industry Acts and Code. One other fundamental difference from the New South Wales provisions is that our recommended reforms do not require the consent of the defence to invoke this jurisdiction. New South Wales experience has shown that such a provision renders a reform of this nature completely nugatory.

Having recommended that specific reform, in that particular area, we paused to look at some statistical material available to us. In compiling these we received very generous co-operation from most authorities from whom we sought them. However, the sad fact is that the whole process of keeping statistical material relating to the whole criminal process is, in most parts of Australia, most inadequate. The result was that, though we were able to derive some assistance from the material provided, it was not nearly of as much assistance as we had hoped it would be. This is, perhaps, a matter that should be considered by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General if it is hoped to establish in Australia, a worthwhile empirical basis for reform in this whole area.

From looking at statistics we moved back into the procedural field, directing our attention to the system of challenging jurors. The Queensland practice in this area is unique in Australia in that it allows for two sets of peremptory challenges. On the first occasion that the list of jurors is called through no limit is imposed on the Crown or the defence as to the number of challenges or those asked to stand by. If a jury is not struck at the end of the first call the cards are replaced in the box and jury called through a second time. We recommend that this system be discontinued and that Queensland adopt the same course as all other Australian jurisdictions having one call with limitations on the number of challenges on those called to stand by.
Another aspect of challenging which the Commission believes is generally unsatisfactory is the situation applying in joint trials. There each accused has the right to his full number of eight challenges and the Crown the right to stand by in the same number. We have recommended that in the case of joint trials the accused be limited to six challenges each and the Crown to eight challenges in all.

Our penultimate matter for consideration was reform to criminal procedure in general. After prolonged consideration and examination of proposals for reform in this area in other jurisdictions, the Commission eventually decided to recommend only moderate reforms. There were two basic reasons for this view. The type of reform that most appealed to us was the trial scheme of pre-trial proceedings in chambers and Court introduced in respect of some of the Crown Courts in England. However, we discovered, at first hand, that this was not operating satisfactorily in practice, and is to be the subject of extensive review. In the second place we are aware that reforms in this area are under consideration by a number of the Supreme Court judges in some of the States. In the circumstances it seemed better to await the outcome of those considerations rather than launch into a large scale review ourselves. Nevertheless we decided that there were some matters of fairly urgent concern which could be made the subject of pre-trial proceedings without any great dislocation of established practice. These are as follows:-

1. Any challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the matter in question.

2. Where there are joint trials of accused, or joinder of counts any applications for severance.

3. The question of fitness to plead.
4. Where it is intended to raise the defence of insanity or the like.

5. Where it is intended to challenge evidence as on the voir dire. This would be conducted by the trial judge.

In broad terms rules required to implement these reforms are suggested.

Finally we dealt with the vexed subject of majority verdicts. In 1977 in a Working Paper on Proposals to Amend the Practice of Criminal Courts in Certain Particulars (W.P. 19) this Commission recommended that the system of majority verdicts be introduced into the procedure in Queensland. However, when the final report was produced the Commission, with some reluctance, changed its mind, recommending that events may occur which would alter this position. We believe that the experience of the Russell Island case was such an event. Accordingly we have recommended that majority verdicts in Criminal trials be introduced into Queensland. This change would have the effect that, except in the case of trials for treason, murder or piracy, where a unanimous verdict would still be required, a jury could bring in a verdict where not less than ten jurors have agreed upon a verdict.

A verdict in such circumstances shall not be accepted unless it appears to the Court that the jury have had such period of time for deliberation as the Court thinks reasonable but in any event not less than two hours.
INTRODUCTION

Although the title of the reference with respect to juries is expressed to be "To review the role of juries in criminal trials", we have assessed the real question intended to be considered as "To examine critically the suitability and effectiveness of the jury in the whole of the criminal law process, in its operation, as an integral part of machinery of the criminal law".

The reference in these extended terms would include making recommendations for reform in criminal practice and procedure generally, if this were determined to be necessary to render the whole criminal process more suited to its task in today's conditions. The reference thus involves a two-tiered exercise:-

(1) To examine the jury as an entity in itself, apart from the general criminal process, to see if reform is necessary in respect of its own basic constitution, ultimate composition and working.

(2) To examine the procedure, practice and rules of evidence in the criminal law process generally to determine if reforms are necessary in any part or parts of that area which may, directly or indirectly have a bearing on the effectiveness of the jury system.

Views as to the value and effectiveness of the jury's role in the criminal trial vary widely. Indeed, no institution within the field of criminal justice generates as much heated controversy as the continued existence or otherwise of the jury. There are even different interpretations of the significance of similar statistical material related to the performance of the criminal jury. This situation will be looked at in more detail later on in this paper. At this stage it suffices to illustrate the differing approaches to the value of the jury by quoting some remarks of learned protagonists for one view or the other. These
range from emotive statements dealing with the jury's role in our constitutional framework as the guardian of the liberties of the people to critically pragmatic assessments of the validity and effectiveness of the jury at all in concrete situations.

A convenient starting point in quotations is that Blackstone (Commentaries Book 4 pp 349 & 350) repeated enthusiastically by Sir Patrick Devlin (as he then was) in the Hamlyn Lectures in November, 1956:

"So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks, (which none will be so hardy as to make), but also from all secret machinations, which may sap and undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary methods of trial; by justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, and courts of conscience. And however convenient these may appear at first (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient), yet let it be again remembered, that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous concern." Trial by Jury (3rd Edition) Page 165.

Lord Devlin, of course, is a strong advocate of the jury system and in a speech delivered at the University of Chicago in January, 1960, he also said:
"Trial by Jury is only an instrument of getting at the truth. It is a process designed to make it as sure as possible that no innocent man is convicted."

The next quote comes from Harry Kalven Jnr. and Hans Zeisel, the American authors of what is undoubtedly the most ambitious and thorough piece of research into how juries and in particular, criminal juries perform, and upon what basis they make their decisions. They published their results in 1966 in a book called "The American Jury". At page 498 of the book, which is also strongly sympathetic to the jury system, they express the following conclusion:

"The jury thus represents a uniquely subtle distribution of official power, an unusual arrangement of checks and balances. It represents also an impressive way of building discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system. Not the least of the advantages is that the jury, relieved of the burdens of creating precedent, can bend the law without breaking it."

Finally, as a matter of balance, we quote from the work of two more recent English researchers on the subject, John Baldwin and Michael McConville. Their work is also most extensive, being contained in a number of publications, and they express a different view. In a paper published in the Justices of the Peace of March 10, 1979 entitled "Research and the Jury" they say in their concluding paragraphs:-
"To many the excellence of juries is an article of faith, and the uncritical light in which the jury has been viewed has made rational discussion of the institution extraordinarily difficult. Many of the attachments to the jury are ideological and, as such, are unlikely to be shaken by the evidence of research. Research can perhaps do no more than provide a limited factual framework within which a more informed debate can be conducted. Our own research in Birmingham and London casts doubt on many assumptions that have been made about juries most notably the assumption that, when juries err, this will invariably operate to the benefit of the defendant.

On the evidence of our research, we concluded that jury trial was an inaccurate and unpredictable method of discriminating between the guilty and the innocent. But this does not mean that the jury is outmoded, inefficient or unacceptably fallible. It may be that, in human terms, it reaches a just determination as often as can reasonably be expected and that other tribunals, if subjected to the same detailed scrutiny, would display similar imperfections.

Our findings do suggest, however, that it is time for uncritical veneration of the jury to end. Juries and other tribunals, including magistrates, ought to be opened up to more rigorous scrutiny. The interests of justice demand that the mystery that surrounds such institutions be finally swept away and that they be exposed to rational inquiry in which ancient shibboleths have no place."
When the conclusions of the empiricists vary so greatly, the task of the mere practitioners in trying to form an accurate assessment of the jury at work is not an easy one.

Having made these general remarks it seems to be essential to look briefly at the historical evolution of the jury in the Common Law.

**HISTORIAL BACKGROUND**

The Norman Conquerors introduced into England, as a primitive form of the jury, what had been prior to 1066, an administrative tool in widespread use in areas of Europe controlled by the Carolingian kings. The body may have indeed had a much earlier origin in the procedure of the Roman fiscus.

Gradually the role of the jury was extended from being primarily used as an administrative measure and as a source of information as to local facts and events to being used in the sphere of the civil law. The impetus to the wider use of the jury was Henry II. In particular, he made provision for a litigant to ask for a royal writ summoning a jury to decide the issue when a title to land was in dispute. He also introduced the jury into criminal justice by establishing grand juries of presentment of accusation: under the Assize of Clarendon these grand juries were required to report on offences committed in their neighbourhoods. This was the seed of the jury in the present form although it took quite some time to develop to that stage.
Although the English common law was beginning to attain some fixed rules of procedure at the time when man's ideas of a trial were dominated by the archaic ideas which centred around the old formal methods of proof of battle, compurgation, and ordeal, these older methods of proof were gradually being supplemented by the jury in its then form as a formal proof. This was hastened by the effect of the Assize of Clarendon (1166) on compurgation and the virtual abolition of the ordeal as a result of its condemnation by the Lateran Council in Rome in 1215.

The result was that, in the field of criminal law also, the jury, in one form or the other, became the formal method of proof of the guilt or innocence of a person on trial. However, its construction and methods of operation were very much in the discretion of the judges during the 13th and 14th centuries. It was still a formal test and not, in any way, an independant judicial trier of fact. The members were witnesses rather than judges of fact.

This concept of the jury slowly changed and, in the long run a tendency emerged for the jury to be regarded as a judicial body. This tendency began to predominate in the fourteenth (14) century although it did not lose its characteristic as a body of witnesses entirely until the seventeenth century.

Out of those historical elements there developed different varieties of juries, broadly grouped into criminal and civil juries. Each of those, in turn, was subdivided; criminal juries into the Grand jury of presentment and the petty jury; civil juries into the jury of Assizes and the jurator. This consideration is confined to the criminal juries.
The Grand jury of presentment was the lineal descendant of the earlier juries of inquiry. As is well known, it was summoned to discover and present to the King's officials (Justices) persons suspected of crimes. It became to be summoned by the Sheriff in the number of 24 persons, of whom 23 were chosen, a majority of whom decided whether to "find a true bill" or "ignore" the accusations preferred before it. There is some suggestion that this majority of twelve was the origin of the number 12 which ultimately comprised the petty jury.

The petty jury which tried the actual issue of guilt, originally as a formal method of proof as has been said, gradually separated itself from the presenting jury and equally gradually overtook the other methods of proof as the only formal method of proof on criminal cases.

The process by which the petty jury became separated from the presenting jury was a very slow one from the middle ages until by the middle of the 16th century it became the general practice to rely on the testimony of sworn witnesses. By the middle of the 17th century witnesses and jurors were regarded as completely distinct. However the law clung so tenaciously to the idea that jurors must come from the immediate neighbourhood of the place where the fact in issue occurred that it was not until 1826 when the necessity to have hundreds or on the jury in criminal cases was formally abolished. Long before that the petty jury had become judges of the facts.

There were two factors which helped to bring about the change from the jury being witnesses to their becoming judges of the facts. The first of these was the evolution of the manner in which the jury informed themselves (i.e. the substance of the law of evidence). This was a long and slow development but ultimately the reception of the testimony of sworn witnesses predominated.
The second factor that contributed to the divesting the jury of their character as witnesses was the growth of the law as to the right of the prisoner to challenge members of the jury panel. To a very marked degree this enabled him to remove anyone with a personal knowledge of the case. It started with the right of the prisoner to challenge "indicators". Later, in addition, a person could challenge on the ground of some defect in capacity (i.e. if he was not a peer) or for partiality, or for previous convictions, among other grounds.

Initially trial by jury could never be used without the consent of the accused. His strict right was to be tried by obsolete, the result was that if he did not consent to be tried by a jury he could not be convicted. One of the major disadvantages of conviction in those days, apart from the likelihood of being executed, was that, in addition, the prisoner forfeited all of his possessions. If he were not convicted, his property would not be forfeited to the Crown. The further result was that many prisoners refused to be tried by a petty jury in order to save his property for his family. Refusal however, was met by torture even to the point of an accused being crushed to death. Finally, after some five hundred years, a refusal to plead to a jury was taken as a plea of not guilty.

The historical outline just given points out a number of significant factors. The first of these is that the jury was not instituted as a fulfilment of the "Human Rights" sentiments contained in the Magna Charta. In essence it was a purely pragmatic response to a set of historical circumstances. Therefore, despite the frequent invocation of Magna Charta as the foundation of the jury, the two are not directly connected historically. Thus, any rationalization or modification of the jury process is not necessarily an interference with an institution sanctioned by its origin in the fundamental statute of English liberty. This historical reality was again expressed clearly and in another context by Lord Devlin in the work referred to earlier when he said at pages 12 to 13:

../9
"Meanwhile in the history of the earlier period, will you note two things which especially contribute to an understanding of the way the jury worked to-day? The first is that the judge and jury were never formally created as separate institutions; there was never any separation of powers, never any conscious decision by anyone that questions of law ought to be decided by lawyers and those of fact by laymen. The jury derived all its powers from the judge and from his willingness to accept its verdict; even now, if he were to refuse to do so, he would offend against no statute and his judgment would be good until reversed by a higher court. In theory the jury is still an instrument used by the judge to help him to arrive at a right decision; from the first and, as you will see, throughout its development, the judges have kept the jury to that nominally subordinate role. The verdict has no legal effect until judgment is entered upon it. The jury's function was always, and still is, simply to answer the question so that judgment may be given. Its place in the trial has become important now because it has been granted or usurped additional powers but simply because the coming of rational methods of proof has given to the task of fact-finding an importance unrecognised by thirteenth century judges; if they had recognised it, they would probably have kept the task for themselves. We talk nowadays of the province of law and the province of the fact almost as if they were separate jurisdictions; and sometimes of judges encroaching on the jury's province. No doubt the easiest way of explaining the modern relationship between judge and jury is to start from the hypothesis that the law is for one and the facts for the other. But you will find that judges have a good deal to do with the facts and you must not think of them simply as invaders on territory to which they have no title."

../10
Next, it is clear that the jury has not always, historically been prized by accused persons as the most highly desirable method of trial, in the sense that it was a strong shield of their liberty or innocence. That exactly the contrary was the case emerges in an article entitled "Early Opposition to the Petty Jury in Criminal Cases" by Charles L. Wells in the Law Quarterly Review Volume 30 (1914) page 97. Mr Wells comments, at p.103:

"There was a little in the jury trial in criminal cases before 1350 to appeal to even a superficial fairmindedness. With a jury prejudiced by its own indictment, relying on rumours and hearsay evidence, often stupid and ignorant, liable to irrational, undue, and underhanded influences and intimidation, and without individual responsibility, a conviction was almost, if not quite a foregone conclusion. The objections sometimes urged against the jury to-day were tenfold more applicable then, when the jurors were judges and witnesses, unrestrained by any laws of evidence or legal restrictions and sometimes only partially informed."

And at page 106 he says:

"The question of evidence received no attention for a long time. No machinery was elaborated for getting fair testimony or an impartial verdict, and no legal test of evidence in the interest of justice and equity has been devised. A jury system, with some or all of the accusers on the jury without any rules of evidence or legally qualified witnesses, would seem anything but impartial and desirable."
One other factor militating against popular acceptance of the jury was the official pressure brought to bear on juries to bring in verdict of guilty. On and off over the centuries juries were subjected to considerable pressure to bring in verdicts of guilty. Recalcitrant juries were fined quite heavily for failing to do so. This latter practice did not cease until the decision of Vaughan CJ in Bushell's Case (1670) Vaughan's Reports 135, in which His Lordship drew the distinction between the ministerial functions of the jury and the giving of the verdict which he classified as judicial. For the latter they could not be fined or punished. This case will be referred to again.

The opposition to the jury by accused persons continued up until the end of the 17 century. Even thereafter, the punishment of jurors who brought in verdicts of not guilty rendered the jury an unattractive proposition to the accused. Again from time to time, specially chosen or picked juries, heavily biased in favour of the Crown, gave further point to the opposition to trial by jury for quite some time.

Against all that, of course, must be set the numbers of historic occasions on which the jury has filled the role of the defender of personal liberty. By standing courageously between the Crown and an accused, jurors played a strong role in ensuring that the accused received a fair trial. It is the ingrained recollection of those occasions that has sanctified the place of the jury in our constitutional life. There are numbers of examples of such occasions but in this brief discussion two outstanding historic cases will perhaps suffice. The first of these is Bushell's Case (1670) Vaughan's Rep. 135. In that case the jurors had, in spite of very brutal treatment by the court (kept without food and drink for three days) persisted in acquitting the Quakers, Penn and Mead. In consequence they were fined and imprisoned, ultimately being brought up before a Court of Common Pleas on a Writ of Habeas Corpus and discharged.
The second such case is that of John Lilburne (1649) 4 State Tr. 1270. Actually Lilburne was tried four times, three times for treason. He was convicted on the first two occasions but on the latter two no jury would convict him. Those juries were under considerable pressure to convict Lilburne who had made some extreme claims as to the breadth of the jury's jurisdiction. After he had been finally acquitted in 1653 the Council of State questioned the jury about their "not guilty verdict". Nine of the jurors stated that their decision was in accordance with the dictates of conscience; the other three repeated an assertion of Lilburne that they were the judges of the law as well as of fact. One must also observe that, at the present day, the jury verdicts, generally speaking, tend heavily in favour of the accused.

The final comment prompted by the historical review is that it is, doubtful, to say the least, that the jury has been historically a body representative of the "country" or a fair cross-section of the community for the purposes of sharing in the enforcement of the criminal law. There is no doubt that as a result of exemptions and challenges it is less so today.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS TO REFORMING
THE JURY

Against this background a number of specific problems relative to the criminal process, generally, and the jury more specifically, may be isolated for consideration. Among these as they relate to the jury directly, are:-
1. Composition (exclusions);
2. Method of Selection (challenge);
3. Unanimity or Majority Verdicts;
4. Suitability of juries at all for complex trials;
5. Modifications of Tribunal for complex fraud trials; and

As a related exercise is the examination of committal proceedings with a view to establishing if they retain any value in their present form, or in some modified form in today's circumstances.

These problems may be conveniently grouped under three headings:

1. Those related to the constitution of the jury itself (lack of representativeness, lack of familiarity with proceedings) and the procedures governing the operation of the jury (challenge procedures, majority verdicts, pre-trial procedures etc.).

2. Those arising from committal proceedings in their present form.

3. Those resulting from the very nature of the jury and its approach to its task (possible inability to understand complex cases, "equitable" view of the law resulting in high proportions of acquittals, disagreements, etc.).

Grouped thus they prompt suggested remedies in each respect ranging from abolishing juries in toto, as part of the Tribunal for determining guilt or non-guilt, through adopting that course partially, particularly in respect of difficult commercial cases to more machinery reforms of modifying the present make-up of
the jury, changing some of the procedures for empanelling juries
or establishing systems of pleading and pre-trial procedures,
or a combination of some or all of these.

Although in theory, when considering answers to problems one
should explore all possible remedies, in practice the possible
course of completely abolishing juries in criminal trials will
not be explored in this paper. For historical, constitutional
and practical reasons that step is not regarded as a viable
alternative in the present milieu in which any proposed reforms
are to be implemented. The reforms to which we will be looking
are those which are to be practicably capable of being put into
effect.

In actually considering what reforms to recommend in relation
to the jury two basic matters ought to be taken into
consideration. The first of these is whether, as Criminal Courts
are constituted and conducted today, the heavily emphasized role
of the jury as the protector of an accused person has the same
justification as in previous times. The second is whether the
jury, as constituted today, is truly representative of the
"country" or community. A third consideration, springing from
that last question is, granted some degree of representativeness,
whether that quality, in the sense traditionally attributed to
it is an appropriate mechanism in some areas of criminal
proceedings.

These considerations will be dealt with in greater detail
hereafter. As to the first query just raised, at the risk of
some repetition in describing the purpose of the jury, it may
help, in this context to quote from a case in the Supreme Court
of the United States, Williams v. Florida 399 US 78 at p. 100.
It is there stated:-
"The purpose of the jury trial ... is to prevent oppression by the Government. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the inter-position between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence."

Other than the vision of this protective role on its part, there is no practical or objective reason for accepting the jury as the best and most effective weapon determining the guilt or non-guilt of a person in a criminal trial. Subjectively of course, the position is very different.

In today's circumstances, in the administration of the criminal law, there arises a very real question as to whether or not the historical protection of an accused, described in Williams v. Florida is still necessary. Experience generally, in Australia at least, would tend to answer that question in the negative.

Rather than being compliant, biased or eccentric, judges today are extremely concerned to protect the accused from any unfairness in respect of evidence admitted against him in a criminal trial and of the conduct of criminal trials in general. In almost the totality of cases in Australia, the judge is, in practice certainly the reverse of the character portrayed in the first sentence of the statement in William's case.
Moreover, the rules governing the admission of evidence are, themselves, designed to ensure the utmost protection for the accused, both in the investigation stage of a crime, and upon trial for it.

Further, ready access to appellate courts provide further protection to an accused who feels he has not received justice. Against that background it is necessary, and important, to examine the jury in the present day to ascertain at least three (3) things:-

1. It is important to see if the jury has lost any of the attributes, or essential features of its make up which contributed to its historically viewed protective role.

2. It is also important to see if its effectiveness as an administrative instrument or its primary role, and purpose, has been negated or limited in certain areas of the criminal law because of extensive social and technological changes and developments which may tend to make the jury, by its very nature, an inappropriate mechanism in those areas.

3. Whether, upon examination, in today's circumstances, the balance of public policy interests in the administration of the criminal law, generally, or in certain areas, is being effected by the use of the jury.

Two of the fundamental purposes of selecting a jury is to provide a tribunal that is indifferent and representative of the community. The latter concept is that of the community judging one of its fellow members on the question of whether or not he has broken the criminal law. i.e. whether or not he has breached one of the norms of conduct imposed on all members of the community so as to preserve order and peace in that community.
The essential characteristic of representativeness is so important that it has been the subject of many references both by writers and committees of enquiry on the operation of juries.

The authoritative writer on the history and development of juries, Charles L. Wells, says of this matter:—

"Their representative character therefore was, and we may say remains, their most important characteristic, It is because they are representative that their testimony and verdict (true statement, vere dictum) is valuable and decisive." see 30 L.Q.R. page 105.

Again the Morris Committee in its report, Cmnd. 2627, at p.18 expressed a similar view in the following terms:—

"In considering what the basic qualifications should be in future, we have been guided by our assessment of the qualities which we think are required of jurors. It is necessary to have on a jury men and women who will bring common sense to their task of exercising judgment; who have knowledge of the ways of the world and of the ways of human beings; who have a sense of belonging to a community; who are actuated by a desire to see fair play; and above all who will strive to come to an honest conclusion in regard to the issues which are for them to decide. We think that in a healthy community there will be a high sense of duty, a fundamental respect for law and order, and a wish that principles of honesty and decency should prevail. A jury should represent a cross-section drawn at random from the community, and should be the means of bringing to bear on the issues that face them the corporate good sense of that community. This cannot be in the keeping of the few, but is something to which all men and women of good will must contribute."
Thus, the jury is viewed as having a certain identification with the accused and with the community's moral views and tolerances in respect of the area of behaviour of the accused under consideration. Whether the jury in Queensland, as ultimately empanelled, meets this criterion is a matter to which our attention will be directed.

Understandably, this relationship is fairly satisfactory in dealing with what may be called "traditional" crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, stealing etc. but which fairly raises the question whether that relationship extends with a real sense, into areas of more sophisticated crime now under the jurisdiction under the criminal law.

Is it appropriate in the sophisticated and complex area of commercial crime or other areas involving advanced technology to accept that corporate good sense of the community as an adequate guide to an understanding of the issues raised therein? It raises a very good question whether a jury is an appropriate tribunal to deal with the criminal law in business, industrial and financial matters which are clearly not within the range of the understanding and experience of an ordinary representative member of a community.

It is virtually impossible to answer these questions from empirical evidence as is the case with so many questions relating to the jury. However, it may not be without significance that in civil actions where personal pecuniary interests are involved juries have been largely abolished. This development has ensued, in modern times without any real protest, from litigants, legislators or legal bodies. Does this not tend to show that when the matter of securing private interests was in issue litigants and their legal representatives were convinced that the jury was an ineffective and inappropriate tribunal to deal with those important matters?
This problem may be looked at from another angle namely; does the length of time, the expense incurred, the risk of a hung jury after a long trial or the danger of unfairness to either the community or the accused through an improper verdict resulting from lack of proper comprehension on the part of jurors in the trials, described above, place in jeopardy the competing public interests in the administration of the criminal law.

Speaking generally, the question of public policy interest throws up another set of interesting questions. Does the jury, as it operates at present, produce an unreasonable proportion of acquittals in the light of pre-trial screening procedures so that public interest is not thereby served? Is this situation affected by the modus operandi of the jury? Is there a difference in results between States where unanimous verdicts are required or those where majority verdicts are permitted. Again, assuming that it is desirable that the jury be retained in all or most of the areas on which they presently function there must be a vested public interest in avoiding procedures which result in unnecessary delays in the course of the trial causing expense, irritation and frustration to members of jury panels.

In this regard, in particular, reference is made to the frequent interruption of trials by the holding of voir dires, the discussion of legal objections of a substantive or procedural nature and other proceedings which disrupt the flow of a trial and can lengthen it inordinately. These are some of the questions widely asked in respect of the effective operation of juries. The paper will consider if some of these problems can be overcome by some change in pleading or procedure, or both, whether or not there should be any limitation of the use of the jury itself in any particular area.

/.20
LEGISLATION

So far this paper has very briefly sketched the origin and development in the Common Law of the major characteristics of the criminal jury to the point where it has evolved into its modern role of being the trier of facts solely on the basis of the evidence presented to it. In addition a number of specific problem areas have been isolated and some philosophical and other questions raised. It is now necessary to look at the next stage of development i.e. the legislation which regulates the composition and operation of juries. In all jurisdictions in which they operate, juries are now regulated in considerable detail by acts generally known as Jury or Juries Acts. So far as England and Australia are concerned the modern source of this legislation is, speaking generally, the Juries Act 1825 (Eng.).

This Act was a consolidation of a number of statutes, the estimated number of which varies between 30 and 85, touching on juries in England until then. Many of them were confused and obscure. Two most informative outlines on the statutory position of juries in the 19th and early 20th centuries in England are contained in two English Committee reports viz., the Mersey report in 1913, being Cd 6817 of that year, and the Morris report of 1965 being Cmd 2627 of that year. Subject to two important amendments, introduced in 1870, making provisions for payment of jurors and for exemptions from jury service, many of the provisions of the 1825 legislation remained essentially unchanged for over 140 years. There have been considerable modifications in the English legislation since, culminating in the Juries Act 1974. (Eng.).

../21
In Australian jurisdictions also, the English Act of 1825 is of considerable importance. Leaving aside the matter of property qualifications, but including the amendments of 1870 it is, in essentials, the basis of present day Australian Jury or Juries Acts.

The relevant Acts and Ordinances in Australia are:-

Queensland
New South Wales
Victoria
South Australia
Western Australia
Tasmania
Northern Territory
A.C.T.

Jury Act 1921-1983
Jury Act 1977
Juries Act 1967
Juries Act 1927-1974
Juries Act 1957-1981
Jury Act 1899
Juries Act
Juries Ordinance 1967.

Unless otherwise indicated all section references in this part are to those enactments.

The starting point in the survey of legislation governing juries is that providing for the requirement of trial by jury. In all States and Territories of Australia, with the partial exception of New South Wales, the trial before the court of criminal jurisdiction of any issue joined upon an indictment, presentment or information for an indictable offence shall be held before a jury of twelve (12). Qld. S.17; NSW S.19; Vic. S.3 & S.14(2); SA S.7; WA S.646 Criminal Code; Tas. S.39; NT S.6 and S.348 Criminal Code; ACT S.7(1).
In New South Wales the position has been extensively modified by the Crimes Amendment Act 1979 No. 95 and the Supreme Court Act (Summary Jurisdiction Act 1967) which provide for summary trial by a Judge alone in the case of crimes specified in Schedule 10 of the former act.

In all States and Territories the fundamental constituency of potential jurors is either that his or her name is on an electoral roll, or that he or she is entitled to vote. In the majority of states there are also varying limitations based upon age. It some cases also there is a primary geographical limitation related to jury districts. The various legislative provisions are: Qld. S.6; NSW S.5; Vic. S.4; SA S.7; WA S.4; Tas. S.4; NT S.9; ACT S.9. There does not appear to be any dissatisfaction with those primary constituencies in any State.

Ignoring for the moment the matter of disqualification and exemptions the next procedure or machinery step that flows from that basic qualification (in each State) is also fairly uniform. Having fixed the overall criterion of potential jurors by their connection with an electoral roll, their age and possibly their geographic location, it then becomes necessary to establish a body of persons ready to actually serve i.e. to prepare a jury roll. Although there are differences in organizational approach between various States and Territories, basically the machinery for this purpose follows a similar pattern.

The basic organizational unit is the jury district. Commonly, this is centred, in all jurisdictions, upon each court town. For each jury district by the combined efforts of the Sheriff and the Chief Electoral Official, in most cases, a prospective jury list of persons apparently qualified to serve is prepared
at varying periodic intervals. Then by one or other of various methods of random selection prescribed by the various statutes the Sheriff either selects or causes to be selected, the actual nominated jurors chosen for jury service. The random selection is generally carried out either by some form of ballot or by computer. This having been done the Sheriff ascertains which, if any, of the persons so nominated are ineligible to serve as jurors by reason of either disqualifiction or exemption. These names are struck from the roll and those that remain make up the jury list. There are provisions prescribing steps for recording these names on cards and ensuring their safe-keeping. When the occasion arises for a panel of jurors to be summoned to attend at a court sitting, in the majority of cases the presiding Judge or one of his officers issues his precept to the Sheriff to summon a prescribed number of jurors to attend. By another of the prescribed methods of random selection the Sheriff chooses the number directed and summons the person so chosen to attend at Court. The routine just described applies in most States but there are certain variations. In Victoria and South Australia no precept from a Judge to the Sheriff is required to finally summon the panel of jurors to court. The Sheriff, on his own initiative choses the final panel by random choice and summons them. The relevant sections prescribing the above procedures in each State and Territory is: Qld. Ss. 12-15; NSW Ss. 9-17; Vic. Ss. 7-13 and Schedules 5 and 6; SA Ss. 20-33; WA Ss. 9-17; Tas. Ss. 8-37; NT Ss. 19-22; ACT. Ss.

Reference has been made above to the removal of names of persons disqualified or exempt from jury service by either the Electoral Officer, or the Sheriff, or both. More discussion is needed on those matters because a real question of the representative character of the jury arises in Queensland, and some other States, as a result of the way the provision as to exemption operates.

../24
It has been noted earlier, that there are with some emphasis, two particular distinguishing characteristics of the jury. The first of these is its disinterestedness in respect of the issues and persons upon which and between whom it is adjudicating; the second is its representative character. This latter may, indeed, be said to be its very basis. It is the erosion of this characteristic that gives rise to this present expression of concern.

The Morris Committee (1965), referred to above, eloquently expressed the concept of representativeness. The Committee's view in this regard is set out above at p.10. The same theme is taken up by Messrs. Baldwin and McConville in an article entitled "The Representativeness of Juries" in the New Law Journal of 22 March, 1979 p. 284. Lord Devlin in "Trial by Jury", referred to above, coined the now much used phrase at p. 20 of the work. His Lordship said "The jury is not really representative of the nation as a whole. It is predominantly male, middle-aged, middle-minded and middle-class." He went on to say "This is due mainly to the property qualification and to some extent at the character of exemptions......the loss of ability resulting from the exclusion of so many professional men and women is especially severe". The property qualification has no counterpart in Australia but the reference to exemptions is more apt.

In Canada the Law Reform Commission adverted to this question in its Working Paper 27 (1980) entitled "The Jury in Criminal Trials". At pp. 42-43 in a preliminary comment to its recommended legislation in this regard the Commission said:
"Three grounds are commonly put forward for excluding people in certain occupations from serving on juries. First, certain persons should be excluded by reason of their position, and the knowledge gained therefrom, because they might be able to exert undue influence on other jurors (lawyers and judges). Second, certain persons should be excluded because they would appear, to the public at least, to have an occupational bias towards guilt or innocence (law enforcement personnel). Third certain persons should be excluded because they perform vital services in society and it would be wasteful to have their time taken up sitting on a jury. The first two grounds for disqualifying persons from serving on the jury are valid and are reflected in the enumeration of persons who are disqualified. With respect to the third ground, however, it is doubted whether any person, other than Legislators and Cabinet Ministers, occupied such a strategic position in society that he or she should be automatically exempt from assuming the responsibilities of jury service. Therefore this ground has not been used as a justification for disqualifying persons from serving on the jury. To the extent that it is a hardship for people to serve on the jury or to the extent that some people have an important and immediate public function to perform, they will be able to apply for an exemption from jury service under the following section."

It should be noted that their recommended legislation narrows very considerably the acceptable grounds for exemption.

In America also this matter has given rise to considerable discussion and, indeed, legislative action. Among the case and literature on the subject are the following (anything but an exhaustive list):--
Taylor v. Louisiana 95 S. Ct 692 (1975)

The latter article deals with the far reaching amendments introduced by the State of California in this area. In 1975 California amended Section 200 of its Code of Civil Procedure by eliminating its long list of occupations that were previously exempt from jury service and substituting a single criterion: "undue hardship on the person or the public services by the person".

The catalyst to the California amendment was probably the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Louisiana (supra) which was the culmination of a series of Supreme Court decisions since 1940. Briefly the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Taylor was that the selection of a petty jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Justices also held, however, that States were entitled to grant exemptions from jury service to individuals in case of special hardship or incapacity and those engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the community's welfare. (emphasis added).
Against this background of discussion and reform it is interesting to look at the Australian position. An examination of the relevant legislation reveals that the States and Territories are divided upon the matter. The division is of two kinds. Firstly in five out the 8 jurisdictions Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory and A.C.T. exemption of persons listed in the legislation is effected automatically by the Sheriff, or other officer, without any application by the person involved: in the other three New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia, the listed categories of people must claim their exemption, otherwise they are included in the panel. Secondly, and probably related to the first, the systems of classification differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example New South Wales and Victoria have three categories viz: (1) Those disqualified (for convictions, physical or mental disabilities etc.); (2) Those ineligible to serve (primarily people involved in the administration of the law); and (3) Those who are exempted. Other jurisdictions, such as Queensland have only two categories: (1) Those disqualified; and (2) Those exempt. The list of the latter is a long one. The relevant legislation relating to those matters is: Queensland, Sections 7 and 8; N.S.W. Section 6 and 7 and Schedules 1, 2 and 3; Vic. Section 4 and Schedules 2, 3 and 4; S.A. Sections 12 and 13 and Schedule 3; W.A. Sections 5 and 6 and Schedule 2; N.T. Sections 10 and 11 and Schedule 7; A.C.T. Sections 10 and 11.

It now falls to consider the Queensland legislation against this background. It is most relevant to look at Section 8 of the Jury Act, the section containing exemptions. This is appended as Annexure A in this report. Before launching on that section it should be said that little fault can be found with the list of disqualifications. The only suggestion made in respect of Section 7 of the Act is that two further categories could be added to cover people intellectually defective, or mentally ill, and an incapacitated person under the Public Trustee Act.
On the other hand when one examines the breadth of exempted occupations in Section 8 it is obvious that a broad spectrum of the community is removed from jury service. When one adds to this the fact that it is done automatically there can be no doubt that the jury, as finally empanelled has lost its truly representative character. In view of this the situation should be remedied by amending legislation. It is not suggested that anything so drastic as the Californian model be adopted although the reasons for that step are persuasive. The following amendments are suggested:

1. Create a new category of persons to be described as "Persons Ineligible to Serve as Jurors". This category should include persons connected with the administration of the law. It is further suggested that the content of that category be or in similar terms to paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 of the Victorian Juries Act. A copy of that Schedule is appended as Annexure B.

2. Repeal Section 8 and replace it with a section in the same of similar terms to the section suggested by the Canadian Law Reform Commission. A copy of that draft section is appended as Annexure C.

3. Amend Sections 12 and 13 by:

(1) deleting those provisions which empower the Principal Electoral Officer and the Sheriff to strike names off lists or rolls on the basis that they may be exempt; and

(2) Insert provisions empowering the Sheriff to send notice to persons on the jury lists compiled under those sections, such notices to be in a prescribed form -
(a) notifying that person of his inclusion in that jury list;

(b) specifying the persons disqualified from serving as jurors or ineligible to serve as jurors and persons who may be entitled to be exempted from serving as jurors;

(c) requiring that person if so disqualified or ineligible or if claiming exemption to inform the Sheriff within the time specified in the notice of:-

(i) the fact of, and reasons for, that disqualification or eligibility; or

(ii) that claim and the grounds on which it is made.

Provision should also be made that the Sheriff may require a person who is included on the jury list, or draft jury roll, and who claims an exemption from serving as a juror to verify the claim by statutory declaration.

If these amendments are made, and implemented, juries empanelled thereafter should be more representative of the community and, the jury, more in accord with fundamental principles.
Committal Proceedings

Having brought the jury to a point where it is about to enter the court room it may be convenient in evaluating the present law and practice in the overall criminal procedure into which the jury fits, to make at this point, an examination of the preliminary hearing, or committal for trial of a person, charged with an indictable offence. It is, like the jury itself, a proceeding which has been the subject of much controversy both in most States of Australia and in other parts of the common law world. Although the terms "preliminary hearing" and "committal proceeding" are used in various Australian jurisdictions, depending upon the terms of their respective legislation, the term "committal proceeding" will be generally adopted in this outline.

A practice has developed in almost all common law jurisdictions that before any person can be put on trial before a judge and jury on a charge of an indictable offence there must first be a hearing before a Magistrate. The function of that hearing "is to ensure that no one shall stand trial unless a prima facie case has been made out against him" - R. v. Epping and Harlow Justices [1973] 1 Q.B. 433 at 434 per Lord Widgery C.J.

The procedure in question has its origin in one of the original functions of Magistrates, or Justices, which was the duty of pursuing, and arresting, offenders and of working up the case against them, in the days before the establishment of regular police forces. The Justices were, in effect public prosecutors. From that investigative beginning it has developed into a quasi-judicial enquiry to determine whether a person charged with an indictable offence should go for trial. It has a secondary function of informing the person charged of nature of the prosecutions' case and of the evidence being led to substantiate that case.

../31
However, despite the entrenched role in criminal procedure of
the committal proceeding, it is of interest to note that there
is nowhere any statutory requirement that the holding of such
a hearing is an obligatory step on proceedings in respect of an
indictable offence. As Fox J. said in R v. Kent ex. p. McIntosh
[1970] 17 FLR 65 at p. 88:-

"Nothing is expressed in any of the legislation about the
need to have preliminary proceedings. The fact appears to
be, as is pointed out in several cases, that whether or not
there are preliminary proceedings is a matter of practice.
This certainly seems extraordinary in view of the elaborate
provisions made everywhere for and concerning preliminary
proceedings".

Whatever may be said about that, it has been, in all Common law
jurisdictions, the invariable practice to have committal
proceedings as a preliminary to the trial of indictable offences.
As described by some judges "... it is now accepted in England
and Australia that committal proceedings are an important element
in our system of criminal justice" cf Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J.
in Bartons case (infra).

To some extent, in some jurisdictions that practice has been
modified quite considerably in recent times. This will be
discussed later. It is also interesting to note that it is not
the practice in Scotland to have committal proceedings. The
decision whether a man should be committed to take his trial for
an indictable offence rests solely with the Lord Advocate, who
is assisted in carrying out the duty and exercising control over
all prosecutions by the Solicitor-General and by four advocates

../32
depute whom he appoints. The Law Officers and the advocates
depute are collectively known as Crown Counsel....In minor cases
the decision to prosecute is taken by the prosecutor fiscal
within his district acting, usually, on a police report. The
prosecutor fiscal ascertains the evidence which the witnesses
will give if called upon at the subsequent trial. This is done
by the process of taking statements, which are called
precognitions. Each witness is precognized privately and
separately and the precognition reduced to writing. The accused
is not present or represented. - see Report of the Departmental
Committee on Proceedings Before Examining Justices - Cmnd. 479
of 1958.

Invariable they may be, but as noted, committal proceedings, are,
and have for some time been, the subject of considerable
controversy. Opinions range from suggestions that they should
be abolished altogether to fierce arguments for their retention,
with many variations in between those extremes.

It is of no real value to quote extensively the proposals of the
various points of view but it is of assistance to set out some
of them. Before doing so, however, it may set the scene to look
at a preliminary hearing through the eyes of a senior and
experienced, Stipendiary Magistrate as it was conducted in 1968
in Victoria.

"There could very well be a series of housebreakings against
a pair of offenders, and the Police who are prosecuting have
all their data in a perfectly typed brief. The inquiry
consists of a procession of citizens giving their evidence
in turn, word for word the same as in the brief, which is
all laboriously taken down in longhand, often not in
copperplate. As each witness has been examined and
occasionally cross-examined, he must wait until the end of the hearing for the formal committal. The witnesses are then all lined up and asked to acknowledge themselves to be bound in the sum of $200 to appear and to give evidence at the trial. They are not sure what it is all about, but all chant "I do" in unison or in turn without knowing the dire consequences of their failure to agree to be bound. A whole morning is often thus wasted on a matter the result of which is a foregone conclusion and which leaves the ordinary citizen or busy businessman with a very poor opinion of the criminal law and its ponderous administration."

Having painted that grim picture he then plaintively comments:-

"It has often occurred to me that there must be a better method for Magistrates to conduct a preliminary inquiry in order to determine whether there is or is not a sufficient case to send to a superior Court for hearing."

The learned magistrate's strictures have been echoed, often much more strongly, in other quarters: some of them are now noted, as are arguments in support of the continuation of preliminary hearings, albeit in a modified form.

The quotations below point to the most commonly raised arguments for committal proceedings, and those against. They illustrate the breadth across the Common law world and the depth, in time, of the competing views. A reflection on these will reveal that, to a considerable degree, the views as to what course should be taken in relation to committal proceedings is a highly subjective one. This is strongly illustrated in the case of Barton v. R. 147 CLR 75 where the High Court divided evenly on the question of the essentiality of committal proceedings; but it was even more noticeable that judges who ultimately differed on a subjective basis pointed to the same elements of the committal as arguments for and against their stand. More will be said of the Barton case later.
Speaking generally the arguments for and against the retention of committal proceedings in their present form, although differing in some matters of emphasis among those advancing then on each side, are fairly consistent in each case. Some of these arguments may be summarised as follows:-

A. Arguments in Favour of Retaining Committal Proceedings in Their Present Form.

(1) Evidence is called whilst fresh in the mind of the witness.

(2) The depositions show whether a prima facie case has been established against him (or her).

(3) No person is put on trial without a prima facie case having first been established against him (or her).

(4) Witnesses are examined publicly and orally, and thus their strengths and credibility are tested in a way which cannot be matched by any other procedure or discovery.

(5) The Justices may be able to save a witness's attendance at the trial by conditionally binding him over, especially witnesses of a formal nature.

(6) Depositions help the prosecution by enabling it to form an impression of the reliability of the witnesses, and, by disclosing defects in the evidence, enable it to be remedied or the prosecution withdrawn. The costs of an unnecessary trial are thus saved.
(7) They enable the accused to know the case that he has to meet.

(8) They frequently led to pleas of guilty at the trial in cases that would otherwise be defended.

(9) They are used in framing the indictment.

(10) They enable an estimate to be made of the time the trial will take and facilitate the making of arrangements for the trial.

(11) Proceedings are materially shortened by clarification and arrangement of evidence presented at the court below.

(12) They are evidence for the court for the purpose of deciding whether to accept a plea of guilty.

(13) They enable the recollection and reliability of the witness to be tested at the trial.

(14) The Judge has an easier task if the evidence given at the preliminary examination is before him.

(15) They are evidence where the witness is unable to attend at the trial.

(16) They are sometimes referred to in the Court of Criminal Appeal on the subject of the exercise of the perogative of mercy.

(17) By reason of the public nature of most committals and the general reluctance of governments to file ex officio indictments the criminal justice system is not used for politically motivated prosecutions.
B. Arguments Against Retention in Present Form

Succinct criticism of several of the arguments set out above is expressed by Professor Glanville Williams in an article entitled "Proposals to Expedite Criminal Trials" published in (1959) Crim. L.R. p. 82.

"On the various advantages specified by the [Byrne] Committees (i.e. most of those set out above) it is perhaps sufficient to append the following comments:

On (1), the depositions are normally not evidence at all at the trial; consequently their freshness is generally no merit. On the contrary, the practice of taking depositions tends to make the evidence at the trial staler than it would otherwise be.

Advantages (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15) could be substantially obtained by making use of the witness's proofs of evidence instead of depositions. Advantages (5) and (6) are altogether too minor to justify the present procedure.

Specifically defined disadvantages suggested by the writers are:-

(1) In practice, little sifting of evidence and defining of issues result from committal proceedings and the length of the trial is seldom influenced by those proceedings. In this regard the Philips Commission said "how effective are committal proceedings in preventing inadequately prepared and selected cases going to the Crown Court?../37
Committal it is said is all too often just an automatic procedure, since Magistrates are reluctant to dismiss cases. Statistics for 1978 show that more than 84,000 defendants were committed for trial and over 2,000, or just over 2% were discharged because there was not sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial in the Crown Court."
(The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981 Cmnd. 8092)

(2) Because of the lower level of evidence required for a committal order than for a conviction, a case which is "weak" at trial is frequently enough to warrant a committal order, and the result is that that case is presented twice before the accused is acquitted.

(3) The nature of the charge at a trial on indictment will be determined by the Crown Prosecutor who signs the indictment, and this decision can be made as readily from witnesses statements as from depositions.

(4) The costs of criminal proceedings plus trial far exceed the costs of a trial alone.

(5) The time taken in Magistrates Courts by committal proceedings delays the ultimate disposal both of the summary trials in those same courts and of trial on indictment which cannot be listed until the committal order is made and the preparation of documents - principally, the depositions - is completed.

(6) It is an unwarranted imposition on witnesses and, in many cases, duplicates what is an unpleasant and traumatic experience for them, to require them to go through their evidence and to be cross-examined twice.
(7) In practice it is almost unknown for witnesses to come forward merely in consequence of the publicity given to committal proceedings.

(8) As the prosecution is under no obligation to adduce all the evidence it will call at the trial committal proceedings are not necessarily an adequate means of enabling the defence to discover the prosecution case.

(9) Committal proceedings are wasteful of time, money and effort and their legitimate function could be more efficiently performed through a system of pre-trial procedures designed to effect disclosure of the prosecution case and such limiting and pre-trial determination of issues as co-operation by the defence will allow. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that approximately 70% of persons committed for trial plead guilty in the higher court. (This figure varies slightly from jurisdiction or jurisdiction).

(10) The Law Reform Commission of Canada in its study report entitled Discovery in Criminal Cases published in 1974 says that committal proceedings are "cumbersome and expensive vehicle for obtaining discovery."

(11) If affords the defendant the opportunity of adjusting his case in the light of the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses given at the preliminary examination.

Finally it is to be noted that Mr Justice Blackburn then Chief Justice of the Supreme of the Australian Capital Territory, in an address to the Fifth South Pacific Judicial Conference in 1982 described committal proceedings as "a total waste of time" (cited in the First Issues Paper; Criminal Procedure of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission at page 77).
It is, however, to be observed that even the majority of the critics of the preliminary enquiry do not advocate its abolition but rather recommend changes to its form and procedure. Many of these changes have recently been adopted in various common law jurisdictions, to a greater or lesser extent. This will appear when the legislative provisions governing the committal proceedings are examined later.

In any event it is suggested that for practical purposes the question of whether or not preliminary proceedings should remain, albeit in some modified form, has been resolved by the decision of the High Court in Barton v R (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75. It is convenient to examine that decision now. The High Court Justices who expressed opposing views as to the necessity, or utility, of committal proceedings advanced much the same arguments as set out above, expressing some of them more forthrightly, and adding some new ones.

The most appropriate way to convey the opinions of the differing justices in Barton is to quote short extracts of the most relevant passages in their judgment.

At pages 100 - 101 the following appears in the joint judgment of Gibbs A-CJ and Mason J. with whom Aickin J. agreed:

"We are not impressed by the argument that because in the distant past the courts proceeded to hear trials on ex officio indictments without benefit of a preliminary examination, it necessarily follows that we should take the same course today or that there is no element of injustice in forcing an accused to trial without such an examination. It is now accepted in England and Australia that committal proceedings are an important element in our system of criminal justice."
They constitute such an important element in the protection of the accused that a trial held without antecedent committal proceedings, unless justified on strong and powerful grounds, must necessarily be considered unfair. To deny an accused the benefit of committal proceedings is to deprive him of a valuable protection uniformly available to other accused persons, which is of great advantage to him, whether in terminating the proceedings before trial or at the trial."

To the contrary of this view Stephen J. said that at pages 104 - 105:

"The fair trial of an accused does not, in my view, require as an essential prerequisite that it should be preceded by committal proceedings. The contrary view would place a significant practical qualification upon the Attorney-General's unexaminable power to file ex officio indictments, a power which applies to ex officio indictments generally without distinguishing between those filed after discharge by a committing magistrate and those filed in the absence of any committal proceedings. It is one thing freely to acknowledge that power while retaining for the courts the not inconsistent duty of ensuring that in each individual case the accused has a fair trial; it is quite another to treat the Attorney-General's power as never properly exercised in the absence of prior committal proceedings. Their absence will, however, always call for a careful evaluation by the trial court of all the circumstances lest, the consequent prejudice to the accused should be such as to have deprived him of a fair trial. Committal proceedings are an important part of the protection ordinarily afforded to an accused in the criminal process and for the accused to be deprived of them necessarily puts a court upon enquiry."
Murphy J. at p. 18 said:

"The desirability of committal proceedings in modern times is doubtful, at least in certain kinds of cases. A trend has developed in New South Wales in which conspiracy, fraud, and various corporate charges become delayed because of committal proceedings which go on for months or years. These are often interrupted with excursions into the Supreme Court for rulings on points of law or procedure. This not only tends to improperly frustrate prosecutions, but also can result in embarrassment and oppression to defendants. While I do not criticise the magistrates who unfortunately have to preside over them, such committal proceedings have become a disgrace to the administration of criminal justice in New South Wales."

Wilson J. at p. 109 of the judgment says:

"I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by Gibbs and Mason JJ. The history of the case and the circumstances in which it comes to this court are there set out. With respect, I adopt their Honour's review of early development of the relevant law ... However I am unable to agree with their Honours that a trial held without antecedent committal proceedings, unless justified on strong powerful grounds, must necessarily be considered unfair."

Page 112 paragraph (c):

"(c) The course that has been followed is wholly consistent with the statute. The conduct of committal proceedings is not an essential condition precedent to the filing of an indictment. It would be remarkable, therefore, if the absence of such proceedings were to deprive that action of any practical effect."
Again at p. 144 His Honour says:

"It is in the light of considerations such as the foregoing that I seek an answer to the present problem. How can it be that resort to the unquestioned power to institute a trial on indictment without a prior committal proceeding is an abuse of the process of the court? It cannot be simply that the loss of some advantage which may ordinarily be enjoyed, whether or not fortuitously, by other persons accused of crime, amounts to such an abuse. That loss of advantage may be felt keenly by an accused person, but this is a very different thing from saying that he has lost the opportunity of a fair trial. With all respect to those who think differently, I am unable to comprehend how the mere absence of committal proceedings of itself could ever sustain an allegation of abuse of process."

Thus with the opinions, (not the decision), in the Barton case being evenly divided the position at common law as to the legal necessity for committal proceedings, even full oral proceedings, is left in a state of flux. The statements of opinion are so forthrightly expressed that it is obvious that the differences of opinion are deep. In those circumstances it would seem undesirable to recommend the abolition of committal proceedings altogether as a preliminary to the trial of all indictable offences by jury. To some extent there is an air of unreality about this rigid approach when one considers, as will hereinafter appear, that the proportion of criminal charges tried by jury is a very small percentage and is constantly shrinking.

Having considered the arguments for and against the retention of committal proceedings it is now desirable to examine the legislation, in Australia, governing those proceedings. It has already been noted that there is no legislation prescribing them.
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING COMMITTAL
PROCEDINGS IN AUSTRALIA

The material in this part of the paper, in the main, incorporates the work of Dr J. Seymour in his publication "Committal for Trial". The legislative references have been updated from 1977 when his work was published.

The most important features of the relevant Acts and Ordinances are as follows:

New South Wales


Victoria

Magistrates (Summary proceedings Act 1975, Sects. 43 - 75 as amended to June 1983.

Queensland


South Australia


Western Australia


Tasmania

Justices Act 1959 (consolidated 1974: reprinted May 1982),

Australian Capital Territory

Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance 1930-1977.

Northern Territory

Unless otherwise indicated all references in this part of the paper are to the enactments and sections set out above.

It is also to be noted that committal proceedings with respect to offences against the laws of the Commonwealth are governed by State or Territory law: S. 68(1) and (2) Judiciary Act (C'wth). Only a Stipendiary Magistrate or his equivalent may exercise the jurisdiction.

**The Court**

In the majority of the States and Territories the legislation empowers a justice or justices to preside over committal proceedings. In two jurisdictions specific mention is made of magistrates: some of the relevant Victorian sections include a reference to a Magistrates' Court, while in the Australian Capital Territory a magistrate is authorised to sit. Where no mention is made of magistrates they may preside by virtue of provisions which empower them to perform the functions of justices. Throughout the description which follows magistrates only are referred to.

In all jurisdictions it is provided that the place where the preliminary hearing is held shall not be deemed an open court, and the magistrates are given the power to exclude persons from the court. A magistrate may use this power if he feels that the ends of justice require him to do so. The Victorian statute adds a reference to the use of the power of exclusion in order to protect the reputation of the victim of a alleged sexual assault or of an offence or extortion. Further, that State has enacted specific rules governing a preliminary hearing when the offence alleged is rape, attempted rape, or assault with intent to rape. A stipendiary magistrate sitting alone must preside
and, when the complainant is being examined or her statement read, no person may be present other than the informant, the accused, legal representatives and their clerks, police and court officers involved in the case, and persons specially authorised by the magistrate. In Queensland there exists a rule as to the exclusion of persons from the court while a child is giving evidence in a case involving a sexual offence against a child.

The same two States have also passed legislation restricting the publication of reports of committal proceedings. The Victorian Act prohibits the publication of a report of any confession or admission unless the accused is discharged or until after his trial. There is also an absolute prohibition on the publication of the prosecution's opening statement, and the magistrate may forbid the publication of any statement to which objection has been taken. Finally, there is an over-riding power to prevent the publishing of material likely to be prejudicial to a fair trial. The restrictions in Queensland apply to hearings in respect of indictable offences of a sexual nature; magistrates are empowered to prohibit the publication of the whole or part of the proceedings.

The Western Australian statute confers a more general power on the magistrate, who may at any time state that in his opinion in the interests of justice it is undesirable that any report of the evidence given at the hearing should be published.

The Oral Hearing

The first part of the hearing consists of the taking of the evidence for the prosecution; the evidence is taken on oath or in such other manner as is prescribed. Where written depositions are taken these must usually be signed by the witness and by the magistrate. In most jurisdictions there is provision for some other form of recording.
The defendant must normally be present throughout the hearing. Four jurisdictions, however, make special provision for the accused to be excused from attendance. These are New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. The Queensland law is unique in that is provided that a person charged upon a private complaint need not appear in person at a preliminary hearing until the magistrate is satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to put him on trial. In the Australian Capital Territory a defendant who is at liberty may apply for an order excusing him from attendance during the preliminary hearing. Where a summons has been issued an order may be made at any time after its issue and before the completion of the taking of the prosecution evidence. Further, it may be made whether or not the applicant is before the court or has attended before the court in connection with the proceedings. The application must not be granted unless the accused will be legally represented during his absence. When an order has been made the court may at any time require the accused's attendance, and must do so once it has concluded that the prosecution evidence has established a prima facie case.

A typical preliminary hearing begins with a reading of the charge, but the defendant does not normally plead at this stage. After the prosecutor opens his case the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is taken in the manner described above. Cross-examination by the accused or his solicitor or counsel is permitted; in two jurisdictions the legislation makes specific reference to this right of cross-examination.
A distinctive feature of the Tasmanian system is that the defendant is asked to plead at the beginning of the preliminary hearing. The Act provides that, at the commencement of the hearing, the court must explain to an unrepresented defendant his rights and duties in respect of the charge. The magistrate is directed to use "the prescribed form of words" or "words of like import". The prescribed formula is set out in rule 49 of the Justices Rules, 1976, and requires the magistrate to explain the purpose of a committal hearing, and to ask the defendant to plead. If the defendant wishes, he will be granted an adjournment. If a guilty plea is entered the defendant is committed to the Supreme Court for sentence. If the defendant pleads not guilty or that he has cause to show why he should not be convicted of the charge, there will not necessarily be an oral hearing, as he is then asked whether he wishes depositions to be taken. If he does not he is committed for trial. If he does require depositions the normal hearing procedure is followed.

In South Australia amendments to the Justices Act in 1983 have considerably extended the jurisdiction and powers of the magistrate in committal proceedings. If a person is charged with a minor indictable offence but no major offence the charge shall be dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction. Moreover the magistrate is given wide powers of amendment.

Special mention must also be made of Western Australia. Before the hearing of the evidence there is a court sitting which seems to be unique in Australia. The defendant is brought before a magistrate, who must read and explain to him the offence with which he is charged, tell him that he is not required to plead, indicate the courses of action open to him, and provide him with a written statement describing the procedure to be adopted. The proceedings are then adjourned.
Later in this paper we shall discuss the provisions - existing in all jurisdictions - which permit committal on the basis of written statements. The Western Australian adjournment of the preliminary sittings allows the prosecution time to prepare written statements of the evidence to be tendered and to make them available to the defendant. The defendant, for his part, also has time to consider his position, and can decide whether or not to allow the prosecution to proceed in this way. When the proceedings resume the defendant is asked to elect whether to have a preliminary hearing. If he elects to have a hearing this takes the normal form, except that the written statements may be tendered as evidence if the defendant does not object; the admissible parts of these statements are read aloud.

In the majority of Australian jurisdictions the legislation sets out a two-stage process to be followed during a preliminary hearing. Having heard the prosecution case the magistrate must make an initial assessment of the evidence in order to determine whether the hearing should proceed further or whether the defendant, if in custody, should be discharged. If the hearing does continue then, once the defence has had its chance, a further assessment is made, and the decision to commit or discharge is reached.

The criteria to be employed by the court in making its decision at each stage of the process must be considered in detail, for there are some variations.

With regard to the making of the discharge decision at the conclusion of the prosecution case the law is clear. In all eight jurisdictions the court must, if it is of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant the defendant being put on trial for any indictable offence, order the defendant, if in custody, to be discharged as to the information or complaint
then under inquiry. As might be expected, the same test predominates when it comes to the making of the alternative decision as to whether the hearing should proceed further. However, in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory a different criterion governs the decision to proceed with the hearing. In each of these jurisdictions the magistrate must proceed only if he is of the opinion that a prima facie case has been made out by the prosecution. There are also differences between these jurisdictions in the wording of the relevant sections. In the Australian Capital Territory the Ordinance refers to the need for a prima facie case "in respect of an indictable offence" whereas the New South Wales Act is less precise.

In Victoria the decision to proceed relates to the indictable offence with which the defendant is charged. Should the magistrate conclude that the evidence is sufficient to put the accused on trial for some indictable offence other than that with which he has been charged, he must direct that a new information be prepared.

A distinctive feature of the Act governing Victorian procedure at this stage is that two tests are available to the magistrate when he performs his task of deciding whether the hearing should proceed. As an alternative to the sufficiency test the magistrate is directed to ask himself "if the evidence given for the prosecution raises a strong or probable presumption of the guilt of the accused" in respect of the indictable offence with which he is charged.
Once it has been decided that the proceedings are to continue the defendant is given an opportunity to make a statement. Before he does so, the court is required to administer a statutory caution, and in most jurisdictions the relevant statute sets this out. The form of words prescribed in Queensland is a good example:

"You will have an opportunity to give evidence on oath before us and to call witnesses. But first I am going to ask you whether you wish to say anything in answer to the charge. You need not say anything unless you wish to do so and you are not obliged to enter any plea; and you have nothing to hope from any promise, and nothing to fear from any threat that may have been held out to induce you to make any admission or confession of guilt. Anything you say will be taken down and may be given to evidence at your trial. Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge or enter any plea?"

If the defendant does make a statement the general rule is that this must be taken down in writing or otherwise recorded. In all jurisdictions provision is made for the accused to give evidence on his own behalf and to call witnesses.

After the defendant has had an opportunity to present his case the court must again assess the evidence in order to reach its decision as to committal or discharge. In the main the criterion employed at this stage is exactly the same as that which was relied on at the close of the prosecution case: is the evidence sufficient to put the defendant on trial for an indictable offence? As well as this test, Victoria repeats the alternative formulation, viz., whether the evidence "raises a strong or probable presumption of the guilt" of the defendant. New South
Wales also adopts this course and makes provision for the same two tests, although the strong and probable presumption test was not included in the section dealing with the court's earlier decision. The idiosyncracies of the Victorian and New South Wales statutes do not end there, however. The former states that when all the evidence has been taken the magistrate must order the discharge of the defendant if he is of the opinion "that there is not sufficient reason to put the accused person upon his trial for any indictable offence", while the latter directs that the defendant must be discharged if the magistrate is of the opinion "that on such evidence the defendant ought not to be put upon his trial for an indictable offence."

When no guilty plea has been entered and the magistrate considers that the evidence is sufficient he directs that the defendant be tried in the appropriate court, and steps are taken to ensure the defendant's attendance, either by remanding him in custody or admitting him to bail.

Plea of Guilty

In all jurisdictions provision is made for the entering of a plea of guilty at some stage of the hearing. Several of the Statutes and Ordinances refer to the possibility of such a plea at the end of the prosecution case. In Tasmania as has been noted, a defendant is asked to plead at the commencement of the committal proceedings, while in Western Australia provision is made for the reception of a guilty plea at two points in the hearing. The defendant may plead guilty when, at the resumed sitting, he has elected not to have a preliminary hearing, or he may do so when the court has finished examining the prosecution witnesses. In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory the defendant may plead guilty at any time during the hearing.
Two States and the two Territories place limitations on a lower court's right to accept a guilty plea. In South Australia a defendant may not plead guilty during a preliminary hearing when the charge is murder, treason or manslaughter. In the Northern Territory a guilty plea may not be received when the offence is punishable by imprisonment for life. The New South Wales statute states that such a plea may not be entered in respect of an indictable offence punishable with penal servitude for life, while in the Australian Capital Territory the relevant section excludes offences punishable by death or penal servitude for life.

Specific provision is made in South Australia and the Northern Territory for the defendant, upon pleading guilty, to call witnesses as to his character, and the depositions of any such witnesses must be recorded.

Once a guilty plea has been accepted the defendant is, in most jurisdictions, committed for sentence. In Victoria, however, the magistrate directs the accused person to be tried.

Another point which must be considered is the possibility of the defendant changing his mind after entering a guilty plea during a committal hearing.

In New South Wales and the Australia Capital Territory a defendant who has been committed on a plea of guilty may request the higher court to order that the proceedings in the lower court be continued. A similar application may be made by counsel for the Crown. The relevant Victorian provision states that where a defendant has pleaded guilty and been presented for trial and then does not plead guilty to the presentment, he must on application by the Crown, and may on his own application, be
tried in the Supreme Court or County Court. In sharp contrast are Queensland and Western Australia, where it is provided that a court confronted by such a defendant who later pleads not guilty must, if satisfied that he did admit the offence before the magistrate, direct a plea of guilty to be entered. In both States, however, provision is made for the higher court to enter a plea of not guilty if it appears from the depositions that the defendant has not committed the offence charged or any other indictable offence.

The situation in Tasmania is that where a defendant has been committed for sentence and withdraws his plea the court may, if the Attorney-General makes an application, direct him to be tried in the Supreme Court.

In South Australia and the Northern Territory the procedure is quite different. A defendant who has been committed for sentence may withdraw his plea by giving written notice to the Attorney-General (or to the Crown Law Officer in the Northern Territory) not less than seven days before the higher court's sittings commence. He is then tried in that court.

Another way in which the procedure set in motion by a guilty plea can be reversed is when the Judge in the higher court concludes that the evidence does not support the charge. As has been noted, both Queensland and Western Australia law permit a Judge to enter a plea of not guilty in such circumstances. In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory the Judge must order the resumption of the committal hearing if it appears to him that the facts do not support the charge.
In South Australia and the Northern Territory if it appears to the court that a guilty plea should be withdrawn, the court may advise the defendant to withdraw his plea. If he does so he is deemed to have been committed for trial.

**Written Statements in Lieu of Oral Evidence**

Two purposes can be fulfilled by the use of written statements instead of oral testimony. These statements may be employed as a means of making the committal procedure more efficient, for the witnesses' need to attend and recite their evidence is obviated and the court's time is saved. This leaves the court's function substantially unaltered, as the magistrate must still consider the evidence and determine whether it warrants committal. Alternatively, the use of written statements can remove from the court the task of examining the sufficiency of the evidence and thus create a mechanism which completely replaces the committal hearing. Each of these approaches will be examined in turn.

In all jurisdictions explicit provision is made for the court to admit witnesses' written statements without the need for those witnesses to appear.

Except in Tasmania the legislation includes certain formal requirements which must be satisfied before these statements may be tendered. Although there are variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the matters dealt with include the need to supply to the other party a list of witnesses and exhibits, copies of statements, copies of documents, a statement of the other party's rights, and the need to observe certain formalities as to attestation. The Tasmanian Act merely refers to the fact that the evidence must be in the form of a statutory declaration.
Varying restrictions are placed on the use of written statements. The most important of these relate to whether both parties may make use of them or only one, whether they may be employed for all offices, and whether legal representation is a pre-requisite.

In Victoria only a stipendiary magistrate or two justices may preside over proceedings employing written statements; also this procedure is not available when the charge is murder, attempted murder or conspiracy to murder. Only the informant may invoke it. In Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania both sides may tender written statements and these may be used in relation to any indictable offence. However, written statements may not be admitted in Queensland if the defendant is not represented. In New South Wales, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory, only the prosecution may claim the benefit of this procedure, which applies to any indictable offence.

The provisions regarding objection to the use of written statements are variously expressed. In New South Wales if the informant fails to comply with a notice served on him by the defendant, or an order from the Magistrate, requiring the attendance of the witness, the statement is not admissible unless it has already been admitted as evidence. In Queensland if the parties do not agree to the use of written statements they are not admissible and in Western Australia a party may object to a statement being tendered. In the two Territories the defendant may, not less than five days before the hearing, require the attendance of the witness. The effect of this is to render the written statement inadmissible. The Victorian Act is very similar, but allows the accused to require the attendance of the witness either to give oral evidence or for cross-examination only. The next section provides that a written statement may
be tendered if the accused has not required the witness to attend "to give evidence". Presumably this means that if the witness has attended for the purposes of cross-examination the statement may still be received by the Court. In Tasmania the law is that a party may request the court to summon a witness who has made a statutory declaration "to attend as a witness for further examination or cross-examination". Whether such a request renders the written statement inadmissible is not made clear. In South Australia it seems that the defendant cannot block the reception of a written statement, but he does have the right, before the completion of the prosecution case, to require the witness whose statement has been admitted. The Western Australian statute enables any party at a preliminary hearing to apply to the court requiring the attendance of a witness whose written statement has been tendered in evidence. In Victoria and the two Territories further opportunity for objection to the admissibility of a written statement arises during the hearing. In such a case it is for the court to decide whether to uphold the objection and to require the attendance of the witness. Provisions enabling the court to require the attendance of a witness who has made a written statement exist in seven jurisdictions. The recent New South Wales amendments contain two sets of other interesting provisions. One set provides for the reception of statements in foreign languages with specified proof as to translation. The other is a presumption of fact as to the date of birth of a person as contained in a written statement.

Also worthy of mention in this analysis of the use of written testimony is the fact that, in Victoria, when a charge of rape, attempted rape or assault with intent to rape is being dealt with, the informant must present the complainant's evidence in written form unless the magistrate rules otherwise. Similarly, South Australian law places some limitations on the right of a defendant charged with a sexual offence (as defined) to require the victim's appearance at the preliminary hearing.
As has been indicated the above-described procedures regarding the reception of written testimony leave the court's task unaltered. However, four States - Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania - have gone further and have enacted laws which obviate the need for consideration of the evidence.

Victoria allows a defendant to elect to stand trial without a preliminary hearing where he has been served with copies of the written evidence. In Queensland, where the evidence consists solely of written statements, and counsel for the defendant consents to his client's committal, then the court must commit without determining whether the evidence is sufficient to put the defendant on trial for an indictable offence. In Western Australia, as we have seen, the defendant is asked to elect whether he wants a preliminary hearing. He will be taken to have elected to have a preliminary hearing if he stands mute or does not answer the question putting him to his election, if he objects to the tender of any statement, if he cross-examines any witnesses, if he gives or tenders any evidence other than by way written statements, or if he submits that there is no case to answer. If he does not elect to have a preliminary hearing the magistrate must, without any consideration of the contents of the written statements, commit the defendant. It will be remembered that in Tasmania a defendant may elect not to have depositions taken. The statute allows a defendant who has made such an election - and who pleads not guilty or cause to show and has not disputed the making of a committal order - to be committed for trial without consideration of the evidence. He is supplied with a copy of the police statements prior to the trial.
The Functions of Committal Proceedings

On this subject Dr Seymour says, in the work cited above:

"In asking what purposes committal proceedings serve one can distinguish between their statutorily proclaimed objective and other benefits which flow from the pursuit of this objective.

In each of the jurisdictions discussed it is clear that the primary function of the committal hearing is to test the sufficiency of the evidence against an accused person. The basic purpose is to screen out cases in which a trial is not justified."

Although that quotation correctly expresses the principles involved a view is not infrequently advanced by defence counsel in some jurisdictions that committal proceedings should be treated as virtually a full dress rehearsal for the trial: that the defence should have the opportunity to cross-examine every witness that the Crown intends to call upon the trial. The authorities, in the main, consistently reject this view as the following citations in Australia and England illustrate.

In an early case in Victoria Hood J. stated the principle as follows:

"The duty of a magistrate on hearing an information for an indictable offence is one which is exercised in favour of the defendants. It is an investigation on their behalf relating to the charge against them in order to satisfy a bench of magistrates that there is something for a higher court to decide. It is not any determination or decision
on the case itself that the magistrates have to give, except, it may be, when they discharge the defendants on the ground that there is no case. All that they really do is to hear the prosecutor's case, to hear anything the defendant chooses to urge on his own behalf, and then to say whether in their opinion there is a case for the higher court to determine. If there is, what they have to do is not to make an order against the defendant in respect of the offence, but simply according to S. 45 to make sure that the defendant will attend the higher court. Their only duty, once they determine there is a case to go to the higher court, is to take such steps as will ensure the attendance of the defendant at that higher court, either committing him to gaol to await the trial, or admitting him to bail."

see in re the Mercantile Bank ex parte Millidge; Cox V. Millidge (1893) 19 V.L.R. 527 at 529.


"Thus stated, this as a point is a very short one: what is the function of the committal proceedings for this purpose? Is it as the prosecution might contend, simply a safeguard for the citizen to ensure that he cannot be made to stand his trial without a prima facie case being shown; or is it, as Mr Beckman would contend, a rehearsal proceeding so that the defence may try out their cross-examination on the prosecution witnesses with a view to using the results to advantage in the Crown Court at a later stage? This matter has never been raised to be the subject of authority, and that was another reason why leave was given in the present case.
For my part I think that it is clear that the functions of committal proceedings is to ensure that no one shall stand his trial unless a prima facie case has been made out. The prosecution have the duty of making out a prima facie case, and if they wish for reasons such as the present not to call one particular witness, even though a very important witness, at the committal proceedings, that in my judgment is a matter within their discretion, and their failure to do so cannot on any basis be said to be a breach of the rule of natural justice."

Finally in the Barton Case Wilson J. said at p. 112 and 113, paragraphs (d) and (e):

"The committal proceeding is a procedure designed to facilitate the administration of criminal justice. It serves this purpose in two ways: in the first place, it marshals the evidence that is tendered on behalf of the informant in deposition form, a form which enabled it to be perpetuated and be available for use at the trial in the event of the witness being dead or otherwise unavailable; in the second place, it requires the magistrate to be satisfied that the evidence established a prima facie case before the accused person is committed to stand trial: Reg. V. Epping and Harlow Justices; Ex parte Massaro.

Although it will ordinarily do so, a committal proceeding is not designed to aid an accused person in the preparation of his defence: Moss v. Brown [1979] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 114. This is borne out by the established fact that the prosecution has a discretion as to the evidence it will tender in the committal proceedings. It is not obliged to produce all the evidence upon which the Crown may rely at the trial: cf. Ex parte Massaro."
Although there are some statements in the judgment of Gibbs and Mason JJ, in Barton, which highlight the importance of the opportunity for the defence to cross-examine witnesses, there is nothing there which suggested that the calling of all Crown witnesses is mandatory.

For the sake of completion, attention is drawn to the recent High Court decision of R. v. Apostilides 58 ALJR 371. In that case the High Court decided that in respect of a criminal trial it is completely in the discretion of the Crown Prosecutor to decide whether a person will be called or not as a witness even if that person's name appears on the indictment as a witness, and who would be expected to be able to give evidence which is material to the matters in issue in the trial. The Court further decided that the trial Judge may, but is not obliged to, question the Prosecutor or decline to call a particular person. He is not called upon to adjudicate the efficiency of his reason.

Assuming, for the reasons set out above, that committal proceedings, in some appropriate form, should be retained in the majority of instances where indictable offences are to be tried by a judge and jury, it is necessary to consider how they can be modified and improved so as to remedy their manifest defects. It should be said, in passing, that not only do we not advocate the complete elimination of committal proceedings altogether but neither do we support proposals in some quarters that committal type proceedings should be introduced as a preliminary to all criminal hearings including summary ones.

As seen above the most serious defects pointed to, in committal proceedings in their present form are:-
(1) The unnecessary delay occasioned between charge and trial by interposing committal proceedings. These result in injustice to both the community and the accused.

(2) The considerably added expense of conducting both a committal proceeding and a trial in each instance.

(3) The inconvenience, expense and, sometimes, trauma occasioned in witnesses by being forced to attend court twice and being subjected to examination and cross-examination twice.

(4) The fact that despite these considerations the vast majority of committals are largely a formality anyway, only a very small percentage of defendants ever being discharged at that hearing.

(5) The delay occasioned to magistrates in disposing of their summary cases, civil and criminal, by the necessity to conduct committals, often of a lengthy nature.

Points (2), (3), (4) and (5), above, are fairly self-evident, although some empirical evidence would probably assist in accurately assessing any modification of (2).

Obviously if one eliminates the necessity for a committal proceeding of completed proceeding, by providing for the acceptance of a plea of guilty at the outset, or during the hearing, followed by an immediate committal for sentence one eliminates altogether the inconvenience and trauma occasioned to a number of witnesses by their being forced to attend at two or more hearings. Expenses would also be considerably reduced.
The same results would flow if one reduces the proceedings to being a fairly informal one involving the calling of few if any witnesses for oral examination. Further, a simpler, more expeditious hearing would considerably lessen delays in disposition of other work in Magistrate's courts.

The criticisms referred to in (1), above, are quite serious, both to the accused and the community. It is highly undesirable that a person charged with a serious offence which may carry with the threat of a quite long gaol sentence should have the resolution of the matter delayed unnecessarily for many months. It is equally important to the community that any breaches of its law should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. It is equally unfair to both parties that there should be such a delay in witnesses giving their evidence that, even with the best will in the world, their recollection of events has failed and become distorted by time, or are reconstructed in a more favourable light to the deponent.

**EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PROCEDURE WHERE MODIFICATION INTRODUCED**

That there is a marked delay, even in the period between the first court appearance and committal is a common experience. Unfortunately little empirical evidence on this matter was available when this paper was being prepared, as it had not been specifically requested when the original pro-forma seeking information was sent to various authorities.
The only figures to hand are for Western Australia and New Zealand. As indicated at p. 47 supra the procedure upon committal proceedings in Western Australia is unique. Because of the structure of proceedings there, care would have to be taken when looking at the interval between first appearance in court and ultimate committal. In the case of both Western Australia and New Zealand the available figures relate to periods after the introduction of amendments providing for speedier disposition of the case either upon an election not to have committal proceedings (W.A.), or, upon a plea of guilty (where this is possible) (N.Z.), and for the use of written statements in lieu of a full oral hearing. Unfortunately no statistics are available for periods prior to that time with which to make a comparison. In any event an accurate comparison is extremely difficult to make because in virtually all jurisdictions the number of trials has been constantly on the rise.

What both sets of figures do indicate is that there is still a marked interval between the date of first appearance in court to the date committed for trial. As said already, however, there are no earlier statistics with which to make a comparison.

In New Zealand the procedure in committal proceedings was extensively modified, and streamlined, by the Summary Proceedings Act 1976, sects. 15, 16 and 17. Section 15 introduced to the existing Summary Proceedings Act a new section 153A which provided for a defendant pleading guilty before or during the preliminary hearing, sections 16 and 17 inserted new sections 160A and 173A dealing with the right to use written statements in lieu of oral evidence. The latter are in what is now a fairly common form, based on the English Criminal Justice Act of 1967, (See Magistrates Courts Act 1980) and providing for the use of statements in prescribed form, duly served on the other side and retaining the right to call for the appearance for cross examination. Similarly in the English act the New Zealand legislation eliminates the necessity for the Magistrate to consider the evidence if the defendant is represented and his representative consents.
Under the terms of the new sect. 153A a represented defendant, in a non capital case, may be permitted to plead guilty. Upon his doing so he is committed to the Supreme Court for sentence.

The legislation came into force on 1st May, 1977. Prior to that, committal proceedings were conducted as full oral hearings with no particular provision being made for a plea of guilty other than his being committed for sentence rather than trial. (sect. 114).

The popularity of the new form of procedure may be indicated by following statistics for 1981 taken from a report by the Planning and Development Division, Department of Justice, New Zealand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Depositions</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both (i.e. witnesses summoned on their statements)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 153A - no hearing</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>339</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, in four years, over 75% of committals were conducted in accordance with the new procedure.

Another statistic that is of some interest bears upon the respective times taken for court hearings in the case of each type of procedure. This is as follows:-
### Table 7 - Time (hours:minutes) in Court per Case by Type of Deposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Deposition</th>
<th>Shortest</th>
<th>Longest</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Total Trials/Sentences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRIAL CASES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td>0:05</td>
<td>36:00</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>0:20</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>2:29</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>0:10</td>
<td>36:00</td>
<td>3:00</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SENTENCE CASES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td>0:10</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>0:30</td>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>1:55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>3:40</td>
<td>2:29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the median lengths of time for each deposition type for trial case clearly shows that written only hearings are dealt with more quickly than any other and that those with both written and oral depositions take longest. Half of written hearings are completed in less than one hour, compared with 2 hours 29 minutes for oral hearings and 3 hours for hearings with both oral and written depositions.

In the course of gathering material for the report the authors interviewed various parties to obtain their views as to how the new system was working. Among the views expressed the following are of interest:-

../67
(a) Written statements are especially used for non-contentious evidence.

(b) Both prosecution and defence counsel usually want to see and hear main witnesses in order to assess their credibility and performance and/or prepare them for a trial situation.

(c) Registrars from all courts emphasised the considerable time saving for all when written statements were used.

(d) It was generally agreed that greater liaison between prosecution and defence is necessary for there to be more use of written statements.

In Victoria by virtue of sections 46-48 of the Magistrates (Summary Proceedings) Act 1975 there is provision for the admission of evidence in statement form verified on oath or in other solemn form tendered by the prosecution only. The consent of the accused is not necessary for this to occur but he has the right to call for witnesses to appear for cross-examination.

There is no provision in Victoria for the examining magistrate to commit the accused without consideration of the statements; even by the consent of a represented accused. Indeed section 46(4) expressly provides the contrary. Nor is there any provision for the magistrate to take a plea of guilty before the conclusion of the evidence even where the evidence consists of written statements only.

However, Victoria has introduced an important time saving provision in section 51 of the above Act by which the accused person may waive the preliminary hearing altogether in cases where statement evidence is proposed to be used by the informant.
This provision applies equally in respect of a represented or unrepresented accused person. The accused may so elect at any time after the service upon him of copies of statements of witnesses together with copies of available exhibits. The election must be in writing. Upon the court or justice being satisfied that the accused person understands the nature and consequence of the election the magistrate shall direct him to be tried at the next sittings of the Supreme Court or of the County Court.

No statistics are available for Victoria indicating the extent to which the paper committal proceeding is being used. However, information provided by the Law Reform Commissioner for Victoria (Prof. Louis Waller) indicates that this form of committal proceeding is now extensively used in that State.

Whilst on the subject of committal proceedings in Victoria it is of more than passing interest to note that the number of indictable offences triable summarily in that State has increased substantially following upon an amendment to section 69 of the **Magistrates Courts Act 1971** extending the range of such offences. In most instances of offences of dishonesty the Magistrates Court has jurisdiction where the sum involved does not exceed $10,000. In addition some significant offences against the person are also encompassed in the amendment. That this extended summary jurisdiction has been available is shown by the following short figures of committals for trial to the County Court - in the main venue for criminal trials in Victoria. The figures indicate that committals were on a rising curve as in other parts of Australia until 1980 when they dropped markedly. The figures are as follows:-
New South Wales has only very recently adopted the course of permitting the use of written statements instead of a full oral hearing. This occurred as a result of the enactment of two Acts towards the end of 1983. These were the Crimes (Procedure) Amendment Act 1983, and, the Justices (Procedure) Further Amendment Act 1983. They were proclaimed on the 18th June, 1984 and the 22nd June, 1984 respectively.

The provisions in that legislation for the reception of statement evidence are in common form but apply only to statements tendered on the part of the prosecution. There is no requirement for consent by the accused person but he has the right to call for witnesses whose statements are to be admitted for the purposes of cross-examination. As in Victoria there is no provision in the New South Wales legislation for the magistrate to commit the accused without consideration of the contents of the statements even in the case of the represented accused.

Obviously there is not indication at this early date as to how the new system has been greeted in New South Wales.

In England the traditional form of committal proceedings i.e. full oral evidence of each witness recorded in a deposition, was the customary practice and was conducted pursuant to section 7 of the Magistrates Court Act 1952.
Much criticism was levelled at that procedure although, on the other hand, in some quarters it was strongly defended. The debate on the merits or otherwise of the full committal procedure is summarised aptly in 1966 Criminal Law Review at pp. 490-498 and 498-502.

The debate was resolved by the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, in particular sections 1 and 2 of the Act. It should be noted that that Act is now largely repealed and replaced by the Magistrates Court Act 1980. The provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the earlier legislation are now contained in sections 6(2) and 102 of the latter Act.

Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act instituted the system of enabling the written statement of a witness to be used in place of oral testimony in committal proceedings. That section is the source of what has been described above as "the common form" sections in other jurisdictions referred to above and of section 101A of the Justices Act of 1886-1982 in Queensland. Briefly, the statement of the witness is to be in writing, signed by the deponent, with the signature solemnly authenticated and a copy served on the other party before it can be used. In the English provisions either party can object to its admission or call upon the deponent for cross-examination.

Section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act introduced the then novel concept of the examining justices being enabled to commit a person, who is legally represented, without considering the evidence, if all the evidence is in writing in accordance with the old section 2 and there is no submission that the evidence is insufficient to put him on trial. The innovation is important and it may be desirable to cite the section in full. In its present form in section 6(2) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 it is in the following form:-

../71
"(2) A magistrates' court inquiring into an offence as examining justices may, if satisfied that all the evidence before the court (whether for the prosecution or the defence) consists of written statements tendered to the court under section 102 below, with or without exhibits, commit the accused for trial for the offence without consideration of the contents of those statements, unless -

(a) the accused or one of the accused is not represented by counsel or a solicitor;

(b) counsel or a solicitor for the accused or one of the accused, as the case may be, has requested the court to consider a submission that the statements disclose insufficient evidence to put that accused on trial by jury for the offence;

and subsection (1) above shall not apply to a committal for trial under this subsection."

It is to be noted that this provision for magistrates to commit without considering the evidence, in the circumstances outlined, was introduced into Queensland and New Zealand along with the general provision as to the reception of written statements in the **Summary Proceedings Amendment Act 1976**. Victoria and New South Wales however, have not followed suit confining themselves only to accepting written statements and treating them in the same way as oral evidence as part of the material to be considered by the magistrate.
There are no firm statistics as to the extent to which the new practices have been adopted in England but it would appear that this has happened to an overwhelming degree. The most authoritative statement as to the extent that the new practice has been adopted is contained in the report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Philips Committee Report) of January, 1981, Cmnd 8092 - 1, The Law and Procedure Volume. At paragraph 193 of that document the following statement appears:-

"193 There is no information kept nationally of the use made of committals under s.1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 as opposed to those under 2.7 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952. It is generally thought that the proportion of the latter to the former is extremely small and the limited research information that is available bears out this impression. In a study of cases committed for trial by Sheffield magistrates' court during 1972, only one case of a total of 356 had full committal proceedings. And of 2,406 cases sent for trial in the Crown Court at Birmingham during 1975 and 1976, only four had full committals; in 18 others some of the evidence had been given orally."

Other reports suggest that up to 95% of cases are now so dealt with.

With such an upsurge in the adoption of the new procedure it is not surprising that problems rose in connection with its use. Some of the criticisms are that:

(1) Too many defendants are committed where there is no prima facie case.
(2) The defence will often accept a committal on the papers because it is expeditious rather than because they have read the evidence and concluded that the case should go to a jury;

(3) The acceptance of written statements which contain much that is inadmissible may lead to the erosion of the law of evidence.

The position is perhaps best summarized in the report of the James Committee. Cmnd. 6323. At paragraph 232 of the report it is said:

"...we are satisfied that the [paper] committal procedure can result in cases being committed for trial which ought not to be committed, and that a case is made out for the introduction of steps which will serve to reduce the number of actions when this happens. We would not suggest that the ... procedure should be abolished. This would be retrograde since...the procedure has brought substantial benefits and its advantages outweigh incidental difficulties to which it has given rise. We have not sought to discover the extent to which the workload of magistrates' courts would be affected if this form of committal procedure were to be abolished. But we are confident...that to revert to the old form of committal in all cases would be impracticable because of the intolerable burden it would impose on magistrates and courts' staff."

In the event, the James Committee recommended that before a person is committed for trial under a paper committal both the defence advocate and the person conducting the prosecution should be required to sign a certificate to the effect that they have examined the witnesses statements and are satisfied that the case is suitable for committal without consideration of the evidence by the court.
One other matter in English practice in this field that should be adverted to is that the accused does not plead at all at the committal hearing. This matter also was referred to in the James report, at pp 262-264, where, whilst it was conceded that if it were known to the Crown Court, that a person committed for trial intended to plead guilty a considerable amount of preparatory work could be avoided and the time of jurors, witnesses and others saved, yet it would not go so far as to recommend that Magistrates Courts be given the power to accept a plea of guilty in respect of an indictable offence. The furtherest it would go would be to recommend that the magistrates' court clerk send to a higher court a certificate indicating that the defendant intended to plead guilty.

That brings us finally to an examination of the Queensland legislation on the subject to ascertain what, if any, amendments are needed to bring it into line with modern thinking on the subject.

The procedure for the conduct of committal proceedings in Queensland, as set out in sections 104-134 of the Justices Act, is reasonably satisfactory as it incorporates a number of the modern developments in this area. The legislation provides for:-

1. The use of tendered statements in lieu of oral testimony in committal proceedings - see s. 110A(2)-(14).

2. Justices being enabled to commit for trial with the consent of a represented accused, and where the evidence of the informant consists entirely of written statements and other documentary evidence, without the necessity of considering the material in the statements - s.110(6).
If these machinery steps are being put into effect they should lead to a speedier and more efficient disposal of committal proceedings.

However, as the high costs of litigation mount even higher, and court lists become more and more cluttered, it is desirable to explore any other avenue which will tend to further reduce expense, delay and inefficiency, consonant with the protection of the accused's reasonable interest. To that end we are of the opinion that the following additional reforms should be included in the Act:-

1. A right to be given to the accused person to waive the committal proceeding if he so desires.

2. Provision should be made for the accused person to plead guilty at any stage of the proceedings rather than, for the first time, at the end of the informant's case, as the law is at present.

3. Written statements should be admissible by consent whether or not the accused person is represented by counsel or solicitor.

4. A technical amendment should be made to section 110A(5)B by inserting at the beginning of that paragraph the words "A reasonable time before the hearing..."

5. There should be special provisions for the reception of statements by minors and illiterate persons. Such legislation already exists in the New South Wales, Victorian and English Acts.

6. By consent parties may dispense with the statutory conditions precedent to the admission of written statements.

7. Provision should be made to accept as proven fact the stated age of a deponent in his declaration.
Some thought has been given to including provisions relating to statements in a foreign language as are contained in the recent New South Wales legislation is ss. 48B(1)(a)(i), 48C(1)(c) and (d) and 48(2)(a). However, the necessity for that kind of provision does not appear to have been regarded as being a necessity in any other jurisdiction. In the circumstances we believe that, for the present, it is unnecessary to insert it in the Queensland Act.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUGGESTED REFORMS

Recommendation (1) above could be satisfactorily implemented by inserting, as s. 107, in the Justices Act a new section closely similar to s.51 of the Victorian Magistrates (Summary Proceedings) Act 1975. That section is in the following terms (adjusted to Queensland terms):

"51 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 104, 108 or section 110A a person charged with an indictable offence may elect to stand trial by jury without a preliminary hearing being conducted.

(2) An election under sub-section (1) may be made at any time after the accused person is served under section 110A with copies of the statements of the witnesses proposed by the informant to be called for the prosecution together with copies or reproductions of any documents referred to in those statements which the informant proposed to tender in evidence.

(3) Every election under sub-section (1) shall be in writing in the prescribed form signed by the accused person who shall deliver the election to the clerk of the Magistrates' Court before which the charge is pending and shall deliver a copy to the informant.
(4) If the accused person is in prison when he wishes to make an election under sub-section (1) he may deliver the election and a copy thereof to the officer in charge of the prison who shall forthwith cause the election to be sent to the clerk of the Magistrates' Court and the copy to the informant.

(5) On receiving an election under sub-section (1) the clerk shall place it before a justice as soon as possible.

(6) When the defendant next appears or is brought before the Court or a justice, the Court or justice, upon being satisfied that the accused person understands the nature and consequence of the election, shall direct him to be tried at the next sittings of the Supreme Court or the District Court on the charge in the place nearest or most convenient to the place in which the Court or justice then is and shall commit him by warrant to prison until he is tried for the offence or until he is removed or discharged by due course of law or shall admit him to bail for trial.

(7) Where an accused person is directed under this section to be tried any statements or documents copies of which have been served on the accused person by the informant may be used in evidence upon his trial in all respects as if they were depositions taken and exhibits tendered upon the preliminary examination."

To bring this innovation into line with the structure of the Queensland Justices Act it would be desirable to frame subsection (6) of the above section in different terms. It would remain the same down to the words "of the election," and thereafter should read "shall formally charge him and, with necessary adaptations, the provisions of s.104 shall apply and, subject thereto, the justices shall order the defendant to be committed for trial or, as the case may be, for sentence."
Recommendation (2) could be implemented by inserting a new s.107A in the Justices Act in the following terms:—

"If a defendant is represented by a barrister or solicitor he may, at any time before or during the preliminary hearing of an information plead guilty to the offence with which he is charged and upon his so pleading guilty the justices may there and then instead of committing the defendant to be tried as hereinbefore in this Act provided, shall order him to be committed for sentence before some court of competent jurisdiction, and, in the meantime shall by their warrant commit him to jail to be there safely kept until the sittings of that court, or until he is delivered by due course of law or admitted to bail as provided in the Bail Act."

To effectuate recommendation (3) above merely needs the repeal of subsection (4) of s.110A.

Recommendation (4) above speaks for itself.

One could satisfactorily effect the recommendations contained in 5 above by inserting as a new subsection (5A) of s.110A a provision in the terms of subsection (5) of s.45 of the Victorian Act:—

"If a statement referred to in paragraph (b) in subsection (2) is made by a person under the age of 21 years, the statement shall set forth his age and, if it is made by a person who cannot read, the statement shall be read to him before he signs it and the endorsement by the member of the police force taking the statement shall state that the statement was read to the person before it was signed by him."

../79
To achieve the recommendation in (6) above one could insert as a new subsection (15) to s.110A a section in the following terms "in any committal proceedings the justice or justices may and, on the application of or with the consent of the defendant shall dispense with all or any of the requirements of subsections 5 and (5A).

Finally for recommendation (7) a further subsection (16) to s.110A could be inserted in the following terms "in any committal proceedings, it shall, for the purposes of this sub-division, be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a date specified in a statement purporting or appearing to be the date of birth of the person who made the statement is in fact the date of birth of that person."

It is suggested that if all the recommendations above are implemented they would contribute in a marked degree to further expediting the hearing of committal proceedings with consequent reduction in cost and delay.

One other matter which most practising lawyers, and magistrates, agree occasions lengthy hearings is the ready availability of legal aid to defendants. It is our view that limitations should be imposed on this availability. It is difficult to formulate an appropriate workable scheme in this regard. Perhaps thought should be given to having legal aid only available upon a certificate of the magistrate presiding at the committal, certifying that the committal raised such substantial issues as to justify the provision of legal aid.

We not turn to deal with matters directly effecting the trial itself.

./80
Pre-Trial Pleading and Procedure; Summary Trial

Over quite some period of time, and in most common law jurisdictions severe criticisms have been levelled within and without the legal profession, at the procedural conduct of criminal trials. Among these are:—

(1) That between the time of committal and the actual trial there is little or no contact between the prosecution and the accused or his representatives. The result is that there is no defining of issues between the adversaries as there is in civil proceedings. This causes, or may cause, considerable waste of time on both sides, in preparing for trial of issues that may not be in dispute, or may quickly be resolved. For the same reason it wastes the time of the court which has to deal with the whole gamut of possible issues.

(2) As a corollary of that lack of communication considerable time can be wasted, with resulting expense and frustration, in preliminary argument on points of law after the jury has been empanelled. Reference is here made particularly to such events as applications for separate trials, hearings on the voir dire and other miscellaneous applications regarding evidence. In the case of a full scale voir dire this kind of application can last for a week or more during which time the jury is probably brought into court morning after morning, or sometimes twice a day and then being sent away for reasons quite beyond their comprehension. In some cases a voir dire can even last longer.
Anyone who has practised at any length before juries is aware of the initial bewilderment, and the growing irritation of juries, as they are sent away to the jury room, and called back, time after time. Whatever may be the feelings of juries on the matter, the waste of time, increased expense and general inefficiency of method resulting from archaic procedures are a serious reflection on the administration of justice and quite unacceptable in the pressured circumstances of today.

The contrast with civil procedure with its sharp isolation of issues by means of pleadings, particulars, interrogatories etc., is strikingly unfavourable. Logically there is no reason why a similar approach could not be applied to criminal proceedings. Both are fundamentally adversary proceedings in the Common Law tradition. Both are conducted within the framework of laws of evidence which are basically similar for both types of proceedings.

The training and experience of those participating in these trials are such as to enable them to operate within a system of pleadings in criminal trials as well as civil. It is recognized that there are basic differences between the two types of proceedings, some of them of great significance. The outcome of a criminal trial, if it is likely to climax in a term of imprisonment for the accused, has much more significance for him than for the parties in the greater majority of civil actions. Further, from a procedural point of view, there is a considerable difference in the available sanctions for failure to abide by any rules of pleading. It would be difficult to apply the same rules as dismissing a statement of claim or entering judgment against a defendant, in default of pleading in either case, as occurs
in civil proceedings. To some extent however those
difficulties have been modified, in both respects, in some
jurisdictions. Prosecutions not brought within a certain
time are dismissed and the accused discharged. On the other
hand, where the accused desires to raise an alibi defence
he may be prohibited from doing so unless he complies with
certain procedures within time limits. There seems no reason
why these innovations cannot be extended.

Those matters will be more fully developed later. Pleading-like
procedures introduced into some jurisdiction will be considered.

(3) Considerable dissatisfaction is also quite widespread on the
subject of the trials of matters involving complex issues
and lengthy technical evidence, particularly in the case of
involved commercial or "white collar" type crimes. In some
jurisdictions there have been moves to eliminate the jury
in this type of case. Such schemes are further considered
below.

(4) The system of challenging jurors has also come under
considerable scrutiny bearing as it does upon the
representative character of the jury referred to at some
length earlier in this paper (see page 24-29 supra).

The situation in Queensland particularly calls for
consideration as a system of double challenges prevails here,
something that appears unique to this State.

../83
(5) Another subject of long-running debate still relevant to
Queensland is whether or not to retain the requirement of
unanimity of jury decisions for conviction or acquittal or
whether to introduce majority verdicts. Quite a number of
Common Law jurisdictions, including some Australian States,
have opted for majority verdicts. Two factors are strongly
urged by the protagonists of majority verdicts as reason
for supporting their claims. The first of these is the
number of hung juries where unanimity is insisted upon. The
other is the high acquittal rate in the same circumstances,
it being said that in the light of the pre-trial screening
process this figure is unduly and illogically high.

Proposals for Reform

It is one of the tasks of Law Reform Commissions to examine and
provide answers to such criticisms when that is possible. In
Australia in respect of some of the objections referred to above,
in some jurisdictions various proposals for reform have been
implemented and others are still in the proposal stage. Speaking
generally, in order to resolve the problems raised in criticisms
(1), (2) and (3) above there are three broad practical types of
modification of trial by jury for all indictable offences which
either operate or are proposed in various places. These may be
grouped as follows:-

(1) The provisions of a right in the accused person to elect
whether he will go for trial by jury or by judge alone.

(2) The allocation of certain indictable offences for trial by
Superior Court Judge alone. That is the system that has been
adopted in New South Wales.

(3) The introduction of a system of pleadings, particulars,
discovery etc.
One could, of course, have various combinations of all three.

As to the first of these, the right of the accused to elect the form of tribunal which tries him, there are several things that can be said. Provision for such a procedure exists in Canada and in some of the States of America. In relation to Canada we have little information as to how this operates in practice. In the United States the frequency of election for trial by judge alone varies very much from State to State. It has been found that the decision by accused persons whether to waive juries in a criminal case or not, depends very largely on regional custom, and that the custom varies enormously from one part of the country to another. Figures taken from *The American Jury* by Kalven and Zeisel show that at one extreme are Wisconsin and Connecticut where the jury is waived approximately 75% of the time; at the other extreme are Montana and the District of Columbia where in felony cases the jury is virtually never waived. (pp. 22-30).

There are no similar provisions in any of the Australian jurisdictions with the limited exception of New South Wales. As will be dealt with immediately hereafter that State has introduced a partial system of waiver in respect of certain "white collar" crimes. Experience to date shows that so far, with one exception, the innovation has not been invoked. In the Australian context, therefore, the right to waive trial by jury over the whole range of indictable offences does not seem to be a very practicable reality. It is not recommended by this Commission.

The more interesting experiment, and one which we believe warrants close attention is the one just referred to which was introduced into New South Wales in 1979. This procedure provides for the summary trial by a Supreme Court Judge of cases of a more or less complex nature in the commercial area. These are roughly those that are commonly called "white collar" crimes.
The reforming New South Wales scheme has been found in three pieces of legislation i.e.:

(1) In the Crimes Act 1900 in a newly inserted part XIIIA, comprising section 475A and 475B, together with a new 10th schedule of that Act.

(2) The Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act 1967.

(3) Division 2 of part 75 of the Supreme Court Rules.

The changes in substantive law are found in part XIIIA of the Crimes Act and the 10th schedule. The summary jurisdiction is created by section 3 of the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act and some basic procedure as provided for in that Act. The more detailed procedure is set out in the Supreme Court Rules referred to.

The offences to which the summary proceeding provisions apply are thus contained in the 10th schedule. In general terms these are:

(a) Offences and conspiracies arising under commercial sections of the New South Wales Crimes Act.

(b) Offences and conspiracies arising under certain sections of the Companies Act.

(c) Offences and conspiracies arising under certain sections of the Securities Industry Act 1975 of New South Wales.

(d) Offences arising under certain sections of the National Companies and Securities Commission (State Provisions) Act 1981.

(e) The Common Law offence of conspiracy to cheat and defraud.
There is also a list of less serious offences of a related nature which may be heard as alternatives to one of the offences in paragraphs (a) - (e) with one of which they must be primarily charged.

The procedural scheme as set out in the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act 1967 is as follows.

Proceedings are initiated by an application to a Judge of the Supreme Court by way of summons supported by an affidavit. The summons claims an order under section 4 of the Act alleging that the defendant has committed an offence under some Act the hearing of which offence is, by that Act, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction. The summons is issued by a Prosecutor and claims an order for the appearance of the defendant at a specific time and place or, alternatively, for the apprehension of the defendant. The summons is supported by an affidavit and at the same time as the summons is filed, the Prosecutor lodges with the Registrar two or more copies of the minute of the order which he claims. After the prosecutor obtains his order a copy of the summons and affidavit and a minute of the order are served personally on the defendant.

Where the procedure involves apprehension of the defendant the Judge proceeds in the normal way and either commits him to prison or admits him to bail. Notices of this effect are immediately forwarded to the Prosecutor.

There are certain procedural provisions which may be discussed in general terms. Section 8 says that the practice and procedure for taking and receiving affidavits at summary trials are the same as trial on indictment. Provisions are made to meet the situation where either of the parties fails to appear and for joint hearings of two or more cases which by law may be heard summarily in the Supreme Court or where two or more defendants are charged with offences similarly punishable. Section XIII A is interesting as it provides as follows:-

../87
"Nothing in this Act requires the Judge to proceed to hear and determine any case if any prescribed pre-trial procedures which are required by rules made under this Act could be completed before the trial of a case commences have not been completed."

The pre-trial procedures referred to are set out in Rule 11 of Part 75 of the New South Wales Supreme Court Rules. Before looking at these in detail it should be noted that by Rule 6 a large number of procedural rules relating to civil proceedings are made applicable to the summary jurisdiction criminal proceedings. These, relating primarily to the filing of documents, execution of judgment etc. applicable to civil proceedings, are made to apply to these summary jurisdiction criminal proceedings. It will be noted later that this is unnecessary in Queensland. In more or less summary form the procedure contained in Rule 11 is as follows:-

(1) As stated, the pre-trial procedures must be completed before the trial commences.

(2) The section does not apply where the accused pleads guilty or the Judge dismisses the case for the non-appearance of the Prosecutor.

(3) The Judge may on his own motion or on the application of a party make orders and give direction for the just and efficient disposal of the proceedings. In particular he may order the supply by the Prosecutor to the defence of lists of witnesses, copies of statements and copies of exhibits.

(4) When all the pre-trial procedures are completed the Judge so certifies and the trial may proceed.
There are certain other machinery matters in the Act which may be referred to. These deal with orders for payment of costs and enforcement of such orders. There is the provision that aidors, abettors etc. of offences punishable summarily may be tried at the same time as the principals. There is also a provision for the termination of any Petty Session proceedings in the same matter upon commencement of summary jurisdiction proceedings in the Supreme Court. One effect of such an order is that it prevents or interrupts committal proceedings. The rules provide the machinery for terminating any proceedings in Petty Sessions for the same offence and for notifying the defendant of that termination.

Section 475B of the Crimes Act which we are informed was introduced as an after thought, provides in sub-section 1 that this summary trial procedure applies only if upon the completion of the pre-trial procedures the defendant makes an election to be tried for that offence in the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction. Enquiries from New South Wales have revealed that, in practice, the provisions of section 475B have virtually emasculated the use of this new procedure. Since this inception in 1979 only one person has been tried summarily pursuant to these proceedings. That seems to be a matter of some regret as the system itself seems to provide a possible answer to much of the uneasiness that surround the role of the jury in trial of the type of cases there dealt with.

The New South Wales amendments were introduced to meet the kind of objections referred to in paragraph (3) on page 82 above and, to a lesser degree those in paragraph (2) on pages 80-81. It is instructive to look at some of the reasons advanced for the contention that the jury is unsuited for these types of offence.
Primarily, one relates to one of the fundamental characteristics of the jury - its representative character. Historically the members of the jury, in themselves, had a close affinity or empathy with an accused person. Originally, as we have seen, they actually knew the facts relating to the charge or had close contact with those who did. Even after the jury became Judges of fact there was, generally speaking, a fairly close local identification between the accused and the community in which the offence did occur and whose mores had been breached.

The jury was, in effect, a cognitive conscience of that community to some degree. In respect of what may be called "traditional" crimes e.g. killings, assaults, rape, theft and robbery etc. it lay within the bounds of the experience of life of the jurors in the community to make a comprehending judgment of the case. In the case of trials involving complex commercial or legal elements that inherent cognition is not a community trait. In dealing with an accused in such an area the jury is not able to bring to bear upon their deliberations the same elements of comprehension and understanding that characterised their historical role. Thus in the case of these kinds of offences one of the key factors in the retention of the jury is missing.

The fact that they are complex is evidenced by the difficulties that frequently beset such trials from the initial stage of committal, through to appeals to higher courts. It was to these kinds of proceedings, particularly that Murphy J. was referring to in Barton's case at p. 108 (see p. 41 above). The incidental benefit of eliminating committal proceedings in, what he described as "...conspiracy, fraud, and various corporate charges..." would meet His Honour's criticisms.
Objections are made to non-jury tribunals dealing with serious criminal matters but these must be put into the perspective of the growing tendency to allocate greater areas of even quite serious offences to the jurisdiction of stipendiary magistrates. Reference was made earlier (see p. 68 supra) to the Victorian experience where the upper monetary limit of the magisterial jurisdiction for offences of dishonesty of most kinds is now $10,000. Our information is also that the same trend is evident in the Australian Capital Territory. As one critic of this situation there wrote:

"There has also been in this jurisdiction such a massive increase in the jurisdiction of magistrates that they can now hear summarily matters involving a sentence up to ten years imprisonment. What is effectively the destruction of the jury system here has all happened without any public consideration and without any argument as to the merits or otherwise of the retention of the jury system". (Dr D. O'Connor, Reader in Law, ANU, to Law Reform Commission of Queensland).

Whatever may be said for or against that trend it is surely better, if rationalisations are desirable, that the professional tribunal dealing alone with criminal charges should be on the highest professional level.

Having looked at the reasons for adopting some such system as the New South Wales one we now look at the practicalities of introducing a similar system into Queensland. This could be fairly simply achieved by taking the following legislative steps. Firstly, as to the substantive law, by inserting two new sections in the Criminal Code. It is suggested that the logical and convenient place to insert these sections would be to create a new chapter XLIIB, comprising sections 442N and 442P. These would be in the following terms:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) but notwithstanding any other law, proceedings for any offence mentioned in section 442P, may, pursuant to an application made under section 4(1) of the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act 19, by the Attorney-General, be taken before the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction.

(2) Proceedings for an offence mentioned in paragraph (f) of section 442P may not be taken under subsection (1) unless, in the application made under section 4(1) of the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act, 19..., in respect of the offence, the person against whom the offence is charged is also charged with an offence mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of that Schedule.

(3) A person may be convicted of an offence mentioned in paragraph (f) of section 442P notwithstanding that he is not convicted of the offence mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of that Schedule that was also charged in the application made under section 4(1) of the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act 19, in respect of the offence mentioned in paragraph (e) of that Schedule.

(4) The penalty that may be imposed by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction on a person convicted of an offence mentioned in section 442P notwithstanding the penalty provided by law (other than this subsection), is a fine not exceeding $100,000, in the case of a person not being a body corporate, or $250,000 in the case of a body corporate, in respect of each offence.

(5) Subsection (1) does not prevent proceedings for any offence referred to in that subsection from being taken otherwise than before the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction.
(6) The reference in subsection (1) to the Attorney-General includes, in relation to any proceedings, a reference to any person who is authorised in writing by the Governor to act, for the purpose of that subsection, on behalf of the Attorney-General in relation to those proceedings or in relation to proceedings for all offences mentioned in section 442P.

(7) A document purporting to be signed:-

(a) by the Governor and to authorise a person specified in the document to act as referred to in subsection (6) is, in any proceedings referred to in subsection (1), admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence that the person is authorised so to act; or

(b) by the Attorney-General for the purpose of any proceedings referred to in subsection (1) is admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence that the Attorney-General signed the document.

442P

Offences Punishable by the Supreme Court in its Summary Jurisdiction

(a) Any offence arising under, or of attempting, or of conspiracy, to commit any offence arising under section 437(1) & (2) or 438. (Sections of the Criminal Code).

(b) (i) Any offence arising under, or of attempting, or of conspiracy, to commit any offence arising under, section 124, 374A(1) or (3), 374B, 374C(2); 374G, 375A or 376(2) of the Companies Act 1961-1981.
(ii) Any offence arising under, or of attempting, or of conspiracy, to commit any offence arising under sections 229(1)(b), (3), (4), (7), (8), (9), (10), 554(1) or (5), 555, 556(1) or (5), 561, 564, 563(2), 565(2) of the Companies (Queensland) Code.

(c) Any offence arising under, or attempting, or of conspiracy, to commit any offence arising under section 14(1), 27, 59(7), 109(1) or (2), 110, 111, 112(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) or 121(1) of the Securities Industry Act 1975-1978.

(d) Any offence arising under, or of attempting, or of conspiracy, to commit any offence arising under -

(i) Sections 10(1), (2), (3) and (4) 37(1), 73(7), 124(1) of (2), 125, 126, 128(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6), 137, 151A(3) or (4) of the Securities Industry (Queensland) Code; or

(ii) Section 16(1) of the National Companies and Securities Commission (State Provisions) Act, 1981.

(e) Any offence arising under section 430 of the Criminal Code.

(f) Subject to section 442N of this Act, any offence arising under, or of attempting, or of conspiracy, to commit any offence arising under -

(i) section 398VIII, 427(1) and (2), 428, 436, 441, 488, 4888II(b), 488II(g), 488II(h), 488IV(h), 493 or 494 of the Criminal Code;

(ii) section 47(1), 51(3), 64(10), 86(1), 163(1) (being an offence committed as referred to in section 163(3)), 179A(1), 180J(1) or (1A), 180W or 374F(1) or (2) of the Companies Act 1961-1978.
(iii) section 12(6), 25(1), 54(1) or 58(1), (2), (3) or (4) of the Securities Industry Act 1975-1978;

(iv) section 14(6), 34(1), 68(1) or 72(1), (2), (3) or (4) of the Securities Industry (Queensland) Code;

(v) section 44 or 53 of the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) (Queensland) Code; or

(vi) section 108(1), 123(1), 174(1), 276(1) (being an offence committed as referred to in section 276(1)(b), 310(1), 559 or 560 of the Companies (Queensland) Code.

Summary of Content of Sections Listed in Section 442P:

(a) 437(1) Director or officer of a corporation or company fraudulently appropriating property.

437(2) Director or officer of a corporation or company keeping fraudulent accounts or falsifying books of accounts.

438 False statements by officials of companies.

(b) (i) 124(b)(ii)229 Breach of duty by officer to act honestly and with reasonable diligence etc.
(b) (i) 374A(1)(b)(ii)554 Offences by officers failing to deliver up property etc. to the appropriate officer.

(b) (i) 374B  (b)(ii)555 Liability of officer for failing to keep proper accounts.

(b) (i) 374C  (b)(ii)556 Officer fraudulently being a party to the contracting of a debt of a company.

(b) (i) 374G  (b)(ii)561 Officer fraudulently inducing persons to give credit to the company or fraudulently dealing with the property of the company.

(b) (i) 375(2)(b)(ii)563  (2) A person making a false statement in a document required for the Companies Act.

(b) (i) 375A  (b)(ii)564 An officer of a corporation fraudulently authorising or permitting the making etc. of a false or misleading statement.

(b) (i) 376  (b)(ii)565  (2) Director or manager wilfully paying dividends other than from profits.

(c) 14 Officer of the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs breaching restriction on dealings.

27 Establishing an illegal stock market.
59 A person breaching the Dealers Trust Account Provisions with intent to defraud.

109(1) & (2) False trading and markets and market rigging transactions.

110 Person making false statement likely to induce sale or purchase of securities.

111 Fraudulently inducing persons to deal with securities.

112 Concealing etc. of books relating to securities.

(d) (i) 10 Failing to comply with provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Securities Industry (Queensland) Code.

37(1) Establishment of an illegal stock exchange.

73(7) Breach of provisions relating to Dealers Trust Accounts.

124(1) False trading and market rigging transactions.

125 Making statements false or misleading likely to induce the sale or purchase of securities.
126 Fraudulently inducing persons to deal in securities.

128 Breach of prohibition of dealings in securities by insiders.

137 Concealing etc. of books relating to securities.

151 Contravention or failing to comply with an Order in Council relating to dealers' trust accounts.

(ii) 16 Breach of restrictions on dealings and securities.

(e) 430 Conspiracy to cheat and defraud.

(f) (i) 398VIII Stealing of property or money by agents etc.

427(1) & (2) Obtaining goods or credit by false pretence or wilfully false promise.

428 Obtaining the execution of a valuable security by a false pretence or wilfully false promise.

436 Trustees fraudulently disposing of trust property.

441 Clerk or servant fraudulently falsely accounting.
Forgery in general.

Forgery of a transfer or assignment of a share in any corporation etc.

Forgery of a bank note, bill of exchange etc.

Forgery of a deed, bond, warrant, order etc.

Forgery of an instrument made evidence by a statute in force in Queensland.

Obliterating crossings on cheques.

Making documents without authority.

Making an untrue statement in a prospectus.

False statement in a statement in lieu of a prospectus.

Officer of company fraudulently dealing with debts of creditor in case of reduction of share capital.

A person contravening or failing to comply with a provision of Division 5 of the Act dealing with interest other than shares and debentures.
163(1) Director failing to comply with provisions relating to accounts and audit.

179A A person concealing, destroying etc. books of a company.

180J Liability for mis-statements in Part A statement.

180W A person contravening or failing to comply with a provision of the Act relating to take-over schemes.

374F A person giving etc. any inducement to be appointed a liquidator or a manager.

(iii) 12(6) A person breaching an order of the Court relating to dealings in securities or on the stock exchange.

25(1) Concealing etc. books relating to securities.

54 Offences relating to short selling.

58 Offences relating to security documents in custody of a dealer.

14(6) A person breaching an order of the Court relating to dealings in securities or on the stock exchange.

34 Concealing etc. of books relating to securities.
Offences relating to short selling.

Offences relating to security documents in custody of a dealer.

Liability for mis-statements in Part A, B, C or D Statements.

General offence of contravening or failing to comply with the provisions of the Act.

Criminal liability for untrue statement or non-disclosure in prospectus.

Officer committing offences in case of reduction of share capital in a company.

Breach of provisions relating to prescribed instruments and covenants.

Breach of provisions relating to Audits and Accounts where intent to decline to defraud present.

Concealing, destroying etc. of books of a corporation.

Giving or offering inducement to be appointed liquidator of official manager.

Falsification of books of company by officer or former officer.
Secondly, the procedural measures necessary to implement this scheme would comprise two steps viz:-

(1) The passing of a new Act to create the summary criminal jurisdiction in the Supreme and District Courts and provide for some basic rules of procedure. This Act may conveniently be called the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act; or the District Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act; as the case may be.

(2) The addition of some new Court Rules to establish the appropriate procedure in more detail.

The District Court is included in the scheme as a large proportion of the offences set out in the proposed section 442P are presently tried in the District Court.

As to (1), without attempting at this stage to set out the Acts in toto, it is suggested that the following would provide the basic structure. The sections are based upon New South Wales numbering and content.

"3. (1) Where under any Act, proceedings for an offence may be taken before the Court in its summary jurisdiction, the Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine those proceedings in a summary manner.

(2) The summary jurisdiction conferred on the Court by subsection (1) shall be exercised by a Judge sitting alone, and not otherwise.

4. (1) Upon an application being made by any person (in this Act referred to as the "prosecutor") in accordance with the rules, a Judge may make an order -
(a) ordering any person alleged in an application to have committed an offence punishable in the Court in its summary jurisdiction to appear at a time and place specified in the order to answer to the offence charged in the order; or

(b) ordering the apprehension of any such person for the purpose of his being brought before a Judge or answer to the offence charged in the order.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may be made ex parte.

5. (1) Where any person apprehended pursuant to an order made under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 4, or by reason of his failure to comply with the conditions of a recognizance previously entered into pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, is brought before a Judge, the Judge shall—

(a) by warrant commit him to prison and order him to be there detained until he is brought before a Judge at a time and place specified in the order to answer to the offence with which he is charged; or

(b) order that he be discharged upon his entering into a recognizance, with or without sureties, as the Judge may direct, conditional for the appearance of that person at such time and place as may be specified in the order to answer to the offence with which he is charged.

(2) The Prothonotary, or Registrar, as the case may be, shall, as soon as is practicable after the making of any order under subsection (1), cause notice of the order to be given to the prosecutor.
(3) Failure to comply with the conditions of a
recognizance entered into pursuant to paragraph (b) of
subsection (1) is punishable as contempt of the Court.

7. Where the hearing of the proceedings for an offence
punishable in the summary jurisdiction of the Court is
adjourned, whether under section 6 or otherwise, the Judge
before whom the proceedings are taken may —

(a) by warrant commit the defendant to prison and order him
to be there detained until he is brought before the Judge
at a time and place specified in the order to answer
further to the offence with which is he charged; or

(b) order that the defendant be discharged upon his entering
into a recognizance, with or without sureties, as the
Judge may direct, conditioned for the appearance of the
defendant at such time and place as may be specified in
the order to answer further to the offence with which
he is charged.

8. Subject to this Act and the Rules, the practice and
procedure of the Court in relation to the taking and
receiving of evidence at the trial of accused persons on
indictment apply to the taking and receiving of evidence in
proceedings in the summary jurisdiction of the Court.

12. If, upon the day and at the time and place appointed for
hearing or to which the hearing or further hearing has been
adjourned, both parties appear in person or by their
respective counsel or attorneys the Judge shall proceed to
hear the case.

../104
13. (1) Where a defendant is charged with two or more offences punishable in the summary jurisdiction of the Court, whether of a like or different nature, the Judge shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine and charges together.

(2) Where two or more defendants are separately charged with any such offences, whether of a like or different nature, alleged to have been committed at the same time and place, the Judge shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges together.

17. A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission by another person of an offence punishable in the summary jurisdiction of the Court is guilty of the like offence and may be tried at the same time as or before or after the trial of the principal offender.

19. Any proceedings in Magistrates Courts for an offence for which proceedings may be taken either under this Act or before a Magistrates Courts shall be terminated upon the Magistrates Court being notified, in accordance with the rules, of the commencement of proceedings under this Act for that offence.

As to (2), i.e. the making of appropriate Rules of Court it must first be said that the situation in Queensland is much different from that operating in New South Wales so far as the application of the Supreme Court Rules to Criminal Proceedings is concerned.

In New South Wales section 17(1) of the Supreme Court Act provides, specifically, that the provision of that Act and the Rules do not, with certain exceptions not relevant here, apply to criminal proceedings. Consequently it was necessary in the
formulation of Rules under the New South Wales Summary Jurisdiction Act to specifically incorporate a number of rules applying to civil proceedings and to make other consequential provisions.

In Queensland, by virtue of the combined effect of the wording of the preamble to the Rules and of Order 1 Rule 1 of the Criminal Practice Rules of 1900 that degree of elaboration in unnecessary. The former says, in part:

"The Rules shall as far as they are applicable, apply to proceedings in all its jurisdiction, unless otherwise stated, and except so far as they are inconsistent with any provision contained in any Statute or Rule of Court relating to proceedings in any special jurisdiction of the Court..."

The latter states:--

"In the application of the Rules of the Supreme Court to proceedings in its Criminal Jurisdiction, the term "cause" shall be deemed to include any prosecution or other proceedings."

In the circumstances it is suggested that the following special rules would suffice:

Order 21 (This is presently a vacant Order)

Criminal Proceedings - Summary Jurisdiction

1. Application. This Order applies to proceedings in the Court under the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act, (in this Order called the "subject Act").
2. **Interpretation.** For the purposes of applying rules other than this Order to proceedings to which this Order applies, unless the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires -

"prosecutor" means plaintiff.

3. **Commencement of proceedings.** Proceedings for an offence under any Act which may be taken before the Court in its summary jurisdiction shall be commenced in the Court by summons claiming an order under section 4 of the subject Act in respect of the offence and claiming that the defendant be dealt with according to law for commission of the offence.

4. **Copies of order.** When the prosecutor files the summons, he shall lodge with the Registrar two or more copies of a minute of the order which he claims.

5. **Service.** (1) The summons and any affidavit in support of an application under section 4 of the subject Act shall not, unless the Court so directs, be served before the making of the order but shall be served on the defendant when the minute of order is served on him.

   (2) Subject to any Act a minute of any order made under section 4(1) or section 10(b) of the subject Act and any affidavits used to obtain either of those orders shall be served personally upon the defendant.

6. **Evidence of service.** Evidence of service of any document in any proceedings to which this Division applies may be given by affidavit.
7. Pre-trial procedures. (1) The procedures prescribed this rule shall be completed before the trial of a case commences.

(2) This rule does not apply where the person charged with an offence pleads guilty to the offence or where the Judge dismisses the charge under section 9(1), section 9(2) or section 11(1) of the subject Act.

(3) In this rule, "trial" includes the hearing and determination of the case and the adjudication on the case under section 10(a) of the subject Act.

(4) The Judge may, of his own motion or on the application of a party -

(a) make orders and give directions for the just and efficient disposal of the proceedings;

(b) without limiting the generality of paragraph (a), make such orders and give such directions as may be appropriate relating to -

(i) the giving by the plaintiff to the defendant of particulars or further and better particulars;

(ii) the giving by the plaintiff to the defendant of a list of persons who it is expected will be called to give evidence at the trial or, if the Judge thinks fit, who have made statements in writing but who it is expected will not be so called;
(iii) the giving by the plaintiff to the defendant of a copy of any statement made in writing by any person whose evidence it is expected will be given at the trial or, if that person has not made a statement in writing or if the Judge thinks fit, of a summary of the evidence which it is expected he will give at the trial;

(iv) the giving by the bailiff to the defendant of a list of documents or things which it is expected will be tendered in evidence at the trial;

(v) the giving by the plaintiff to the defendant of copies of documents;

(vi) inspection by the defendant of documents or of property;

(vii) evidence, including evidence under sections 92, 93, 94 and 95 of the Evidence Act 1977-1981;

(viii) any admission or consent of the defendant; and

(xi) any alibi.

(5) The procedures prescribed by this rule are completed when the Judge certified that in his opinion the pre-trial procedures prescribed by this rule have been completed.

8. Security. (1) A security referred to in section 16(1)(c) of the subject Act shall be filed in the registry.
(2) Upon default by any person bound under the security, the Court may make such orders for payment as the case may require.

(3) Any order made under subrule (2) may be enforced in accordance with the rules.

(4) Evidence of default under a security under section 16 of the subject Act may be given by affidavit.

9. **Termination of Proceedings in a Magistrates Court**

(1) A Magistrates Court is notified under section 19 of the subject Act of the commencement of proceedings under the subject Act for an offence when a minute of the order made under section 4 of the subject Act is delivered to a justice at the court of petty sessions before which the proceedings for that offence are pending.

(2) A notice stating that the proceedings in the Magistrates Court for the offence charged in the order have been terminated shall be served on the defendant with the minute of order under section 4 of the subject Act."

Several comments are, perhaps, pertinent with regard to this proposed scheme. Firstly, it is the view of this Commission that no section equivalent to section 475B of the **New South Wales Crimes Act** should be introduced in Queensland. The New South Wales experience has shown that such a section reduces the whole scheme to an exercise in futility. If it is seriously intended that such a scheme should work there is no place for provisions 475B. In any event by subsection (5) of section 442N the Judge retains a discretion whether to order trial by jury or not.
The second comment is that differing views are held by members of this Commission as to the appropriate maximum penalty that may be imposed upon conviction in these proceedings. Whilst, in the draft section above a sole monetary penalty is provided for, views are held by some members of the Commission that this is not adequate. The monetary penalty alone, is not consistent with the practice adopted, not only in the Criminal Code, but also in the Companies Act and the Securities Industry Act when dealing with these types of offences. All of these pieces of legislation provide for alternative prison sentences to the fine. There are grounds for believing that this should be adopted in any new scheme established in Queensland.

A third comment relates to the constitution of the tribunal. An alternative, sometimes suggested, to the Judge sitting alone is to have him sit with assessors instead of a jury.

Tribunals comprising professional judges and lay assessors (or, in some cases, lay judges only) are the rule in the Civil Law system that prevails in Europe and other countries which follow the European Civil Law system. They are the norm in both civil and criminal law jurisdictions and over a wide range of areas of litigation. In France, in relation to criminal matters, the Cours d'Assizes which handle the most serious offences, associate nine laymen with three judges in deliberation on the defendant's guilt. A majority of eight is required to convict. Since 1941 the laymen deliberate upon both matters of law and fact with the professional judges.

In the Federal Republic of Germany two types of courts have jurisdiction in ordinary private law matters - the Amtsgerichte and the Landgerichte. In addition to their civil jurisdiction the regular courts also handle all criminal cases. In certain criminal cases laymen participate in the proceedings with the Judges. Until 1975 the arrangement was that six laymen sat with three judges, sitting from time to time and deciding questions of both law and fact. It would appear that problems were encountered in this arrangement and in 1971 the system was revised to provide for three judges and two laymen who sit continuously.
It would seem that this arrangement works effectively in the Civil Law System. However, it must be remembered that they have virtually grown up as a relevant part of the systems themselves. The concepts involved are historically familiar to practitioners and the community. At the same time the machinery to provide the lay "assessors" has also grown as an integral part of the system. It is not felt by this Commission that, at this stage at all events, it is desirable to add this further element to any reform of the criminal law system here. We are reinforced in this view by our belief that if the procedure of summary trial outlined above for certain offences is introduced, together with the system of pleading and procedure set out later, many of the difficulties presently being encountered will be eliminated.

If it were felt desirable to invest the trial judge with some power to call in assessors to assist him in certain extremely technical cases the provision of s.11 of the Judicature Act 1876 and of Order 39 and Order 40 of the S.C. Rules could be made applicable to those summary criminal proceedings.

In the result this Commission is of the view that the provisions just authorised would be the most appropriate form of tribunal in Australian circumstances to deal with the particular types of criminal offences there considered, and satisfactorily meet all the major disadvantages of there being tried by jury.

Having looked at this specialized jurisdiction we finally turn to examine possible reforms in relation to the procedure applying to the generality of crimes triable upon indictment. Before embarking on that exercise it is, perhaps, convenient at this stage to look at some statistics which illustrate certain facets of the working of criminal juries in Australian today. This can only be done in a fashion limited by the thinness of statistics in relevant areas. That being done we shall then deal with challenges, suggested procedures in the nature of discovery and pleadings. Finally, we shall look at majority verdicts.
Professor Paul Lermack of Bradley University, in the United States, has done a considerable amount of research on the subject of the judicial use of empirical studies, particularly by the United States Supreme Court. In an article in the New York University Law Review, Vol. 54 p. 951 (1979), dealing with the United States jury-size cases, largely a study of the land mark case of Williams v. Florida 399 U.S. 78 (1970), Professor Lermack points out the difficulty of using social science research in general, and statistics in particular, as a basis upon which to obtain an accurate picture of the workings of criminal juries whether for reform or other purposes.

At p. 967 he says:

"But the problems inherent in the jury-right studies cannot readily be remedied by improved research design. First, practical obstacles stand in the way of implementing the prescribed research design. And second, because of the uncertainty about the nature of the rights protected by a jury and the kinds of jury deliberation that best preserve these rights, it is impossible to conduct successful empirical research."

As to the first he says, at the same page:

"Law and public expectations forbid direct examination of jury deliberations by social scientists. Therefore, investigators will be restricted to indirect observation or simulation of juries for the foreseeable future. Although it is theoretically possible to design rigorous indirect studies of jury deliberations, judges or litigants might refuse to participate in any study if there were any question of its legal propriety. Moreover, financial obstacles might be insuperable."
On the question of the nature of the right preserved by the jury the learned author says, at p. 972:-

"Notions of community participation and common sense judgment are based on fundamental values that can only be demeaned by attempts to quantify and measure. ...These questions may depend more on history and the philosophy of individual rights than on empirical conditions. Legal rights are not necessarily reducible to statements that specify - prospectively and for broad classes - the empirical conditions to be met if the right is to be protected."

Professor Lermack's remarks may aptly be applied to bodies other than courts, particularly in relation to an attempt to establish a statistical picture of the supposed workings of Australian criminal juries, as a basis of reforming the system. Indeed his remarks are even more to the point in the context of the present state of Australian statistics in this field. In many instances these are incomplete, or nonexistent, lack uniformity or basic criteria or any real common system, even where they are supplied to the Commonwealth Government statist as a common repository. They are of little assistance to someone attempting to make hard decisions. In saying that, we are not in any way detracting from the most co-operative response we have received from the various Law Reform Commissions and State Government authorities whom we approached for statistical information. Their response has been generous and we express our appreciation for it. The unfortunate fact, however, is that adequate relevant material just does not seem to be kept by the various State and Territory authorities.

All that having been said we set out hereunder some tables of statistics which may, to some limited extent, reflect the working of juries in certain areas with which we are concerned. The first of these tables sets out the number of committals for trial in each jurisdiction (except Western Australia) between the years 1978 and 1983 and provides an approximate assessment of the lapse of time between committal for trial and arraignment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NO. PRICES</th>
<th>NO. OF COMMISSIONED PROCEEDINGS</th>
<th>NO. OF COMMISSIONED PERIODS</th>
<th>NO. OF COMMISSIONED PERIODS FROM DATE OF COMMISSION TO DATE OF TOTAL (IN WEEKS) - STARTS AND COMMISSIONS TO DATE OF TOTAL (IN WEEKS) - STARTS AND COMMISSIONS TO DATE OF TOTAL (IN WEEKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>2292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>2370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1980</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>2090</td>
<td>2980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>3550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some values are not available. (N.S.) means not specified.
TABLE "A"

As can be seen, the figures in table "A" are not really of any great assistance to us. As is not unexpected the greatest delays are in the larger metropolitan areas of Melbourne and Sydney. From other information available it is known that the Law Authorities in both New South Wales and Victoria are concerned with the delays and are taking steps to minimise them. So far as Queensland is concerned the period of time between committal and trial is not really unreasonable, being in line with the situation in the smaller States. Indeed, recent procedural changes in placing the Supreme Court Criminal List under the control of a Judge, has reduced that period even further; in some instances there is, for all practical purposes, no delay at all. Unfortunately the statistics do not reveal, with the exception of Victoria, whether the average delay is occasioned by lengthy preparation required for complex cases or not. Nor do they assist us to come to any conclusion as to whether or not the delays would be lessened by introducing some other system then trial by jury for complex cases.

TABLE "B"

The next table, Table "B" sets out, State by State, the percentage of convictions and acquittals upon actual trials by juries where these statistics are available.

Two significant features seem to emerge from these figures. The first of these is that in the States where the figures are available (N.S.W. and Victoria) they show that the percentage of convictions of persons tried is markedly higher in the Supreme Court in each State than in the District of County Court. This statistical result, in our view, accords with the experience of those who have practised to any extent in the criminal jurisdiction. Apart from the standing of the tribunal there may be a number of reasons for this. Generally speaking, crimes which are dealt with by the Supreme Court are generally those
of a much more serious or complex character than those tried in
the District of County Court. Equally, they customarily carry
heavier penalties. Experience would seem to indicate that a much
higher quantum of proof is demanded in these cases before the
indictments are filed. Further, both the preparation and
prosecution in court are usually in the hands of more experienced
persons in respect of prosecutions in the Supreme Court.
However, to a considerable extent these considerations must
remain speculative as there is no empirical data against which
to test them.

The second significant feature is the high rate of acquittals
before juries in all jurisdictions, but particularly in the
District and County Courts. Leaving aside Queensland where the
statistics show a quite erratic pattern the following situations
appear to prevail.

In the Supreme Court of N.S.W. for the years 1979-1982 the
percentage of acquittals ranged between 27% and 35%. In
Victoria, between 1978-1982, with the exception of 1981 when the
figures reached almost 41%, the percentage was similar i.e. 25%
to 38%. In the District Court in New South Wales the percentage
of acquittals is fairly steady at slightly over 44%. In Victoria
the figure in the County Court is slightly under 47%.

When one takes an overall figure of acquittals in higher courts
in all jurisdictions the average percentage of acquittals between
1978-1982 are as follows:-

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>44.59%</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>N.S.W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>40-44%</td>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>27-41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Aust.</td>
<td>34-41%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria the verdict of the jury must be unanimous. In Tasmania and South Australia majority verdicts are permitted. Whether it follows from that fact, or not, it is to be noted that percentage of acquittals in the majority verdict States is significantly lower than in the States which require a unanimous verdict. There may, of course, be other factors operative to produce that result. We shall return to this subject later.

TABLE "C"

The statistics in Table "C" are of little if any help. We had hoped by a process of extrapolation between Tables "B" and "C" to be able to draw some conclusions as to the contrast, if any between the percentage of appeals lodged against conviction, or conviction and sentence, in relation to the number of trials held in the majority verdict States and in those States requiring unanimity. We had also hoped to be able to discover if there was any significant difference in the fate of appeals between the two regimes. This is rendered impossible not only by the dearth of actual statistics but even further by the lack of dissection of most of those that do exist. On the figures available the only comparison that could be made would be between the total number of appeals dealt with over a comparatively short period of time and the overall results of those appeals. As both of these sets of figures would largely deal with appeals against sentence only they are of little significance in any attempt to set up any comparison of frequency and outcome of appeals between the two procedures.

Having given, in statistical form, a picture of the juries working in Australia, albeit in a rather limited form, we now direct our attention to some facets of the actual operation of the jury.
### TABLE B

PERCENTAGE OF CONVICTIONS AND ACQUITTALS UPON ACTUAL TRIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1. Number of actual trials Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>(NOTE - A warning accompanied the figures below that they were to be treated with caution because of reporting difficulties)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of convictions Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67.30</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58.88</td>
<td>FIGURES</td>
<td>FIGURES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of acquittals Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>NO FIGURES AVAILABLE</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41.12</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1. Number of actual trials Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>2. Number of convictions Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>55.84</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>52.66</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>59.80</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of acquittals Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>44.16</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>47.34</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>40.20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1. Number of actual trials Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>367</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2. Number of convictions Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>55.04</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>57.43</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>65.66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of acquittals Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>44.96</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>42.57</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>34.34</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1. Number of actual trials Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>2. Number of convictions Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>41.16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59.01</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72.09</td>
<td>226</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of acquittals Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>58.84</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>47.42</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>36.88</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1. Number of actual trials Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>No reliable figures for this year</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>378</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2. Number of convictions Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72.99</td>
<td>74.68</td>
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<td>72.72</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>58.99</td>
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<td>3. Number of acquittals Supreme Court, District or County Court</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>44.97</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>41.01</td>
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### "TABLE C"

**APPEALS DEALT WITH BY COURTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Queensland</th>
<th>N.S.W.</th>
<th>Victoria</th>
<th>Tasmania</th>
<th>South Australia</th>
<th>Western Australia</th>
<th>Northern Territory</th>
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<td>1978</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Total number of appeals (including appeals against sentence only)</td>
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<td>243</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Appeals against conviction only</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Appeals against conviction and sentence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Appeals dismissed</td>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>Figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Appeals abandoned</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>Available</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Conviction varied</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Sentence varied</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Total number of appeals (including appeals against sentence only)</td>
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<td>Appeals against conviction and sentence</td>
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<td>86</td>
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<td>Figures</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Available</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Sentence varied</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Total number of appeals (including appeals against sentence only)</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Appeals against conviction only</td>
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<td>Appeals against conviction and sentence</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>128</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Total number of appeals (including appeals against sentence only)</td>
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<td>N.S.W.</td>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>Western Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Figures</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>Figures</td>
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<td>4. Appeals dismissed</td>
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<td>Available</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>Available</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5. Appeals abandoned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6. Conviction varied</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Other</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3. Appeals against conviction and sentence</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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The first of these, chronologically speaking, also the subject of much discussion and some legislative change is the system of "challenges", particularly in respect of challenges to the polls i.e. to the individual juror. We shall say nothing here of challenges to the array i.e. the whole panel, these being of very rare occurrence.

Speaking strictly, the right of "challenges" is that of the accused. The similar right in the Crown is that of standing by, or standing aside, jurors, although in some Australian jurisdictions the term "challenge" is used to apply to both the Crown and the accused.

Both of these rights are of ancient historical origin and, in most common law jurisdictions are now contained in various statutes. Historically the almost correlative right of challenge with trial by a form of jury may be illustrated as far back as early Roman law. In an article entitled "Stand By for the Crown' An Historical Analysis" in 1979 Criminal Law Review p. 272 Mr J.R. McEldowney says at p. 273:

"...the challenging of jurors was probably borrowed from the Roman law for it was in use among the Romans. The Lex Servilia, 104 B.C., enacted that the accusor and accused should severally propose 100 Judices and that each might reject 50 from the list of the other, so that 100 would remain to try the alleged crime."

Certainly in the common law, as we saw when dealing with the history of the development of the petty jury the right of the accused to challenge the presence of "indictors" on the trial jury was one of the keys to the establishment of the jury as a judicial body charged with trying the facts impartially from evidence given by witnesses. The right of peremptory challenge
i.e. without having to show cause, has remained as part of
criminal procedure since that time but in most jurisdictions has
now been considerably limited by statute, as we shall see. There
is also a right in both the accused and the Crown to challenge
individual jurors for cause upon certain prescribed grounds,
generally without numerical limitation.

The historically developed right of the Crown to stand by or to
stand aside an unlimited number of jurors has been a matter of
some contention over recent years. In England, at Common Law
the Crown had an unrestricted right of peremptory challenge.
This unlimited right has been gradually undermined by statute
and by the 15th century it was general practice that the Crown
was bound to justify its challenges after the whole panel had
been gone through. It was out of this situation that the
practice developed of directing jurors to stand by for the Crown.
Now, in some Australian jurisdictions this right has been
further limited to confine the Crown's right to stand aside to
the same numerical level as the accused's number of challenges.
It will be noted that Australian jurisdictions are fairly evenly
divided in this regard.

Three matters call for general comment in respect of challenges.

The first of these relates to the question of representativeness.
The ideal jury is, in theory, to be composed of a group of people
representative of the wider community, selected at random and
disinterested as to the parties and the issues between them.
To quote the Morris Committee Report of 1965 (Cmnd 2627):

"It is...inherent in the very idea of the jury that it should
be as far as possible a genuine cross-section of the adult
community" see para 50.
In theory, at least, the attempt to control the ultimate composition of the jury by eliminating persons believed to be unfavourable to one, or the other side, derogates from that ideal.

Whether in fact challenging or standing by does have a bearing on the ultimate verdict or not is the second matter for comment. Unfortunately there is no empirical evidence in Australia from which we can decide whether jury composition is related to verdict. In England and America various studies and examinations have been carried out on this subject but in most instances the results have to be treated with some reserve as they were derived from using simulated juries.

However, surer assistance can be derived from an extensive study carried out by Messrs John Baldwin and Michael McConville, lecturers at Birmingham University in England. Their research was principally concerned with the evaluation of jury verdicts in the Birmingham Crown Court over a 21 month period in 1975 and 1976. During that time they collected, and analysed, background information on the 3,912 jurors (members of 326 juries) who heard cases in the Crown Court during that period. As to the relationship between the composition of a jury and verdict they examined three important areas viz. sex, age and social class or occupational background. In respect of each of these they found no significant difference in verdicts whatever the mix of jurors. Their conclusion is interesting and probably applies with more force to Australian than to English juries. In an article published in "Judicature" of September 1980 p. 133 the learned authors say at p. 139:-

../124
"Our study shows that, as far as juries in Birmingham are concerned, the ideal of the jury being a cross-section of the community at large is only partly achieved. While these distortions are disturbing, it is reassuring to discover that, so far as we were able to tell, social composition per se produced no significant variation in verdicts. One explanation for this finding might be the heterogeneous character of English juries, which appears to produce verdicts reflecting more the unique social mix than the broad social characteristics of the individuals on the panel."

Despite this the right of challenge has an entrenched place in criminal procedure, even if its advantages may be more psychological than real. One view is put by the learned authors of an article in 6 Criminal Law Journal, 138, on the subject of jury vetting in which they say:-

"the existence of the challenge is, in theory at least, designed to avert the possibility of an imbalance of interest on any particular jury. However, if the peremptory nature of these challenges is true and they are merely based on such issues as the sex, race, appearance and demeanour of the perspective juror, then such justification seems rather casually exercised."

Its purpose is more sympathetically expressed in a report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada entitled "The Jury in Criminal Trials". At p. 54 of the report the Commission says:

"The peremptory challenge has been attacked and praised. Its importance lies in the fact that justice must be seen to be done. The peremptory challenge is one tool by which the accused can feel that he or she has some minimal control over the make-up of the jury and can eliminate persons for whatever reason, no matter how illogical or irrational, he or she does not wish to try the case."
From a practical point of view, then, the challenge is such an inherent feature of the criminal trial that it ought to be retained. However, equally, it ought to be kept within reasonable bounds as it is in most jurisdictions by statute. In this regard there is one feature of the procedure in Queensland which calls out for attention and in our view ought to be remedied. As will be seen from a brief glance at the practice in other Australian jurisdictions, Queensland has a unique feature in respect of challenges and stand bys. This is the practice of both sides having two opportunities to challenge or stand by, the first occasion being without limit in number on either side. A brief look at other legislation indicates the following:

In **New South Wales**, by s.43 of the Jury Act 1977 both the Crown and the accused have the same number of peremptory challenges. These are:-

(a) Capital offences and murder - 20 challenges

(b) All other offences - 8 challenges.

The Crown has no right of unlimited standbys. Each party has one opportunity only to challenge or stand by.

In **Victoria**, by s. 34 of the Jury Act 1967 the accused has 20 challenges in capital offences and 8 in others. The Crown has an unlimited right of stand asides until the panel is exhausted after which it must show cause. Again there is only one opportunity to challenge or stand aside.

In **Tasmania**, by s.54 of the Jury Act 1899 each person arraigned has 6 peremptory challenges. By s.55 the Crown has unlimited stand asides until the panel is exhausted. Again there is only one opportunity for each party to challenge or stand aside.
In South Australia, by s.61 and 62 of the Juries Act 1927-1974 each party has the right to 3 challenges only. There is no right in the Crown of stand asides without cause. Here also there is one opportunity only for each party.

In Western Australia, by s.36(2) of the Juries Act 1957-1981 the Crown has an unlimited right to stand aside until the panel is exhausted. By s.38(1) the accused has the right to challenge peremptorily 8 jurors, but on the joint trial of 2 or more persons, those jointly charged have 6 challenges each. By s.38(2) the Crown may challenge 8 jurors peremptorily and, in addition may pray for an order to stand aside four more. Again only one opportunity is afforded to the parties to exercise these rights.

In the Northern Territory, by s.43 of the Juries Act the Crown has the right to stand aside only six jurors. By s.44 the accused may challenge twelve in capital cases and six in others. Again these rights are confined to one occasion.

In the A.C.T., by s.33(1) of the Juries Ordinance 1967 the Crown has an unlimited right to stand by until the panel is exhausted. By s.34(1) and (2) the Crown and the accused have the following right to challenge:-

(a) A capital offence - 20 peremptory challenge

(b) Other offences - 8 peremptory challenges

(c) Unlimited challenges for cause.

Here also these rights are confined to one occasion.
In these circumstances there seems no logical reason why the present Queensland practice of the double opportunity to challenge should be persisted with. It can only waste time and be a possible cause of unnecessary affront to members of the jury panel if they are challenged or stood aside in considerable numbers. In the interest of efficiency and respect for the criminal procedure, it is suggested that the Jury Act be amended to eliminate this procedure. In any event it would seem that the practice of the double opportunity to challenge seems originally to have grown up without a strict legislative basis. In the case of *R. v. Johnstone* St. R. Qd. 1907 p.155 at p.164 Real J. said in referring to an earlier similar section:

"In point of fact, the provisions of that section have never been absolutely followed by the Court, for the Court has always allowed, on the first calling of the jury panel, both the Crown and the prisoner to stand aside any juror; that is to say it has always allowed both the peremptory challenges of the prisoner, and the challenges for cause of the Crown to be deferred until the names have been once called. If a jury is not obtained on the first calling, the names are called a second time. The cards are kept in the same order as they were drawn from the box, and consequently on the second calling the names appear in the same rotation. On this calling, challenges may be exercised by the prisoner, and he may challenge peremptory or for cause. The challenge for cause may indeed be made at any time, and the validity of the cause is at once tried. The Crown Prosecutor is again allowed to order any juryman to stand by. After the panel had been gone through, the names of those challenged peremptorily or against whom good cause was shown, are set apart from the others, and are not called again, but the order of the remaining names is still otherwise preserved, and, if necessary, these names are then called for the third time".
The present relevant Queensland legislation is contained in the Jury Act 1929-1982 and in the Criminal Code. The respective provisions are:

**Jury Act.**

*Section 32(1)* When any trial or any issue joined on any indictment or in any civil action or other civil proceeding shall be brought on to be tried in any Court the proper officer shall mix the cards within the box, and shall then, according to the practice of the Court, proceed to draw cards, one after another, out of the box and call aloud the name on each card until the full number of jurors appears and remains approved as indifferent:

Provided that he shall proceed as aforesaid until all the cards in the box have been drawn out unless the full number of jurors has been sooner approved. The cards bearing the names of such jurors as have then been approved shall be set apart by themselves. The cards bearing the names of all the remaining jurors shall as they are drawn out be set aside. If, when all the cards have been so drawn out, the full number of jurors has not been approved, such number or the remaining jurors as the case may require, shall be obtained in the manner following:- The officer shall return to the box all the cards bearing the names of all the remaining jurors which have been set aside as aforesaid, and shall mix the cards within the box, and shall then proceed to draw cards one after another out of the box and call aloud the name on each, and the respective parties may exercise the right of challenge of jurors hereinafter mentioned, until the full number of jurors remain approved as aforesaid.
It shall be the duty of the proper officer on each day on which a panel of jurors attends the Court to notify the sheriff forthwith in writing of the number and names appearing on the panel of those jurors who -

(a) have been empanelled on a jury;

(b) have been excused from attendance at the sittings and the period of such excusal; or

(c) have failed to attend and if fined for non-attendance, the amount of the fine,

and furnish to the sheriff in writing details of every order made for replacement of any juror excused and the date upon which the remaining jurors have been directed to again attend the Court."

"Section 33  The law in the case of criminal trials respecting notice to an accused person of his right of challenge, and challenge to the array and to individual jurors for cause, and the time for challenging, and the ascertainment of facts as to challenge, and the swearing of the jury and informing them of the charge, and the discharge or incapacity of a juror, and the separation and confinement of the jury, and view by the jury, and special and general verdicts, and the discharge of the jury, is set forth in The Criminal Code."

"Section 35(1) In all civil trials each of the parties who appears in person or appears by a separate counsel or solicitor shall be admitted to challenge peremptorily a number equal to one-half of the jury.
(2) Every person arraigned for any treason shall be admitted to challenge peremptorily to the number of twenty-three.

(3) Every person arraigned for murder shall be admitted to challenge peremptorily to the number of fourteen.

Every person arraigned for any other crime or for misdemeanour shall be admitted to challenge peremptorily to the number of eight.

(3A) Where the Court has directed that a reserve juror or reserve jurors be chosen and returned, the person arraigned shall be admitted, in addition to the number hereinbefore prescribed, to challenge peremptorily to the number -

(a) where one reserve juror is to be chosen and returned, of one;

(b) in any other case, of two.

(4) Every peremptory challenge above the number herein mentioned shall be void, and the trial shall proceed as if no such challenge had been made."

Criminal Code.

"Section 608 When an accused person has demanded to be tried by a jury, the proper officer of the Court is to inform him in open court that the persons whose names are to be called are the jurors to be sworn for his trial, and is further to inform him that if he desires to challenge any of them he must do so before they are sworn."
"Section 611 An objection to a juror, either by way of peremptory challenge or by way of challenge for cause, may be made at any time before the officer has begun to recite the words of the oath to the juror, but not afterwards."

The amendment to streamline the procedure could be simply effected by repealing the proviso to section 32(1) and inserting before sub-section (1A) a new subsection (1AA) in the following terms:--

"(1AA) Every person arraigned shall be admitted to challenge jurors peremptorily only in accordance with sections 33 and 35".

We recommend that this amendment be made.

The Commission also believes that the practice relating to challenges needs further modification in respect of the number of challenges where a number of persons are tried jointly. It is the view of the members that the present practice of each of the accused having his full quota of eight challenges and the Crown having the right to stand by the total number of the accused's challenges is unnecessarily cumbersome and time consuming. Accordingly, we recommend that in the case of joint trials the number of the accused's peremptory challenges be reduced to six each with the Crown being confined to stand by a total of eight only of the potential jurors.
This modification could be achieved by two slight amendments. Firstly, by amending subsection (b) of section 35 of the Juries Act in the following fashion. In the second paragraph after the word "eight" delete the full stop, insert a comma and add the words "except where more persons than one are jointly arraigned in which case each of those persons may challenge peremptorily six jurors".

Secondly, subsection (1A) of s.35 should be amended by omitting all the words after the word "arraigned" in the last line and substituting in lieu thereof the words "a total number of eight".

Criminal Procedure

Having completed the mechanics of choosing the jury, as it were, we now look briefly at some possible modifications of criminal procedure which bear upon the matters decided by the jury.

Apart from the introduction of summary jurisdiction for specified offences, as suggested at p.52 et.seq., ante, another query on criminal procedure looms large. That is the matter of amending the rules for practices of criminal procedure generally so as to identify the essential elements in issue and avoid the unnecessary attendance of witnesses or production of exhibits at the trial itself and unnecessary delays and interruptions to the trial before the jury.
We have considered this matter at some length. In the process we have had regard to numbers of proposals for rules establishing and governing pre-trial procedures. On the face of them some of these have much to recommend them. Among such is the experimental scheme introduced, in October 1974, at the Central Criminal Court in England. The rules relating to this experimental procedure are set out as Appendix 27 to the Law and Procedure Volume of the report of the Philips Commission (H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 8092-1). The scheme includes fairly elaborate rules for pre-trial hearings in Chambers and public hearings in Court designed to narrow the issues, avoid waste of time and unnecessary appearance of witnesses.

In other jurisdictions less complicated rules have been proposed. However, in each case, the difficulty lies in the practical application of suggested innovations. This difficulty is aptly expressed in a comment by the English Lord Chancellor's Department upon the scheme referred to above. Paragraph 4 of the appendix referred to above reads as follows:—

"It is difficult to assess the proportion of cases in which a pre-trial review would produce worthwhile savings. To be worthwhile, the savings achieved on preparation and trial work must naturally exceed the additional cost of the review itself. On this basis, the proportion of cases in which worthwhile savings would be achieved is likely to be relatively small. For example, in the first six months of 1978, 23.5 per cent of all contested trials in the Crown Court lasted for less than three hours, and 70 per cent lasted for less than nine hours. Some savings might be achieved if a two-day case (approximately ten hours) were reduced to one day or even 1.5 days, but these would be small given the cost of the pre-trial review itself. Consequently,
it is probably only in cases likely to last more than two
days that the pre-trial review would generally be an economic
proposition, as the daily sums of money involved are greater
and there is a real possibility of significant savings in
time."

The dilemma proposed by the Lord Chancellor's Department has
proved to be a very real one as advised to one of our members
who recently spoke to members of that Department in the course
of a recent visit to London. The information he there received
indicated that considerable practical difficulties had arisen
in the day to day operation of the scheme. In general terms it
was not working well nor living up to expectations.

Apart from the English experience we are also aware that the
Supreme Court Judges Conference is working on a proposal for the
formulation of new criminal rules which would have a fundamental
bearing upon the matters now being considered.

In all the circumstances we do not think that it is apt, at
this juncture, to propose any detailed scheme for pre-trial
hearings in relation to criminal trials.

However, we do appreciate the need for some steps to be
taken, even in the short term, to eliminate delays, and
unnecessary expense, by disposing of essentially preliminary
matters. Some of these which we believe can be conveniently
disposed of before the jury is empanelled are as follows:-

1. Any challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the
matter in question.

2. Where there are joint trials of accused or joinder of counts
any applications for severance.
3. The question of fitness to plead.

Apart from those essentially preliminary matters, modifications ought to be made in two other areas.

Firstly, where it is intended to raise a defence of insanity, diminished responsibility or any other such form of disability, this should be notified to the Crown at least 14 days before the date of the hearing and those appearing for the Crown afforded the opportunity of having the accused medically examined.

Secondly, where the defence intend to challenge, on the voir dire, any evidence proposed to be read by the Crown, provision should be made for this to be done by the Trial Judge after arraignment but before a jury is empanelled.

It is not proposed, in this working paper, to set out, in terms, draft rules to implement these changes. Two rules, however, would be essential.

Firstly, a rule providing that the Crown shall file the indictment charging the offence or offences and serve a copy of it on the accused or his representative not less that 21 days before the date listed for the trial.

Secondly, a rule that any order made on pre-trial proceedings shall be deemed for all purposes to have been made during the course of the trial on indictment.
We are of the opinion that, coupled with our recommendations as to streamlining committal proceedings, and the introduction of summary jurisdiction in the higher Courts, these fairly modest adjustments to criminal procedure could result in significantly reducing waste of time and expense, without jeopardising the rights of the accused.

**MAJORITY VERDICTS**

The final matter for consideration under this reference is the question whether the present requirement in Queensland of unanimity of decision by criminal juries should be maintained or should be replaced by majority verdicts as is the case in England and some other Australian States.

In real terms this can only be a policy decision as we have seen that no empirical assistance can be derived in this area from the statistics available.

So far as Queensland is concerned, this subject was exhaustively considered by the Law Reform Commission in 1977 (as part of an exercise on proposals to amend the practice of Criminal Courts). At the stage of the Working Paper (QLRC W19) the Commission recommended that the Criminal Code be amended to provide for majority verdicts. The machinery to effect this was the introduction of a new section 625A into the Criminal Code. However, in the interval between the working paper and the publication of the Final Report (QLRC 27), the Commission changed its mind and indicated that it did not persist with the proposal. In the Working Paper, in the course of considering figures relating to disagreements, the Commission said:-

../137
"In 1976, one criminal trial in a District Court lasted some 25 weeks. Fortunately, a verdict was reached in that case. If there had been a disagreement by the jury at the end of a trial of this length, the consequences could have been serious. The reputation of the jury system would have been damaged if the decision of ten of the jurors could not then have been taken to conclude the case. We believe that it would generally be better to take the verdict of ten jurors in such circumstances rather than to insist upon a new trial in an attempt to achieve unanimity."

In the course of giving its reasons in the Final Report for withdrawing its proposals to provide for majority verdicts, the Commission said:—

"Developments might occur in the future that make such a change desirable. However, until they do occur or until there is a strong prospect that they will occur, we are unable to recommend that the change be made."

We believe that a development has occurred which now tips the scale in favour of majority verdicts. That event was the unfortunate outcome of the Russell Island trial. It is true that there appear to be very particular circumstances which led to the discharge of the jury in that case, not the least being the particularly active role played by the sick juror in course of the trial. However, the jury had, at that stage, retired for over 13 days considering their verdicts. The possibility of a disagreement must have been a very real one. Had that occurred in a trial lasting some 20 months there is little doubt that the reputation of the jury system would have been seriously damaged. As it was, in circumstances that were far more sympathetic than a disagreement, the discharge of jury in that trial caused a storm.
In the Queensland Parliamentary Library, alone, there are at least 30 references to articles and discussions on the discharge of that jury. Numbers of them raised the question of the continued utility of the jury in the context of modern criminal trials.

Whilst there is no guarantee that a majority decision of 10 jurors would entirely obviate a disagreement in such a case it must considerably lessen the possibility of that event. In the circumstances we now believe that the Commission's recommendation in QLRC W19 should be adopted and a new section 625A be inserted in the Criminal Code.

The analysis of the arguments for majority verdicts by the Commission in 1977 were so thorough that there is no point served by advancing new ones. Accordingly, that part of QLRC W19 dealing with this subject is cited in full, together with a draft of the proposed amending section. We approve the arguments, and decision, and recommend the draft section.

"PART IX - MAJORITY VERDICTS"

The proposed new s.625A of the Criminal Code, set out in the Draft Bill, would allow majority verdicts to be given at criminal trials in Queensland in certain circumstances. Queensland has inherited from the English common law the rule that the verdict of a jury must be unanimous. The rule does not apply without exception to civil trials: Jury Act 1929-1976 s.42. However it continues to apply without any exception to criminal trials. The time has come, in our opinion, to review it.
It cannot be said that there is an overwhelming case for modifying the rule that the verdict of the jury at a criminal trial be unanimous. Nevertheless, the unanimity rule should be examined to ensure that the jury system remains in good standing within the community. There is nothing sacrosanct about the role played in juries in criminal trials. The jury system will remain only so long as the public has confidence in the way it works. Its survival in the long run may depend upon timely alterations being made to its method of working. In Queensland and elsewhere, an increasing emphasis is being placed on trial procedures that do not involve a jury. As an English commentator has remarked, one of the most significant developments in the administration of criminal justice over the last hundred years has been the extension of the trial jurisdiction of the lower courts: D.A. Thomas, "Committals for Trial and Sentence - the Case for Simplification" [1972] Crim.L.R.477. In the last three years, the Queensland Parliament has itself increased the number of occasions when indictable offences may be dealt with summarily by Magistrates Courts. See the Criminal Code and the Justices Act Amendment Act 1975 and the Criminal Code Amendment Act 1976. There is no reason to suppose that the growth of lower-court jurisdiction has come to an end.

These developments are unexceptionable and probably inevitable. However they do call for a close examination of the jury system to see whether any changes are desirable. It would be a pity to see the jury system wither away by default.
The unanimity rule has been an ingredient of the common law for over 600 years. The reasons for its development in England are far from clear. Indeed, the opinion has been expressed that the rule arose more out of accident than by design: D.M. Downie, "And is That the Verdict of Your All?" (1970) 44A.L.J.482 at p.484. The desirability of such a rule would have been more evident in earlier times in England when there were many capital offences and the death penalty was frequently carried out. A reluctance to impose the sentence of death where there had been dissentents on the jury would be understandable. However, the death penalty was virtually abolished in England by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1966. It seems to us significant that less than two years after the passage of this Act, the English Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.13 allowed majority verdicts to be given by juries in criminal proceedings. Thus the rule requiring unanimity came to an end in its homeland six centuries after it had come into existence.

This change in sentiment toward the unanimity rule is especially significant. Changes in the law of England need not necessarily be adopted in countries that still retain the English rules of law. However, the unanimity rule has been a characteristic feature of the English common law for centuries. It has never thrived in countries whose law is not derived from the common law. (Even in Scotland, majority verdicts have been permitted in criminal proceedings for many years.). The modification of the unanimity rule in England is a striking circumstance that calls for a re-examination of the rule elsewhere to see whether it is thoroughly in keeping with the times.
Changes in sentiment toward the unanimity rule have not been confined to England. Indeed the rule was modified by three Australian States before it was modified in England. South Australia allowed majority verdicts in criminal trials in 1927, Tasmania in 1936 and Western Australia in 1960. Significantly, in each of these three States capital offences were excepted from the general provisions relating to majority verdicts. In the United States, five years after the passage of the English Act, the Supreme Court in *Apodaca v. Oregon* (1972) 406 U.S. 404 held that a state law that allowed a less than unanimous verdict in a non-capital proceeding did not violate the right to trial by jury specified by the United States Constitution.

It is true that expressions of opinion in favour of the unanimity rule have been made by well-known commentators and jurists. H.V. Evatt said "Where there is a dissent in an important criminal case, it is almost impossible to expect silence upon the question after the verdict is pronounced. In other words the dissenters will probably state openly what their opinion is." R.G. Menzies said "When you have a unanimous verdict given by a jury in a proceeding by the Crown against a citizen it induces in the minds of the ordinary citizens a feeling of confidence in the administration of the law, and that is worth a great deal to society. When you depart from that and 10 people out of 12 find a man guilty or innocent you build up a world of uncertainty and speculation." However these views were expressed in 1936 when capital punishment was still an important feature of the criminal law in Australia. See "The Jury System in Australia" (1936) 10 A.L.J. Supplement p.49. We suggest that they should not be given the same weight today that they were given then. The same may be said of the views expressed by P. Devlin in his book *Trial by Jury* (1966). He wrote (at p.57):
The sense of satisfaction obtainable from complete unanimity is itself a valuable thing and it would be sacrificed if even one dissentient were overruled. Since no one really knows how the jury works or indeed can satisfactorily explain to a theorist why it works at all, it is wise not to tamper with it until the need for alteration is shown to be overwhelming.

However, this was written at the end of the long era of capital punishment in Britain before the changed circumstances could assert themselves. As things turned out, majority verdicts were introduced in England only one year after this was written.

From the practical point of view, the most important argument in favour of majority verdicts is that they will reduce the number of cases where jury disagreement prevents a verdict being given. In calendar years 1974, 1975 and 1976, 4.1 per cent of criminal trials in the Queensland Supreme Court and District Courts ended in disagreement by the jury. Although this percentage is relatively small, the absolute number of trials that were thus rendered futile during these three years was 51, a substantial figure. Moreover, criminal trials vary greatly in length. In 1976, one criminal trial in a District Court lasted some 25 weeks. Fortunately, a verdict was reached in that case. If there had been a disagreement by the jury at the end of a trial of this length, the consequences could have been serious. The reputation of the jury system would have been damaged if the decision of ten of the jurors could not then have been taken to conclude the case. We believe that it would generally be better to take the verdict of ten jurors in such circumstances rather than insist upon a new trial in an attempt to achieve unanimity.
A rule that allows less than unanimous verdicts will not eliminate jury disagreements altogether. American statistics suggest that majority verdicts of the kind we contemplate would reduce the number of disagreements by about 45 per cent: Kalven and Zeisel, *The American Jury* (1966), p.461. Nevertheless, this would be a substantial reduction, especially if it includes a number of complex and protracted trials. With the ever increasing complexity of modern life, it is likely that such trials will increase in number in the years to come. It is important that the jury system should be able to cope with them. If the jury system cannot meet the needs of a more complex world, the jurisdiction of courts functioning without juries is likely to grow.

**Details of the Proposed New s.625A**

(1) Subsection (1) permits a majority verdict to be taken provided it has been agreed upon by not less than ten of the jurors and provided the other conditions specified are met. In our opinion, the agreement of at least ten jurors should be necessary in all cases. Generally, a criminal trial is had before a jury of twelve: *Jury Act* 1929-1976 s.17; *Supreme Court Act of 1867* s.25; *District Court Act* 1967-1976 s.63. Where the twelve have not agreed upon a verdict, subs. (1) would allow the decision agreed upon by eleven or ten of them to be taken as the verdict. It must also be noted that a criminal trial may proceed though the original number of twelve jurors has been reduced by the death of a juror or the incapacity of a juror to continue to act, provided that at least ten jurors remain: *Criminal Code* s.628. Where a trial proceeds with eleven jurors, who have not agreed upon a verdict, subs. (1) would allow the decision agreed upon by ten of them to be taken as the verdict.
We have not allowed for a majority verdict where a trial proceeds with only ten jurors. In such a case, a unanimous verdict would be necessary. In England and South Australia, the decision of nine jurors may be taken as the verdict where the trial has proceeded with ten jurors: Eng. Juries Act 1974 s.17 (which now contains the provisions formerly contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1967 s.13); S.A. Juries Act 1927-1976 s.56. In Western Australia and Tasmania, the agreement of at least ten jurors is always necessary: W.A. Juries Act 1956-1976 s.41; Tas. Jury Act 1899 s.48.

(2) Subsection (2) provides that the Court shall not accept a majority verdict unless the jury have had such period of time for deliberation as the Court thinks reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity of the case. The Court shall in any event not accept such a verdict unless it appears that the jury have had at least two hours for deliberation. Such a provision is necessary to ensure that a majority of ten, once formed, does not ignore the arguments of the minority. Our provision is derived from the English Juries Act 1974 s.17(4), which slightly modified the earlier provision of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 s.13(3). In South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania the time prescribed for deliberation is specified as at least four hours, three hours and two hours (in ordinary cases) respectively.

(3) Subsection (3) excludes from the general majority verdict provision the verdicts of guilty of treason, murder and the crimes defined in the second paragraph of s.81 and in s.82 of the Criminal Code. For each of these offences, the Criminal Code specifies the penalty of imprisonment with hard labour for life, which cannot be mitigated or varied under s.19 of the Code. We have reached the conclusion that a person ought not to be convicted of any of these offences upon a majority verdict.
However, the matter is debatable. Somewhat analogous provisions are to be found in the legislation of South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania though not that of England (above). It is not necessary to make provision for capital offences. Capital punishment was abolished by the Criminal Code Amendment Act of 1922 of the Queensland Parliament and, in relation to the laws of the Commonwealth, by the Death Penalty Abolition Act 1973 of the Commonwealth Parliament.

New s.625A. The Criminal Code is amended by inserting after section 625 the following section:—

"625A. Number of jurors required to agree on verdict

(1) Where the jury on the trial of an accused person have retired to consider their verdict and have not arrived at a unanimous verdict, the decision agreed upon by not less that ten of the jurors shall, subject to this section, be taken as the verdict given by the jury.

(2) The Court shall not accept a verdict given by virtue of subsection (1) unless it appears to the Court that the jury have had such period of time for deliberation as the Court thinks reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity of the case; and the Court shall in any event not accept such a verdict unless it appears to the Court that the jury have had at least two hours for deliberation."
(3) Subsection 9(1) does not apply to —

(a) a verdict that the accused person is guilty of the crime of treason or murder or any of the crimes defined in the second paragraph of section 81 and in section 81; or

(b) any special finding upon which the accused would be convicted of any such crime.

(4) For the purposes of this section the term "verdict" includes any special finding made by a jury.

Amendment of s.626. Section 626 of The Criminal Code is amended by omitting the words "cannot agree as to the verdict to be given" and substituting the words "is unable to give a verdict".
8. Exemption. (1) The undermentioned persons are exempt from serving on any jury, and their names shall not be inserted in any jury list, and they shall not be summoned as jurors:—

(i) Members of the Executive Council;

(ii) Members of Parliament;

(iii) Judges; members of the Land Court;

(iv) Ministers of religion; officers of the Salvation Army who are lawfully authorised to celebrate marriages; monks, nuns and other members under vows of any religious community which requires its members to be under vows and postulants for membership of such a community;

(v) Barristers-at-law, solicitors, and conveyancers, and their clerks;

(vi) Officers of His Majesty's navy or army or of the defence force of Australia on full pay;

(vii) Medical practitioners, dentists, pharmaceutical chemists, nurses, nursing aides and physiotherapists, all being duly registered or enrolled and in actual practice and members of any Ambulance Transport Brigade within the meaning of the Ambulance Services Act 1967-1975;
(viii) University professors and lecturers, registrars of universities, inspectors of schools, schoolmasters and schoolteachers actually employed as such, directors, principals, registrars and academic staff of colleges of advanced education, and principals, secretaries and instructional staff of rural training schools;

(ix) Permanent heads within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1922-1976 and any other persons who hold an office or a position in the public service of Queensland that is equal to or higher than such a permanent head;

(x) Persons employed in the Department of Justice;

(xa) Persons employed in the Prisons Department of the Probation and Parole Service;

(xb) Persons employed in the Police Department;

(xi) Masters and crews of vessels actually trading, and pilots duly licensed;

(xii) Mining managers and engine-drivers, all being actually employed as such;

(xiii) Officers of Parliament, household officers and servants of the Governor, the Chairman and other members of The Totalisator Administration Board of Queensland, and officers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations;
Members of Local Authorities;

Commercial travellers actually employed as such, and journalists bona fide actually employed in court reporting, and buyers, managers, and other persons who by reason of their employment in a primary industry are frequently required to travel outside the relevant jury district to remote places;

Persons who are blind, deaf, or dumb, or are of unsound mind or are otherwise incapacitated by disease or infirmity;

Female persons who have informed the sheriff, as prescribed by this Act, that they desire to be exempt from serving on any jury and whose exemption thus obtained continues in force as prescribed by this Act;

Aircraft pilots regularly employed as such on Australian aircraft used in a public aerial transport service;

members of a Fire Brigade provided and maintained pursuant to section 9 of the Fire Brigades Act 1964-1973;

Such other persons as are exempted from service on juries by the Governor in Council by Order in Council published in the Gazette.
Annexure "A" - continued

4.

(2) The Governor in Council may from time to time by Order in Council -

(i) Exempt any person, or any persons included in any class of persons, specified in the Order in Council from service on juries; or

(ii) Revoke or modify the exemption from service on juries prescribed in respect of any persons, or persons included in any class of persons, by an Order in Council under this subsection or by any provision of paragraphs (i) to (xix), both inclusive, of subsection one of this section.

An Order in Council under this subsection may limit the exemption from service on juries, or the revocation or modification of the exemption from service on juries, thereby prescribed to the time, or place, or time and place therein specified, and subsection one of this section shall, with respect to such an Order in Council, apply with and subject to all such adaptations as are necessary to give effect to any limitations specified therein.

Every Order in Council made under this subsection shall be published in the Gazette, and thereupon shall be judicially noticed and such publication shall be conclusive evidence of the matters contained therein.

While an Order in Council under this subsection remains in force any rule of court made in pursuance of section fifty-one hereof applies subject thereto and accordingly such a rule shall be of no effect to the extent to which it is inconsistent with such an Order in Council.
5.

Every Order in Council under this subsection shall be laid before Parliament within fourteen sitting days after the publication thereof in the Gazette, if Parliament is in session, and if not, then within fourteen sitting days after the commencement of the next session.

If Parliament passes a resolution of which notice has been given at any time within fourteen sitting days after any such Order in Council has been laid before Parliament disallowing the same, that Order in Council shall thereupon cease to have effect, but without prejudice to the validity of anything done in the meantime or to the making of a further Order in Council.

(3) A female person may, at any time (except while she is required to attend as a juror at the Court upon any day of the sittings in question of the Court) and from time to time by writing under her hand, inform the sheriff that she desires to be exempt from serving on any jury.

Upon receipt by the sheriff of such a writing the informant shall be exempt and, for so long as such exemption continues in force, shall continue to be exempt from serving on any jury within the jury district within which she was hitherto liable to so serve and within every other jury district within which she may thereafter be shown by the rolls or other records for the time being kept in accordance with the Elections Act 1915-1971 to reside.

An exemption obtained pursuant to this subsection shall continue in force for the period specified in the writing informing the sheriff as aforesaid and, if such a period is not specified, shall continue in force until the informant otherwise indicates as prescribed by subsection (6) of this section.
Annexure "A" - continued

6.

(4) Upon receipt by him of a writing referred to in subsection (3) of this section the sheriff shall forthwith strike out (but not obliterate) the name and other particulars of the informant from such of them the current jury list, the prospective jurors' list and the panel of jurors intended to be summoned as contain the informant's name and shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the informant's name does not, during the period her exemption continues in force, appear in a jury list, a prospective jurors' list or a panel of jurors intended to be summoned made or completed for his jury district after the date of the receipt by him of such writing.

(5) Where it appears to the sheriff that an exemption of a female person obtained pursuant to subsection (3) of this section is likely to continue to the next ensuing completion by the Principal Electoral Officer of a relevant roll or record in accordance with the Elections 1915-1971 or is of indefinite duration he shall notify that officer in writing that the female person in question is exempt from serving on any jury and the period of such exemption and thereupon the Principal Electoral Officer shall take all steps necessary to ensure that during the period of such exemption the name of the female person in question is not indicated by him or by the prescribed officer to the sheriff as the name of a person apparently qualified, and not exempt, to serve as a juror.

(6) A person exempted for an indefinite period from serving on any jury pursuant to subsection (3) of this section may, at any time, inform the sheriff by writing under her hand that she no longer desires to be so exempt and, if she does so, shall furnish to the sheriff such particulars as he may require of her for the purposes of this subsection.
If the sheriff is satisfied that the person in question is otherwise qualified and liable to serve as a juror he shall forthwith notify the Principal Electoral Officer that she is no longer exempt from serving on any jury and thereupon the Principal Electoral Officer shall take all steps necessary to ensure that such person's name is indicated on the copy (furnished by him or forwarded by the prescribed officer to the sheriff) of the relevant roll or other record completed or made next after the receipt by him from the sheriff of such notification as the name of a person apparently qualified, and not exempt, to serve as a juror.

As amended by Act of 1956, 5 Eliz. 2 No. 6, s.2; Act of 1967, No. 16, s.5; Act of 1972, No. 35, s.5; Act of 1976, No. 39, s.8; Act of 1978, No. 78, s.2.
ANNEXURE "B"

SCHEDULE 3.

PERSONS INELIGIBLE TO SERVE AS JURORS

1. Any person who is or has at any time within the last ten preceding years been -

   (a) a judge of the Supreme Court or of the County Court or the holder of any other judicial office;

   (b) a duly qualified legal practitioner;

   (c) employed by a duly qualified legal practitioner in connexion with the practice of the law;

   (d) a minister of religion, monk, nun or other vowed member of a religious community;

   (e) in receipt of a salary provision for which is or was made in the annual appropriations of the Attorney-General;

   (f) the Chief Commissioner of Police the Director-General of Social Welfare or the Chief Electoral Officer;

   (g) employed under the direction and control of the Chief Commissioner of Police or the Director-General of Social Welfare or in the Police Department or under the direction and control of the Chief Electoral Officer;

   (h) an honorary probation officer;

   (i) a justice of the peace;

   (j) employed as a Government shorthand writer licensed court reporter or in connexion with any court recording service.
ANNEXURE "C"

(Recommendation 3)

Section 2. Exemptions from Jury Service

(1) Prospective jurors may be exempt from serving on a jury if:

(a) they adhere to a religion or religious order which renders service as a juror incompatible with the beliefs or practices of the religion or order;

(b) serving as a juror will cause them serious hardships or loss to themselves or to others who are immediately relying on them;

(c) their serving as a juror would cause their employers exceptional hardship;

(d) serving as a juror would be contrary to the public interest because they perform essential and urgent services of public importance which cannot reasonably be rescheduled or cannot reasonably be performed by another and which are not ordinarily performed by another during their absence on vacation;

(e) they were called for jury duty at any time in the five preceding years;

(f) they are 65 years of age or over.
(2) The court, upon request of a prospective juror or on its own initiative, shall determine on the basis of information provided on the juror qualification form or interview with the prospective juror or other evidence whether the prospective juror should be excused from jury service.

(3) A person who is excused from jury service pursuant to paragraphs 2(1)(b), (c) or (d) shall have his or her name placed on the jury panel for the following year.